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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis project  is to  investigate the managerial behavior, the conflict of  interest as 
well as the flow of information in the financial markets, in particular in the setting around equity offerings. 
An Initial Public Offering (IPO)s represents a fertile testing ground for these topics as this event constitutes 
a  major  structural  change  in  the  life  of  a  company.  At  the  time  of  the  offering,  data  on  past  firm 
performance is very limited and the estimation of future cash flows very difficult. This is especially true in a 
dynamic environment of a young and fast growing company. Consequently, the asymmetric information, in 
this  context  the  difference  in  knowledge  of  the  firm  and  its  expected  future  performance  between 
managers and  insiders on the one hand and potential  investors / the market on the other hand, are very 
pronounced.  
This thesis project is divided into three chapters. Each chapter focuses on a specific problem setting 
and time period in relation to the equity offering.  
Chapter 1 tests and finds support for the hypothesis that shareholders pressure analysts to support 
the share price until the end of the lockup period1. The end of the lockup period of initial public offerings is 
of  particular  importance  to  insiders  as  this  time  period  generally  constitutes  the  first  time  corporate 
insiders  sell  significant numbers of  shares on  the market. Chapter 2  investigates  if  and  to which extent 
managerial  behavior,  its  private  information  and  its  potential  behavioral  biases  can  account  for  the 
underperformance phenomenon of companies in IPOs as well as Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). I test a 
behavioral  explanation,  the  Optimistic  Manager  Hypothesis,  and  rational  theories,  the  Window  of 
Opportunity Hypothesis as well as Empire Building Hypothesis. I find support that both optimistic managers 
as well privately informed managers help to explain the phenomenon of the long‐run underperformance of 
equity issues. Chapter 3 investigates why and to which extent companies pay out dividends prior to going 
public. We  find  support  for  the hypothesis  that pre‐IPO  shareholders use dividends as a means  to avoid 
sending a bad signal by selling a large number of secondary shares in the IPO. Furthermore, managers are 
actively managing their cash holdings prior the IPO. They fear the market undervalues the marginal dollar 
of  excess  cash  in  the  IPO  and  reduce  their  cash  holdings  accordingly.  We  reject  the  hypothesis  that 
managers pay out dividends  to  take advantage of a window of opportunity and strip  the company of  its 
hard assets before going public. 
    
                                                            
1 The lockup period is a voluntary agreement between the underwriter and corporate insiders not to sell 
shares without the consent of the underwriter during a set time period, in general 180 days, after the IPO. 
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Summary 
 
Chapter 1: Prop Ups during Lockups 
In chapter 1 I investigate the impact of the end of the lockup period on analyst behavior. The lockup 
period is a voluntary agreement between the underwriter and corporate insiders not to sell shares without 
the consent of the underwriter during a set time period, in general 180 days, after the IPO. Insiders refrain 
from selling shares during the IPO itself as they fear it will convey a negative signal to the market (Brau and 
Fawcett (2006)). Thus, the end of the IPO lockup period is the prime opportunity for corporate insiders to 
cash out  their  shares when  taking  a  company public.  Indeed, Brav  and Gompers  (2003)  observe  a high 
selling pressure by insiders after the end of the lockup period.  
Analysts are pressured both by  the pre‐IPO  shareholders, who want  to exit, and  the  investment 
banks,  which  seek  to  maintain  a  reputation  to  support  the  share  price  until  insiders  are  able  to  exit. 
Michaely  and Womack  (1999) demonstrate  that  analysts deviate  from  the  role  as  a neutral provider of 
information  for  investment  decisions  and  issue  overoptimistic  recommendations  for  IPOs.  Degeorge, 
Derrien and Womack (2007), as well as Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2009), show that even analysts 
unaffiliated  with  the  underwriting  syndicate  will  issue  biased  share  recommendations,  because  such  a 
behavior  increases their chances to be part of an underwriting syndicate  in the future. Aggarwal, Krigman 
and Womack (2002) develop a model in which insiders strategically underprice their IPOs in order to create 
price momentum which enables these insiders to exit at a superior share price after the end of the lockup 
period.  Surprisingly, however,  there  is  no  literature on  analyst  behavior  around  the  lockup period.  This 
chapter of my thesis tries to fill this gap. 
I develop the Prop Up during Lockups hypothesis, which argues that analysts behave strategically 
and prop up the share price until the end of the lockup period allowing insiders to exit on good terms. My 
hypothesis yields  four conjectures. First, analysts artificially support  the share price of an  IPO during  the 
lockup period. Hence, they will revise their recommendations significantly downward after the end of the 
lockup period. Second,  insiders of companies whose stock underperformed after the IPO will  increase the 
pressure on analysts to issue favorable recommendations. Consequently, the downward revision of analyst 
recommendations  after  the  end  of  the  lockup  period  will  be  especially  pronounced  for  these 
underperforming  companies.  Third,  analysts  issue  similar  recommendations  for  underperforming  and 
overperforming  companies  during  the  lockup  period.  Only  after  the  end  of  the  lockup  period  will 
underperforming  companies  receive  significantly  worse  recommendations  compared  to  overperforming 
companies. Fourth, the pressure on analysts to send a good signal to the market in the form of coverage of 
the IPO is only temporary. As a result, the coverage will decease after the end of the lockup period.  
This paper  finds evidence  that  is consistent with each of  these conjectures. Using U.S. data  from 
1995  through  2006  obtained  from  FirstCall,  SDC  Platinum,  CRSP  and  Thomson  Financial,  I  find  that  the 
probability  for  a  company  to  receive  a  strong buy  recommendation drops by  31%  after  the  end of  the 
lockup period. This finding supports my first conjecture. Consistent with the  incentives of the underwriter 
to  act  strategically,  affiliated  analysts  issue  even  more  optimistic  recommendations  during  the  lockup 
period.  This  results  in  an  additionally  15%  increased  probability  for  an  IPO  to  receive  a  strong  buy 
recommendation by an affiliated analyst during the lockup period compared to after the end of the lockup 
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period. Confirming the second conjecture, I find that underperforming companies have an additional 12.8% 
increased probability  to  receive a strong buy  recommendation during  the  lockup period. Consistent with 
the third conjecture, I observe no difference between underperforming and overperforming companies  in 
terms of analyst recommendations during the lockup period. However, this behavior changes after the end 
of  the  lockup  period,  when  analysts  issue  significantly  worse  recommendations  for  underperforming 
companies. Finally, I detect a significant drop in coverage in the 50 days following the lockup period, which 
provides support for my fourth conjecture.  
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Optimistic and Privately Informed Managers on 
Firm Performance and Corporate Decisions 
In  this  chapter,  I  aim  to  shed  light  on  if  and  to  which  extent  managerial  behavior,  its  private 
information  and  potential  behavioral  biases  can  explain  the  underperformance  phenomenon  of  equity 
offerings.  I derive  the  theoretical predictions  for  the behavior of  the managers both  from  the behavioral 
literature as well as from the rational expectations literature. Indeed, several models of these two schools 
of  thought can be  found  to offer very  similar predictions, which  seem plausible examined on  their own. 
However,  I  find  these  rivaling models  standing  in  stark  contrast  in  their  reasoning  to  each other, while 
trying  to  explain  the  same  economic  context.  I  test  as  a behavioral  explanation  the optimistic manager 
hypothesis and as rational theories the window of opportunity hypothesis as well as empire building. 
Recent  papers  in  the  behavioral  finance  literature  seek  to  investigate  the  effect  and  impact  of 
optimistic managers, referred to as managerial hubris by Roll (1986), on corporate decisions, for example 
Heaton (2002). An optimistic manager is defined as a manager who systematically overestimates good firm 
behavior  and  underestimates  bad  firm  behavior.  Thus,  while  believing  to  act  in  the  best  interest  of 
shareholders and the firm, the manager will  invest the proceeds of the offering  into suboptimal projects. 
However, the manager will believe in the profitability of the investments by the company.  
According to the Window of Opportunity Hypothesis, the manager is trying to time the market and 
to  take  advantage  of  his  private  information.  He  believes  that  the  market  overvalues  the  company 
compared  to  its real value. The company will return  from  its  inflated share price  to  its  true value on  the 
long  run,  resulting  in  a  long  term  underperformance  of  the  stock  price.  Thus,  the  offering  in  itself 
constitutes  a  positive  net  present  value  project  which  should  motivate  the  manager  to  maximize  the 
amount  of  proceeds. A  different motive  for  conducting  an  equity  offering  and  a  possible  cause  for  the 
underperformance arises  from  the agency  conflict between managers and  shareholders. Managers may, 
according to Jensen (1986), rationally maximize their private benefits at the expense of their shareholders. 
This  implies  that  the more  free  cash  the manager  is  able  to  raise during  the offering,  the more he  can 
channel away to  invest  in his pet projects and the worse the performance of the firm will be on the  long 
run.  I  identify the type of managers according to his trading behavior: optimistic managers believe  in the 
long  run  overperformance  of  their  companies  and  will  consequently  buy  shares.  Informed  managers 
believe,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  long  run  underperformance  of  the  company  and  will  therefore  sell 
shares.  I observe  the  trading behavior  in  three different  time periods:  trading  in  the period  six months 
before the equity issuance up to one day before the issuance. Trading during the equity offering, hence the 
selling  of  secondary  shares  or  the  signing  of  new  shares  at  the  time  of  the  offering  as  stated  in  the 
prospectus. As well as trading beginning from the end of the lockup period for a period of three months. In 
case I lack the exact duration of the lockup period, I assume a six month lockup period. 
This chapter seeks to contribute to the existing literature on several dimensions. First, I give for the 
first  time  empirical  evidence  of  the  impact  of  optimistic  managers  on  underperformance  of  IPOs 
respectively SEOs. Second, I show that the amount of free cash which both privately informed managers as 
well as optimistic managers are able to  invest helps to explain underperformance. Third,  I  investigate the 
change  in  firm  variables  such  as  debt  level,  cash  holding  and  capital  expenditure,  and  if  this  change  is 
consistent  with  the  predicted  behavior  for  each  type  of  manager.  I  employ  U.S.  data  of  companies 
undertaking either an IPO or a SEO from 1990 up to 2001. 
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Chapter 3: The Pre‐IPO Dividend Payment Puzzle 
Chapter 3 investigates the behavior of companies prior to their Initial Public Offering. It is joint work 
with Richard Zeckhauser. In May 2006, Burger King conducted an IPO. The company sold primary shares to 
raise 400 million USD  in new  funds. However,  three month before going public  in February 2006 Burger 
King paid out a dividend of 367 million USD to old shareholders. In addition, they paid 33 million USD to its 
senior management as compensation payment at  the same  time. This anecdote  illustrates  the puzzle we 
investigate  in  this  chapter:  Why  does  a  company  choose  to  pay  dividends  only  to  pay  fees  shortly 
afterwards to raise monies in an IPO? 
In particular, we examine  if and why managers pay out cash dividends prior to going public. Cash 
payouts prior to an IPO are particular puzzling as taxes on dividends were higher than capital gains prior to 
2003. In addition, raising monies in an equity is very costly for the company, both in terms of fees as well as 
money left on the table due to underpricing of the IPO. 
We find that these cash dividends prior to the IPO, either measured  in a three year or a one year 
window before the IPO, are significant in number and in economic value. 30% of all companies do pay out 
dividends  in  the three years prior to going public. On average, these companies pay out dividends worth 
20% of the money subsequently raised in the IPO. We see the impact of the 2003 tax act in our data as both 
the number of dividend payments prior  to  the offering as well as  the payout amount of  those dividends 
increases after 2003. 
We develop three potential hypotheses explaining this puzzle and test these subsequently on the 
data.   We  use U.S.  data  of  companies  going  public  between  1990  and  2006.  The  first  two  hypotheses 
involve the avoidance of negative signals. The third is the avoidance of insufficient valuation: cash on hand 
is undervalued in an IPO.  
We  find  evidence  that  pre‐IPO  shareholders  use  dividends  in  addition  to  secondary  shares  as  a 
means to exit the company before the  IPO  itself.  In such a way they are able to avoid sending a negative 
signal to the market by selling a large amount of secondary shares during the IPO itself. Managers split the 
amount they wish to sell in the IPO into secondary shares sold and dividends. They sidestep in such a way 
the appearance of having  lost the confidence  in the company. Accordingly, we find that pre‐IPO dividend 
payments help to explain the amount of secondary shares sold in the offering. 
The  second  hypothesis  conjectures  that managers  believe  their  company  to  be  in  a window  of 
opportunity.  In  this  scenario,  the manager will  take  advantage  of  the  temporarily  overvaluation  by  the 
market and  conduct an equity offering. Managers do not need  the  funds  from  the  IPO due  to a  lack of 
liquidity or for future investments. The IPO in itself constitutes the positive NPV project. However, potential 
investors might  raise  doubts  about  the  true motivation  for  the  IPO  if  the  company  has  already  a  high 
amount of excess cash prior to its IPO. Hence, the manager pays out dividends to lower the cash levels to 
avoid  sending  this  signal. After  the  IPO,  the  company will  eventually  revert  to  its  lower  true  value  and 
underperform  on  the  long  run.  However,  we  do  not  find  that  dividend  paying  companies  predict 
subsequent underperformance. Thus, we are able to reject that dividend payments are initiated as part of 
the Window of Opportunity Hypothesis. 
Our  third  hypothesis  predicts  that  the  market  is  too  focused  on  the  envisioned  future  growth 
opportunities of  the company going public  In such a setting,  the market  tends  to neglect  the amount of 
excess liquidity in the company, resulting in an undervaluation. Consequently, it is optimal for managers to 
‐ 8 ‐ 
 
reduce  the  undervalued  excess  cash  before  the  IPO  to  the  level  at which  it  is  valued  correctly  by  the 
market. We  find evidence  for  the undervaluation hypothesis. Even  though companies  that pay dividends 
prior to their IPO are bigger and have positive earnings, their cash holdings after dividends and before the 
IPO are remarkably similar to those of non‐dividend paying companies in absolute terms, both on average 
and  in the median. However, taking  into consideration the dividends already paid out, they would exhibit 
significantly larger cash holdings than non‐dividend paying companies. Normalizing cash holdings by assets 
in place yields a similar pattern as described above. In the next step we regress the impact of cash before 
the IPO on the valuation of the IPO at the offer day. We find that the coefficient of pre‐IPO cash holdings on 
Tobin’s Q at the  time of  the offering  is positive.   However,  its square  term  is negative. This supports  the 
hypothesis  that  the  value  of  each  additional  dollar  of  cash  on  the  balance  sheets  is  positive, whilst  its 
incremental value on the firm valuation is decreasing. Thus, by managing the cash and paying out dividends 
prior to the IPO, companies minimize wealth losses due to the undervaluation of excess cash. 
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I. Introduction 
The lockup period is a voluntary agreement between the underwriter and corporate insiders 
not to sell shares without the consent of the underwriter during a set time period, in general 180 
days, after the IPO. Insiders refrain from selling shares during the IPO itself as they fear it will 
convey a negative signal to the market (Brau and Fawcett (2006)). Thus, the end of the IPO lockup 
period is the prime opportunity for corporate insiders to cash out when taking a company public. 
Indeed, Brav and Gompers (2003) observe a high selling pressure by insiders after the end of the 
lockup period.  
Analysts are pressured both by the pre-IPO shareholders, who want to exit, and the 
investment banks, which seek to maintain a reputation to support the share price until insiders are 
able to exit. Michaely and Womack (1999) demonstrate that analysts deviate from the role as a 
neutral provider of information for investment decisions and issue overoptimistic recommendations 
for IPOs. Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2007), as well as Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm 
(2008), show that even analysts unaffiliated with the underwriting syndicate will issue biased shares 
recommendations, because such a behavior increases their chances to be part of an underwriting 
syndicate in the future. Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) develop a model in which insiders 
strategically underprice their IPOs in order to create price momentum which enables these insiders 
to exit at a superior share price after the end of the lockup period. Surprisingly, however, there is no 
literature on analyst behavior around the lockup period. This paper tries to fill this gap. 
I develop the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis, which argues that analysts behave 
strategically and prop up the share price until the end of the lockup period to allow insiders to exit 
on good terms. My hypothesis yields four conjectures. First, analysts artificially support the share 
price of an IPO during the lockup period. Hence, they will revise their recommendations 
significantly downward after the end of the lockup period. Second, insiders of companies whose 
stock underperformed after the IPO will increase the pressure on analysts to issue favorable 
recommendations. Consequently, the downward revision of analyst recommendations after the end 
of the lockup period will be especially pronounced for these underperforming companies. Third, 
analysts issue similar recommendations for underperforming and overperforming companies during 
the lockup period. Only after the end of the lockup period will underperforming companies receive 
significantly worse recommendations compared to overperforming companies. Fourth, the pressure 
on analysts to send a good signal to the market in the form of coverage of the IPO is only 
temporary. As a result, the coverage will decease after the end of the lockup period.  
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This paper finds evidence that is consistent with each of these conjectures. Using U.S. data 
from 1995 through 2006 obtained from FirstCall, SDC Platinum, CRSP and Thomson Financial, I 
find that the probability for a company to receive a strong buy recommendation drops by 31% after 
the end of the lockup period. This finding supports my first conjecture. Consistent with the 
incentives of the underwriter to act strategically, affiliated analysts issue even more optimistic 
recommendations during the lockup period. This results in an additionally 15% increased 
probability for an IPO to receive a strong buy recommendation by an affiliated analyst during the 
lockup period compared to after the end of the lockup period. Confirming the second conjecture, I 
find that underperforming companies have an additional 12.8% increased probability to receive a 
strong buy recommendation during the lockup period. Consistent with the third conjecture, I 
observe no difference between underperforming and overperforming companies in terms of analyst 
recommendations during the lockup period. However, this behavior changes after the end of the 
lockup period, when analysts issue significantly worse recommendations for underperforming 
companies. Finally, I detect a significant drop in coverage in the 50 days following the lockup 
period, which provides support for my fourth conjecture.  
These results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks. In particular, I test if this 
downward revision is due to a correction of the analysts’ optimistic bias (Rajan (1997)). Even after 
accounting for analysts’ learning, my results still hold. Furthermore, I find neither significant 
clustering of earnings announcements around the lockup period, nor particularly good earnings 
announcements at the end of the lockup period, which would be an indication that insiders 
themselves try to deceive analysts and push the share price of their company. Finally, the results 
hold in a subsample of firms with a lockup period different from 180 days, indicating that the event 
of the end the lockup period, and not the time period of 180 days after the IPO, is responsible for 
these downward revisions. 
Additional evidence supports a number of collateral predictions of my Prop up During 
Lockups hypothesis. I find that analysts affiliated with the lead-underwriter react to the ownership 
structure of the IPO. Affiliated analysts issue even more favorable recommendations for IPOs that 
are backed by a venture capitalist or with a very high concentration of managerial ownership during 
the lockup period. This is consistent with the view that these two groups of insiders have higher 
bargaining power. Venture capitalists are repeated players in the IPO business and managers decide 
on the partner for future investment banking business for the company. 
Other supporting evidence comes from the impact of changes in regulation. NYSE Rule 472, 
NASD Rule 2711, and the Global Settlement in 2002 were designed to enhance transparency of 
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analyst recommendations and aimed to reduce the potential conflict of interest. In the sample years 
after the new regulation, I find a significant decrease in the strength of analyst support. 
Concerning the market reaction to analysts’ recommendations, my Prop up During Lockups 
hypothesis is consistent with two alternative views. On the one hand, the market might be deceived 
by these propped up recommendations and weigh similarly recommendations issued before and 
after the end of the lockup period. On the other hand, a rational market might be able to recognize 
this scheme and discount overoptimistic recommendations, even more so for underperforming 
companies, during the lockup period. The evidence is mixed. I find that the market more highly 
values the information content of a downward revision for an underperforming company during the 
lockup period. However, I do not detect a difference in market reaction to analyst recommendations 
that have been issued during or after the lockup period. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the data sources. 
Section III elaborates the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis and shows the empirical results. 
Section IV observes patterns in analyst coverage around the lockup period. Section V investigates 
which groups of insiders (VC or managers) push for these biased analyst recommendations. Section 
VI explores the impact of new regulation and Section VII discusses several alternative hypotheses. 
Section VIII studies the market reaction. Section IX concludes 
II. Data sources and descriptive statistics 
My sample consists of companies conducting an initial public offering (IPO) and issuing 
common class A shares from the years 1996 until 2006, as recorded in the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) database. All firms must be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) or NASDAQ subsequent to their offering.  
Consistent with previous research I omit unit offerings, real estate investment trusts 
(REITS), American depository receipts (ADRs), closed-end mutual funds, financial companies and 
utilities. Consistent with IPO literature (Ritter and Zhang (2007)), I also drop all offerings with an 
offer price of less than $5 as well as firms for which information on the lockup period is missing. 
From SDC I obtain the offer price, length of the lockup period, insider ownership at the time of the 
offering, and primary and secondary shares offered. Stock returns, share volume traded and shares 
outstanding are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  
In a second step I match the analysts’ recommendation history from the FirstCall database to 
the sample firms1. The FirstCall database includes the analyst recommendations on a 1 (strong buy) 
to 5 (strong sell) scale, the analyst’s prior recommendation, the exact time of the recommendation, 
                                                 
1 Of these files of analysts recommendations I omit those records marked as deleted as recommended by FirstCall 
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his affiliation, and the ticker symbol and name of the company he is evaluating. I have to restrict my 
sample to the years 1996 through 2006, because information of the FirstCall database on analyst 
recommendations for earlier years is sporadic. Throughout the paper, I partition the analyst 
recommendations into two distinct time periods. The first time period, which I will subsequently 
call during the lockup period, includes analyst recommendations beginning from the issue day until 
one day before the end of the lockup period. The second time period, in the following called after 
the lockup period, includes analyst recommendations issued from the end of the lockup period until 
50 calendar days thereafter. I chose a period of 50 calendar days in order to measure the differences 
in analyst behavior directly after the lockup period while allowing a buffer period during which 
analysts formulate and issue their new recommendations. I recalculate all my results with an 
alternative time period of 30 calendar days after the lockup period, which yields similar results.  
I group all recommendations published according to the type of analyst affiliation: lead-
manager, co-manager or non-affiliated analysts. I retrieve information about the lead-manager and 
co-manager from the SDC files and match these with the FirstCall database. I consider an analyst to 
be affiliated if the analyst is working for a bank affiliated with the underwriting syndicate or for a 
corporate group in which at least one bank is affiliated with the underwriting syndicate2. I screen 
the data for possible errors such as inconsistencies in primary and secondary shares offered, the 
resulting proceeds, number of shares outstanding, missing or wrong sales, firms classified 
incorrectly as high tech firms, and analyst recommendation which are higher than 5. I use third-
party sources, for example as provided by Jay Ritter (2006), to correct my sample. To calculate the 
underwriting reputation I employ the Carter and Monaster (1990) rank updated by Jay Ritter. 
For each of the sample firms I collect insider trading data from Thomson Financial, which in 
turn obtains insider trading records published by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). I 
examine all open market transactions following the end of the lockup period for 50 calendar days. I 
define managers as employees in the following position: CEO, COO, CFO, CIO, CTO and 
(Executive-)Vice President. As insiders I define managers plus officers and directors of a company. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for this sample. After losing companies due to 
missing CRSP variables, missing information on the lockup period, and other restrictions as 
described in this section, my sample consists of 1,128 firms. Of these companies, roughly half (689) 
were backed by venture capitalists. Two thirds of the IPOs issue only primary shares3, which 
indicates that in most cases these insiders refrain from selling shares in the IPO itself. The vast 
                                                 
2 In this analysis I take all mergers in the investment banking world into account as reported in Morrison and Wilhelm 
(2007) 
3 Primary shares are shares newly issued during a public offering. Secondary shares refer to already existing shares. In 
an IPO, proceeds from primary shares go to the company, whereas proceeds raised from selling secondary shares go to 
existing shareholders. 
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majority of funds raised derive from primary shares. Only 8% of the proceeds went to existing 
shareholders from the sale of secondary shares. The length of the lockup period is highly 
concentrated with 91% of the companies in my sample having a lockup period of 180 days. 
INSERT Table 1 HERE 
The lockup period and insider selling 
The lockup period is a voluntary agreement between the underwriter and pre-IPO 
shareholders not to sell shares without the consent of the underwriter during a set time period, 
usually 180 days after the IPO. Not only are insiders barred from selling shares on the open market, 
this agreement prohibits insider from offering, contracting to sell, short selling or in any way 
reducing their ownership stake (Bartlett (1995)) in the company without the consent of the 
underwriter. Field and Hanka (2001) conclude that selling locked up shares is a rare event. They 
observe that 1% of firms in their sample announce an early release and 6% of the companies 
disclose that at least one insider was allowed to sell locked up shares. Consistent with their findings, 
I see an economically insignificant amount of insider trades during the lockup period. As the vast 
majority of insiders tends to refrain from selling secondary shares during the offering, and is unable 
to do so during the lockup period, the end of the lockup period thus constitutes the first opportunity 
for insiders to sell on the open market. 
Consistent with Brau, Lambson and McQuenn (2005) and Brav and Gompers (2003), I find 
that insiders tend to sell shares as soon as the lockup period is over. I look into every open market 
transaction by insiders and determine whether they have sold or bought shares. The sell-to-buy ratio 
in dollar terms is 35 to 1, which is much larger than the average sell-to-buy ratio over the life of the 
company. When calculating this ratio for my sample firms three years after the IPO, this figure 
drops to 7 to 1. Indeed, research on insider trading shows that insider sales on average outnumber 
insider purchases over the long horizon with a sell–to-buy ratio of 3 to 1 (Seyhun (1998)). Figure 1 
illustrates these findings. As shown in Table 2, in the 50 days following the end of the lockup 
period managers, directors and officers sold shares worth $2,800,000, 6% in terms of the median 
proceeds raised during the IPO. In the same period this group bought only shares worth $83,000. To 
investigate all trades by insiders recorded by the SEC, I add large owners of company stock as well 
as other individuals with possibly access to non-public, price relevant information4. For this group, I 
see an increase in shares sold totaling $7,400,000, 16% in terms of the median proceeds raised 
during the IPO. In contrast, shares worth only $203,400 are bought in the same time period.  
                                                 
4 All trades which are registered by the SEC forms 3, 4, 5 and 144  
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INSERT Table 2 HERE  
III. The Prop up During Lockups hypothesis and its 
predictions 
The share price after the end of the lockup period is of particular importance to insiders, as 
they tend to divest at this time. Indeed, Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) develop a model 
and show empirically that insiders strategically underprice IPOs in order to exit at favorable terms 
after the lockup period. They argue that underpericing creates price momentum which supports and 
pushes the share price of the IPO upwards until insiders are allowed to exit at the end of the lockup 
period. Starting with Michaely and Womack (1999), the literature has shown that analysts may cater 
to companies by issuing more favorable recommendations than is justified by purely economical 
arguments. Michaely and Womack (1999) show that this bias is observable in the recommendations 
issued by analysts affiliated with the underwriting syndicate. Degeorge, Derrien and Womack 
(2007) develop the currying favor hypothesis and find evidence, supported as well by Bradley, 
Jordan and Ritter (2008), that the issuance of overoptimistic recommendations extends to non-
affiliated analysts as well. Similarly Hong and Kubik (2003) find that brokerage houses encourage 
their analysts to issue optimistic recommendations in order to increase trading. However, overly 
overoptimistic recommendations for their clients come at a cost to both analysts and their 
investment banks in terms of loss of credibility. An analyst fears that loss of credibility will hurt his 
career as clients and the market will discount his recommendations. If the analyst’s 
recommendations are discounted by market participants, he has less impact on the market and the 
investor community, and is therefore less valuable for his employer and his clients. Furthermore, an 
aspiring or current all-star analyst will fear that poorly judged recommendations will hurt his 
chances to be elected as an all-star analyst5 the next year6. 
I hypothesize that analysts will try to support the share price of a company for two possible 
reasons: because of pressure by insiders and large shareholders who want t o exit at favorable terms 
as well as because the investment bank wants to maintain a reputation for propping up stocks until 
insiders are allowed to sell to attract future business. As this support is costly for the reputation of 
the analyst, the analyst will revert to his true beliefs as soon as insiders have had the opportunity to 
sell and hence reduce the insider’s pressure on the bank to prop up the share price. This argument 
yields the first testable prediction of the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis. 
                                                 
5 The Investment Dealer Digest organizes once a year a poll in which buy side analysts and customers vote on the 
quality of analysts. The best in each field is elected into a team of all-star analysts. 
6 Members from the Institutional Investor All American Research Team are found to supply more accurate 
recommendations (Stickel (1992)) 
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Prediction I:  Analyst recommendations before the end of the lockup period are significantly 
better than recommendations after the lockup period 
Taking Prediction 1 to the data, I find strong support for the Prop up During Lockups 
hypothesis. The mean recommendation during the lockup period is 1.86 (on a scale of 1=strong buy 
to 5=strong sell), which is significantly lower than the mean recommendation after the end of the 
lockup of 2.23, as reported in Table 3. This trend of downward revisions is observable for affiliated 
as well as non-affiliated analysts 
INSERT Table 3 HERE 
Following I investigate the change in the distribution of analysts’ recommendations before 
and after the lockup period. Figure 2 illustrates this change. I detect a shift from strong buy and buy 
recommendations during the lockup period towards hold recommendations after the end of the 
lockup period. I observe a sharp decline of the issuance of strong buy (buy) recommendations from 
39% (41%) of all recommendations issued before the end of the lockup period to 32% (35%) after 
the end of the lockup period. Additionally, I observe a 69% increase (from 16% to 27%) in hold 
recommendations after the end of the lockup period. 
INSERT Figure 2 HERE 
This difference in recommendations between the two time periods is significantly (at the 1% 
level) more pronounced for lead-manager affiliated analysts than for co-manager affiliated analysts, 
and least pronounced for non-affiliated analysts (see Table 3). To further investigate the change of 
recommendations by type of analyst affiliation, I compare each distribution by affiliation in Figures 
3a, 3b and 3c. Analysts affiliated with the lead manager exhibit the strongest tendency to revise 
their strong buy recommendation (issued during the lockup period) downwards to a hold 
recommendation after the end of the lockup period. Accordingly, this group displays the most 
pronounced increase of 89% in hold recommendations after the end of the lockup period. 
INSERT Figures 3 HERE 
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Next, I move away from the average recommendation issued during the observed time 
period and focus on the recommendations issued closest around the end of the lockup period. I 
compare the last recommendation before the end of the lockup period to the first recommendation 
after its end. Table 3 shows that these changes are large and significant at the 1% level, which 
underlines the impact of the end of the lockup period on analyst behavior. As shown in Figure 4, I 
detect a sharp decrease in strong buy recommendations and an increase in hold recommendations 
after the end of the lockup period. 
INSERT Figure 4 HERE 
To test this prediction in a multivariate regression analysis, which I present in Table 4, I 
employ four different specifications. In Model 1, I run an ordered probit regression with a lockup 
dummy variable (lockup_ended), standard firm control variables as independent variables and the 
analyst recommendation (rec) as the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
(1)
 
Here, reci (1,2,3,4,5) represents the possible type of recommendation issued by the analyst, ui is the 
normally distributed error term and lockup_ended is a dummy variable taking the value one if the 
analyst issued the recommendation after the end of the lockup period and zero otherwise.  
As predicted by the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis, the lockup_ended dummy variable 
is positive and significant at the 1% level. As FirstCall records the analyst recommendation on a 1 
(strong buy) to 5 (strong sell) scale, the positive coefficient is revealing the downward revision of 
analyst recommendations after the lockup period. This downward revision is especially pronounced 
for analysts affiliated with the lead manager, documented by the significant and negative coefficient 
of the dummy variable lockup ended x lead manager7. The regression furthermore reveals that lead 
affiliated analysts issue significant better recommendations than non-affiliated analysts during the 
entire sample period. Holding the other control variables constant at their mean, the probability of 
receiving a strong buy (=1 in the FirstCall database) recommendation after the lockup period 
decreases by 31%. The probability to receive a strong buy recommendation after the end of the 
lockup period by an analyst affiliated with the lead manager is furthermore decreased by an 
                                                 
7 The dummy variable lockup ended x lead manager equals 1 if the analyst is affiliated with the lead manager and the 
recommendation has been issued after the end of the lockup period, 0 otherwise. 
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additional 15%. The probability of getting a good recommendation, defined as a buy or a strong buy 
recommendation, drops by 13% points after the end of the lockup period. The ordered probit 
regression model computes the error terms and hence the significance of my regression coefficients 
on the assumption of the normality of the sample distribution. As a robustness check for the 
observed significance of the coefficients, I relax this assumption and recalculate my regression 
using the bootstrapping methodology. Instead of assuming a specific theoretical distribution of the 
underlying population, the bootstrapping methodology uses the observed sample to calculate the 
underlying distribution and thus the standard errors (Efron (1979), Davison and Hinkley (1997)). I 
proceed as follows: My dataset contains N observations. From these I draw randomly N 
observations with replacements. With this new dataset I now calculate my estimator and the 
statistics. I repeat the resampling and the subsequent calculation of the estimator 1000 times. I then 
use the following formula to calculate the standard error of my coefficients (as shown in Hall and 
Wilson (1991)): 
ݏෞ݁ ൌ ቎
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Here k represents the number of repetitions and θ෠୧ the statistics of the i
th bootstrap sample.  
The results using the bootstrapping methodology remain highly significant as shown in 
Model 2 in Table 4 which supports my earlier results and validates the use of the oprobit model. To 
account for both seasonal and industry effects, I add additional control variables such as a bubble-
period dummy and industry dummies based on the 2-digit SIC code. The results are robust as 
shown in Model 3. I find that during the bubble period analysts issued significantly better 
recommendations. Nevertheless, the impact of the lockup period remains highly significant for the 
whole sample. As a robustness check, I want to see whether these results are possibly driven by 
small firms. These suffer from large information asymmetries and have very few analysts following 
(hence with very few analyst observations). I restrict my sample in Model 4 to companies with at 
least 5 analyst recommendations during the sample period. The results remain highly significant and 
are consistent with the findings for the entire sample. To furthermore test the sensitivity of these 
results, I rerun these regressions with alternative dependent variables. First, I keep only the last 
recommendation of an analyst before the end and the first recommendation after the end of the 
lockup period as the dependent variable. In this way, I only capture the change in recommendation 
directly around the end of the lockup period. Alternatively, I use the difference in analyst 
recommendation to the analyst consensus as the dependent variable. The results remain significant 
in both alternative specifications (not shown).  
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INSERT Table 4 HERE 
The lockup period, company performance and analyst incentives 
In this section I discuss the different incentives analysts face during and after the lockup 
period of a company. On the one hand, analysts want to build and maintain a reputation in the 
market. This implies issuing precise recommendations according to their true beliefs about a firm 
and its economic outlook. On the other hand, analysts are exposed to pressure of varying magnitude 
to support the stock to please their clients. Although managers and large owners would always 
prefer to receive strong buy recommendations, they will attach special importance to favorable 
analyst coverage if they plan to sell shares of the company in the near future 
In the following I describe two different scenarios to illustrate the changing pressure on 
analysts. In Scenario I, Company A performed poorly since its IPO. Insiders pressure the analyst to 
support the company stock by issuing overly optimistic recommendations, which are contrary to his 
true beliefs. The analyst’s career concern incentive and currying favor incentive are thus 
conflicting. He has now two possibilities: the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis predicts that he 
will yield to the pressure and issue overly-optimistic recommendations. If he adheres, on the other 
hand, to his career concern incentives, he will issue recommendations according to his true beliefs, 
which are worse than those demanded by insiders. The pressure by insiders eases as soon as they 
had the possibility to sell their equity. Hence, from this point in time, the career concern incentive 
prevails and analysts issue their true recommendation. Analysts behaving according to the Prop up 
During Lockups hypothesis will subsequently revise their recommendations downward to the level 
consistent with their true beliefs. 
In contrast, in Scenario II the stock price performance of company B is positive after its 
IPO. Insiders are happy with the performance and will put less pressure on the analysts to support 
the share price with too optimistic recommendations. In this setting, the career concern incentive 
prevails and the analyst’s recommendation will represent to a large extent his true beliefs. After the 
lockup period ends and insiders have the opportunity to divest from the company and existing 
pressure by insiders eases. The analyst will follow his career concern incentive and issue 
recommendations according to his true beliefs.  
Figure 5 illustrates the above described two scenarios, from which I derive two separate 
testable predictions. 
INSERT Figure 5 HERE 
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Prediction II:  Comparing recommendations during and after the lockup period, analysts will 
revise their recommendations downwards to a higher degree for underperforming 
firms than for overperforming firms. 
 
Prediction III:  Analysts will issue qualitatively similar recommendations for under- and 
overperforming companies during the lockup period, and afterwards issue 
significantly worse recommendations for underperforming companies. 
 
To test Prediction II of the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis, I divide my sample into 
performance tertiles. The buy and hold return is measured from the closing price of the offering day 
through the day prior to each recommendation. I subsequently benchmark the buy-and hold return 
against the equally weighted market index. As a robustness check, I use a variety of different 
performance measures. The results remain stable. Next, I measure the mean analyst 
recommendation for each tertile before and after the end of the lockup period. The results, as shown 
in Table 5, support Prediction II of the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis. The difference of the 
analyst recommendation for the overperforming tertile of 1.78 before the lockup period compared to 
2.01 after the lockup period is significantly smaller than the downward revision for the 
underperforming tertile: for this tertile, the mean recommendation drops from 1.77 to 2.13, 
approximately 30% larger than the downward revision of the overperforming companies. This 
finding is consistent whether I use mean recommendation during the sample period or focus on the 
closest recommendations around the end of the lockup period.  
INSERT Table 5 HERE 
Next, I test Prediction II with the following ordered probit regression. 
(2)
Here i (1,2,3,4,5) represents the possible type of recommendation issued by the analyst and ui is 
normally distributed, lockup_ended is a dummy variable taking the value one if the analyst issued 
the recommendation after the end of the lockup period and zero otherwise. The crossproduct 
variable lockup_dummy x underperformance tertile equals one if the lockup has ended and the 
company belongs to the tertile with the worst share price performance, and equals zero otherwise. 
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To account for a possible econometric miscomputation when using an interaction term 
including a dummy variable in a probit model, I adjust the marginal effects for this interaction term 
using the methodology proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) and Powers (2005). I find the coefficient 
on the variable lockup_dummy x underperformance tertile to be highly significant (at the 1 % level) 
and positive, which supports my reasoning. The marginal effects reveal that firms have a 12.8% 
point lower probability to receive a strong buy recommendation after the lockup period. Companies 
belonging to the worst performance tertile have an additional 10.6 % point lower chance to receive 
a strong buy recommendation after the lockup period. The significance of these results holds 
whether I calculate the buy-and-hold return performance benchmarked against the equal weighted 
CRSP market return, starting at the closing price at the offer day until the midpoint of the lockup 
period (Model 1), or if I calculate the performance until the day prior to each recommendation 
(Model 2). The results of both performance measurement alternatives are shown in Table 6.  
INSERT Table 6 HERE 
I now test Prediction III, which conjectures that analysts following underperforming stocks 
tend to imitate the behavior of analysts following overperforming stocks up until the end of the 
lockup period. During the lockup period, the analyst will state his true positive belief or only issue 
only slightly biased recommendations for the overperformer. In contrast, the analyst is supporting 
strongly the share price of the underperformer. Hence, one cannot statistically discern a difference 
between these two groups. After the end of the lockup period, analysts will issue recommendations 
according to their true beliefs for both types of companies. In the case of the underperforming 
company, the analyst will switch from highly inflated recommendations to recommendations 
according to his true belief after the lockup period has ended. Alternatively the analyst will reveal 
bad news for the company only after insiders were able to exit. This results in a strong downward 
revision of his recommendations and to a significant difference in recommendations between the 
over- and underperforming firms after the end of the lockup period. Table 5 supports the above 
reasoning. In line with Prediction III of the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis, this gap between 
analyst recommendations between over- and underperformer widens from -0.01 (Underperformer 
1.77 - Overperformer 1.78) during the lockup period to 0.11 (Underperformer 2.13 - Overperformer 
2.02) in the period after the end of the lockup period. 
To test if these descriptive statistics hold in a multivariate regression setting, I run the 
following probit models: I first split my sample into two groups whether recommendations have 
been issued before or after the end of the lockup period. Subsequently, I create tertiles according to 
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the share performance. I measure the buy and hold return from the end of the first trading day 
through the mid-point of the lockup period. I choose this measurement period on the one hand to 
give the market, the issuer and the involved banks sufficient data on the share performance to 
determine a trend of the past performance (and enough time for the issuer to worry about the 
performance and pressure the investment bank for support). On the other hand, it leaves the analysts 
enough time to react to this pressure (I rerun this regression with a multitude of different periods, all 
yielding the same results). I run the ordered probit model once on the sample containing the 
analysts’ recommendations before the end of the lockup period (3) and a second time on the 
recommendations after the end of the lockup period (4), as shown below.  
 
 
 
(3)
 
 
 
 
(4)
Here i (1,2,3,4,5) represents the possible types of recommendation issued by the analyst and ui is 
normally distributed. 
 
Consistent with the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis, the coefficient of the 
underperformer tertile in Table 7 is insignificant (compared to the overperformer tertile which was 
left out of the regression). Hence, the recommendations issued during the lockup period for 
underperforming companies are qualitative similar and are statistically indifferent from those issued 
for the overperforming tertile. However, for recommendations issued after the end of the lockup 
period, I observe a highly significant negative coefficient of the underperformer tertile. Thus, in 
contrast to the period during the lockup period, underperforming companies are getting significantly 
worse recommendations than overperforming companies after the end of the lockup period. 
INSERT Table 7 HERE 
IV. Analyst coverage around the end of the lockup period 
I now turn my attention to the number of analysts starting (and stopping) coverage of the 
newly issued firms. The market perceives an increase in analyst coverage as a good signal. For 
example, Das, Guo and Zhang (2006) show that IPOs with high analyst coverage yield better 
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returns than IPOs with less coverage. Given the positive reaction by the market, companies might 
try to increase the number of analysts following their IPO. Indeed, Cliff and Denis (2004) 
demonstrate that companies conducting an IPO try to boost coverage by underpricing the equity 
offering.  
However, taking into consideration analysts’ time constraint and the fact that the average 
analyst consequently covers only about 10 companies (Boni and Womack (2006)), increasing the 
number of covered companies is costly and has an upper limit. An analyst who is pressured into 
covering the stock after the IPO to convey a positive signal to the market, but does not believe in 
the positive outlook of the company, will consequently see this commitment as only temporary. He 
will seek to avoid the time consuming process of collecting and processing of information as soon 
as he is permitted. Thus, the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis predicts that coverage will be 
sustained only until insiders are able to cash out after the end of the lockup period. In addition, 
McNichols and O'Brien (1997) show that analysts adding coverage of a company are bullish about 
this economic outlook and bearish if they drop coverage. Thus, analysts feeling bearish about the 
company and would like to drop coverage are aware that stopping coverage conveys a bad signal to 
the market. The Prop up During Lockups hypothesis predicts that analysts will convey this bad 
signal only after the end of the lockup period. 
 
Prediction IV:  The coverage by analysts for an IPO will drop after the end of the lockup period 
 
Thus, if the analyst was pressured by his employer into taking up coverage or he himself 
became bearish after voluntarily taking up coverage, I expect to find a significant clustering of 
analysts dropping coverage after the end of the lockup period.  
INSERT Figure 7 HERE 
Figure 7 illustrates the predicted discontinuity around the end of the lockup period. I observe 
a sharp (and significant at the 1% level using the Kruskal-Wallis test) spike in the number of 
analysts dropping coverage8 following the end of the lockup period. Following this spike in the 
reduction of coverage, I detect a decrease in the number of analysts dropping coverage. Thus, 
equivalent to the pattern thed downward revisions after the end of the lock period, I detect a large 
drop in coverage after the end of the lockup period. 
                                                 
8 A drop of coverage is hereby defined if a given broker does not issue a new recommendation for more than 180 days 
as reported by the FirstCall database 
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V. Specific groups of insiders 
The previous sections show that analysts cater to insiders in IPOs by offering biased 
recommendations. In this section I investigate if a specific group of insiders is prone to receive this 
service. I investigate two groups of stakeholders, both having a strong interest in a positive share 
price performance around the end of the lockup period. In addition, both groups have a considerable 
lever on the investment banks. One group consists of management, directors and possibly founders 
working in the company. This group of insiders chooses the future path of the company, including 
follow-on investment business such as SEOs and mergers and acquisitions, and decides which 
investment bank will accompany them on this track. Thus, knowing that this group will bring 
follow-on business, investment banks might be tempted to cater to the needs of these insiders and 
attempt to ensure that they are content with the business relationship. Venture capitalists (VCs) are 
a second group of stakeholders with a special interest in a good share price performance after the 
lockup period. VCs which use an IPO as an exit strategy do so by redistributing their shares back to 
their limited partner at the end of the lockup period. The performance of the investment of the VCn 
and hence his fees, is calculated from the time of the investment until the shares are transferred to 
the limited partner. Hence the VC has a very keen interest to have a favorable share price at the end 
of the lockup period. VCs have a different type of leverage on investment banks compared to 
entrenched managers: instead of directing the future business course of the company they are 
currently bringing public, VCs are repetitive players in the IPO market. IPO underwriting is a very 
lucrative business, generating substantial fees of around 7% of the proceeds raised (Chen and Ritter 
(2000), which does not even include any kickbacks after the IPO. Consequently, investment banks 
have a large incentive to retain these VCs as customers for future deals.  
To test if either one of these two groups is particularly prone to receive these biased 
recommendations, I run the below ordered probit model with analyst recommendations as the 
dependent variable. As right hand side variables I add a interaction variable if an IPO is backed by a 
VC, the lockup period has ended and if the analyst is affiliated with the lead manager. As a proxy 
for the strength of management leverage over the investment bank I split my sample into quartiles 
according to the degree of management ownership concentration before the IPO (obtained via SDC) 
and interact this variable with both the end of lockup variable and the type of affiliation by the 
analyst.  
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Here i (1,2,3,4,5) represents the possible type of recommendation issued by the analyst and ui is 
normally distributed. 
 
As shown in Table 8, I find that neither VCs nor large ownership levels by management 
significantly increase the bias in analyst recommendations per se. However, both VCs and 
companies with high insider concentration profit from their leverage on the lead-manager. Analyst 
affiliated with the lead-manager revise their recommendations significantly stronger downward for 
both interest groups.  
INSERT Table 8 HERE 
VI. The impact of stricter regulation  
In wake of the corporate scandals of 2001-2002 such as Worldcom, GlobalCrossing or 
Enron, the U.S. government decided to impose new regulations to increase accounting standards, 
transparency of analyst recommendations and reduce the possibility of fraud. In 2002, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) was introduced. As a consequence of the congressional “Analyzing the Analyst” 
hearings in 2001, both the NASD and the NYSE issued new regulations affecting basically every 
sell-side analysts and brokerage houses doing business in the U.S. These two sets of regulation were 
enacted in July 2002 in form of NASD Rule 2711 and the amendment of NYSE Rule 472. An 
article in the Wall Street Journal describing an alleged misconduct by analysts within the 
investment banking industry initiated an investigation by the New York Attorney General. This 
inquiry uncovered several cases in which analysts yielded to internal pressure in investment banks 
by issuing favorable investment recommendations, even though internal e-mails showed the 
analyst’s true private beliefs to be less than positive about potential of the company. This 
investigation led to the Global settlement between initially ten investment banks9 and the Attorney 
General, which was subsequently announced in December 2002. The involved investment banks 
were fined a total of $1.435 billion and accepted new regulation to curb inappropriate influence of 
investment banking departments on analysts within banks. 
The new regulation affected different aspects of the position of the analyst within the 
investment bank and the transparency of analysts’ output. In order to prevent analysts from being 
                                                 
9 The ten investments banks involved in the Global settlement 2002 were Bear Stearns & Co. LLC, Citigroup Global 
Markets, Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., Goldman Sachs, J. P. Morgan Chase & Co., Lehman Brothers Inc., Merrill 
Lynch & Co., Morgan Stanley, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Salomon Smith Barney, UBS Warburg LLC. and U.S. Bancorp 
Piper Jeffray with Deutsche Bank and Thomas Weisel agreeing on the settlement two years later in 2004.  
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pressured by investment bankers to issue too favorable appraisals in order to gain new business, 
investment banks were forced to establish “Chinese walls”. These sought to separate the analyst and 
investment banking departments. Furthermore, the budget allocation decision to analyst 
departments had to be independent from specific fees generated by the investment banking 
department. Analysts were furthermore prohibited to accompany the investment banker to clients to 
deliver pitches as well as to participate on roadshows with clients and investment bankers. 
Additionally, the quiet period has been increased from 25 to 40 days. Historical ratings by the 
banks’ analysts had to be made available to investors. 
Overall, these new regulations increased the scrutiny with which the media and markets 
were able to observe analyst behavior, reduced the pressure on the analyst by investment bankers 
and made it more difficult to issue biased recommendations in order to positively influence the 
market. Recent papers, such as Bartov and Cohen (2008) as well as Koh, Matsumoto and Rajgopal 
(2008), find a distinctive difference in earnings management and analyst behavior between the pre- 
and post-regulation era. 
The Prop up During Lockups hypothesis argues that analysts are pressured to issue 
knowingly upward biased recommendations. Consequently, the passing of tougher regulation and 
increased scrutiny lead to two testable hypotheses. Fewer biased recommendations will result in, on 
average, worse recommendations for newly issued companies. Additionally, if analysts are less 
willing to booster the stock price of a company up until the end of the lockup period, I expect to 
detect a less severe downward revision of recommendation by analysts after the end of the lockup 
period.  
INSERT Table 9 HERE 
I add in the oprobit regression as additional right hand side variables a dummy variable 
regulation, equaling one after the new regulation was ebacted, as well as an interaction term of 
regulation and the end of the lockup period. The regulation variable in Table 9 is positive at the 1% 
level significant, indicating that analysts issue on average worse and thus less over-optimistic 
recommendations after the new regulation has been passed. This finding is consistent with earlier 
literature such as Kadan, Madureira, Wang and Zach (2008). Interestingly, the interaction 
coefficient of the post-regulation period with the lockup ended variable is significantly negative. 
Thus, after the new regulation has taken effect, I see a less severe downward revision of analyst 
recommendations after the lockup period. This is consistent with the prediction by the Prop up 
During Lockups hypothesis. Due to the new, stricter regulation, analysts are less willing to support 
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insiders with overoptimistic recommendations during the lockup period. Consequently, analysts 
revise their recommendation downward to a lesser degree after the end of the lockup period. It has 
to be noted, however, that I still detect a significant, albeit weaker, negative revision after the end of 
the lockup period. Hence, even after the new regulation has been in place, I still observe that analyst 
prop up shares during the lockup period.  
 
VII. Robustness Checks 
In this section I present and test competing hypotheses which have similar predictions as the 
Prop up During Lockups hypothesis and hence offer an alternative explanation for the results 
presented in this paper 
A. Updating beliefs 
Rajan (1997) argues that analysts are on average too optimistic about a company at the 
moment they initiate coverage. Only with time do analysts learn about the lower true value of the 
company and thus continuously downgrade their recommendations towards the real value of the 
firm. This implies that the end of the lockup period per se is no significant event during this 
downgrading process and should thus have no additional impact on the analysts’ recommendations. 
As a testable prediction of this hypothesis, I expect a continuous downward revision for each 
recommendation issued by the analyst over time, independent of the firm performance and the 
lockup period. 
The difference of the recommendations before and after the end of the lockup period, as 
shown in Table 3, as well as the significance of the end of the lockup dummy variable in Table 4, 
are predicted by this alternative hypothesis. The difference in recommendation derives from the 
division of my sample into two consecutive time periods: the time period during the lockup period 
and the time period after the end of the lockup period. According to the learning hypothesis, the 
average recommendation during the lockup period has been issued earlier and is thus more 
optimistic than the recommendations issued after the lockup period.  
However, I find that this alternative hypothesis does not substitute the Prop up During 
Lockups hypothesis. The first evidence contradicting this alternative hypothesis, in particular the 
prediction that the event “end of the lockup period” has no significant impact, can be found by 
comparing Figure 2 to Figure 4. The magnitude of the shift in distribution from strong buy 
recommendation during the lockup period to hold recommendation after the end of the lockup 
period is very similar for the sample containing all the recommendations to the sample focusing on 
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the last recommendation before to the first recommendation after the lockup. Thus, the difference 
between the recommendations is largely captured around the end of the lockup period and is hence 
not due to a continuous updating by analysts. Additional evidence for the discontinuity of analyst 
behavior around this time period is the number of analyst following the company. I do not detect a 
continuous pattern in analyst coverage from the IPO onwards as predicted by this competing 
hypothesis. Rather do I detect a large spike in the number of analysts dropping the coverage of 
companies shortly after the lockup period (as shown in Figure 7). This pattern underlines the unique 
impact of the end of the lockup period in analyst behavior and strongly supports the Prop up During 
Lockups hypothesis.  
As a second test I modify the probit model run in Table 4 by adding a right hand side 
variable accounting for analyst’ learning in form of counting the previous number of 
recommendations issued for the firm.  
INSERT Table 10 HERE 
If analysts continuously downgrade their opinion with each recommendation from a too 
optimistic starting point, this counting variable will capture all significance of this downgrading and 
hence the learning. The end of the lookup period, on the other side, should not constitute a special 
event. Consequently, the lockup ended dummy variable should lose its significance. However, I find 
that the lockup ended dummy remains highly significant as shown in Table 10, even after including 
the count variable. This result shows that, while analysts may be too optimistic at the time of the 
IPO, they still revise their recommendation downward after the end of the lockup period. 
Calculating the marginal effects, I find that the end of the lockup period reduces probability of 
receiving a strong buy recommendation by 25.6% after the end of the lockup period, even after 
controlling for analyst learning. This finding supports the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis. 
B. Earnings announcements around the lockup period 
The Prop up During Lockups hypothesis states that analysts issue too optimistic 
recommendations to enable insiders to cash out at favorable stock prices. However, instead of 
putting pressure on analysts, the company itself could try to influence the market by issuing too 
optimistic earnings or release an over-optimistic earnings outlook at the end of the lockup period. 
Thus, the attempt to influence the market to provide a good exit for insiders might originate from 
the company and not from the analyst. In such a setting, analysts would be merely manipulated into 
issuing too optimistic recommendations up to the end of the lockup period. The company will 
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release only more realistic future outlook and earnings after the end of the lockup period. This drop 
in earning will cause the analysts to revise their recommendations downward.  
This alternative theory predicts a significant decrease in earnings per share (or alternatively 
a decrease in growth of earnings) after the end of the lockup period, which would in turn account 
for the downward bias in analyst recommendations illustrated in this paper. To test this theory, I 
obtain the date of the quarterly earnings announcement releases together with the quarterly earnings 
per share (EPS) as reported from Compustat (variable epsfiq). Table 11 displays the mean and the 
median of the diluted EPS of three earnings announcements before up to three earnings 
announcements after the end of the lockup period. Both, median and mean EPS, increase slightly 
over this time period (from 0.05 up to 0.07 for the average). The mean EPS of the first earnings 
announcement after the end of the lockup of -0.01 (median 0.05) dollars do not significantly differ 
from the last reported EPS before the end of the lockup period of -0.03 (median 0.06) dollar, as a 
non-parametrical Kruskal-Wallis test confirms. 
INSERT Table 11 HERE 
Firms furthermore do not exhibit to cluster their earnings announcements around the end of 
the lockup period. Out of 1,008 companies, only 173 (17%) release their earnings in the 30 days 
around the end of the lockup period. Focusing on these companies, I investigate the change in EPS 
around the lockup period in the same fashion as before. As illustrated in Table 12, I discover indeed 
a local maximum in the EPS at the end of the lockup period. However, while I find this maximum 
to be significant in the mean, the magnitude of this difference in EPS disappears largely, together 
with its significance, when I focus on the median. I consequently conclude that this difference is 
largely drive by outliers and is not inherent in the majority of my sample firms. 
INSERT Table 12 HERE 
In total, the investigation of the earnings releases around the end of the lockup period shows 
that companies do not exhibit pronounced higher earnings around the lockup period in order to 
manipulate analysts to issue biased recommendations.  
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C. Investigating the variation in the length of the lockup period 
The vast majority, more than 90%, of my sample firms has a lockup period duration of 
exactly 180 days. Thus, one might argue that the 180 days after the IPO constitutes a special event 
which drives the downward revision by analysts instead of the end of the lockup period. To 
investigate this possible explanation, I focus on the companies which have a lockup period different 
from 180 days. For these companies I am able to disentangle the potential 180 days effect and the 
end of lockup effect on analyst recommendation. For this subsample, I run a panel data probit 
regression on the probability of receiving a good recommendation. I add to my set of right hand side 
variables a dummy variable to take into account if a recommendation has been issued after 180 
days.  
INSERT Table 13 HERE 
While the end of the lockup ended dummy remains highly significant at the 1% level, the 
180 days dummy variables shows no statistical significance as shown by Table 13. Thus, I conclude 
that the end of the lockup period is indeed causing the observed downward revision in analyst 
recommendation. 
VIII. The market reaction 
In this section I investigate the market reaction to analyst recommendations around the 
lockup period. If the analysts have been issuing booster shots during the lockup period and return to 
issuing recommendations according to their own true belief afterwards, downgrades after the 
lookup period have less informational content. This is especially pronounced for underperforming 
firms, which, according to the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis, exhibit a particularly strong 
predictable downward revision after the end of the lockup period.  
If the market learns from past analyst behavior and thus anticipates the analyst behavior, it 
will react less strongly to sell recommendations after the end of the lockup period than during the 
lockup period. However, even if the market is fully rational, investors may not learn that analyst 
issue continuously strategically distorted recommendations, as shown by Benabou and Laroque 
(1992).  To test empirically the market reaction, I calculate the cumulative market adjusted 
abnormal returns (CMAR) starting one day before the recommendation until the day after the 
recommendation has been issued. I benchmark these returns against the CRSP equal-weighted-
market return. Table 14 displays the market return in relation to past share price performance and in 
relation to whether the analyst’ recommendation has been issued before or after the end of the 
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lockup period. Panel A shows the market reaction to downgrades, Panel B for upgrades by analysts. 
I define an upgrade as a positive change in recommendation, for example from buy to strong buy, 
by a given analyst in comparison to his previous recommendation, and vice versa for downgrades. 
Panel A highlights a remarkable difference in market reaction whether the downgrade has been 
issued before or after the lockup period. I find that the market reacts on average less negatively to 
downgrades for underperforming companies after the end of the lockup period (median minus 
6.6%) compared to during the lockup period (median minus 14.9%). In contrast, the market reacts 
to downgrades of overperforming companies more strongly with an increase in the median market 
reaction from -4.4% to -6.0%. The Prop up During Lockups hypothesis predicts upgrades to be 
more informative after the lockup period, because they represent the true beliefs by the analysts. 
Consistently, as revealed by a Kruskal-Wallis test, I find that the market reacts significantly more 
positively to an upgrade after the lockup period than to an upgrade during the lockup period. 
INSERT Table 14 HERE 
However, the market discounts only downward and upwards revisions by the same analyst. 
Comparing the market reaction to the level of recommendation (buy, hold, etc.) during the lockup 
period compared to after the end of the lockup period, I find no difference in magnitude.  
 
IX.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the behavior of analysts around the lockup period. For a sample of 
IPOs going public either on the NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE from 1996 through 2005, I find that 
analysts issue significantly better recommendations during the lockup period. I argue that insiders, 
who fall under the lockup agreement, pressure analysts to issue upward biased recommendations 
until insiders are allowed to sell shares on the open market. In addition, the investment bank may 
pressure the analyst in order to keep up a reputation of propping up shares in the lockup period. 
Consistent with the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis, I find a significant downward revision by 
analyst recommendation after the end of the lockup period. This downward revision is even more 
pronounced for analysts affiliated with the lead manager. I predict that insiders will be more 
concerned and thus exercise more pressure if their firm has underperformed since its IPO. Dividing 
my sample into performance tertiles I find indeed that analysts’ downgrades after the end of the 
lockup period are significantly more pronounced for recent underperforming firms than for those 
overperforming. This difference in pressure exercised by insiders leads to an additional testable 
- 36 - 
prediction. During the lockup period, analysts following underperforming stocks tend to imitate the 
behavior of analysts following overperforming stocks. Statistically, one cannot discern a difference 
between these two groups. Only after the end of the lockup period, when insider pressure eases, I 
detect significantly worse recommendations for underperforming companies in comparison to 
overperforming ones. 
Which insiders are responsible for this systematic bias in recommendations? Ordered probit 
regressions show that IPOs backed by venture capital, or in which ownership is very concentrated, 
are more likely to receive optimistic recommendations during the lockup period.  
The fact that an analyst is starting coverage (dropping) coverage sends a good (bad) signal to 
the market. Thus, the Prop up During Lockups hypothesis also predicts a strong increase in 
coverage during the IPO and a cluster of analysts dropping coverage after the end of the lockup 
period. The data confirms this pattern. 
The market is only partly aware of this bias in analyst revisions for underperforming 
companies. The price reaction to downgrades by the same analyst after the end of the lockup period 
is less severe than to downgrades before the end of the lockup period. However, the market reaction 
to analyst recommendations issued during or after the lockup period is indifferent. 
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Appendix A: Why  do  insiders  not  sell  secondary  shares  during  the 
IPO?  
Even though insiders and shareholders are theoretically able to significantly reduce their 
equity stake in the company during an IPO by issuing a large amount of secondary shares, they 
generally refrain from doing so. Insiders fear that selling a large number of secondary shares during 
the IPO will send a bad signal to the market as Leland and Pyle (1977) as well as Brau and Fawcett 
(2006) point out. Consequently, managers believe that they could realize only a lower and thus 
worse offer price. Additionally, the literature offers alternative explanations why insiders would 
optimally sell shares only after the lockup period: insiders can use underpricing to create 
momentum for the share price as described by Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002). 
Alternatively, they might use the IPO as a marketing tool as shown by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) 
as well as Demers and Lewellen (2003). In these cases insiders would leave money at the table if 
they would sell own shares at the offer price, as the offer price has been knowingly set too low.  
Appendix B: Robustness Checks 
In this section I want to account for the potential sensitivity of my results to performance 
measurement methodologies as well as to the time frames in which the performance has been 
measured. I test several different time horizons to calculate the firm performance. First, I select two 
different starting points: the day of the offering as well as ten days after the offer date. I chose the 
latter point in time to avoid the impact of the IPO underpricing. I recalculate the performance 
window with these starting points in combination with different time lengths, which I selected in 
relation to the timing of the analyst recommendation as well as in relation to the ending of the 
lockup period. I include time periods ending at the midpoint of the lockup period, the end of the 
lockup period, up to ten days before the end of the lockup period, 50 days after the lockup period, 
one day before the analyst recommendation as well as 10 days before the analyst recommendation 
has been issued. I moreover benchmark these different buy and hold returns against the equally 
weighted market portfolio, the value weighted market portfolio and, alternatively, take the raw 
returns. These robustness checks reveal that the results are stable across these different 
methodologies (not shown). 
As a second robustness check I specify which analysts issue recommendations at which 
point in time. Instead of regressing my sample on each analyst recommendation for the whole time 
period, I rerun my tests focusing on the revision around the lockup period. I take only the first 
recommendation after the end of the lockup period minus the last recommendation before the end of 
the lockup period into consideration. Furthermore, I look into the potential differences whether 
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these recommendations around the end of the lockup period have been issued by a lead manager 
affiliated, a co-manager affiliated, non-affiliated analyst or any analyst. Again, my results are 
similar to those presented earlier.  
Additionally, I interpret an analyst’ recommendation in different ways. Next to the five point 
scale offered by the FirstCall Database and used in this paper, I calculate the difference of the 
current recommendation with a) the prior recommendation b) the analyst consensus (average 
recommendation for this company) up to the issuance of the current recommendation. I split these 
recommendation measures into quintiles according to their magnitude and according to the type of 
analyst. As a further alternative I reduce the 5 point scale into a binary scale: Good 
Recommendations (1 or 2 in the FirstCall database) versus Bad Recommendations (3, 4 of 5 in the 
FirstCall Database) as well as Very Good Recommendations (1 in the FirstCall database) versus Bad 
Recommendations (2, 3, 4 of 5 in the FirstCall Database). I find qualitative similar results with each 
of these measurements (not shown). 
To avoid seasonal influences and effects of specific time periods such as the bubble period 
1998-2000, I create and add time fixed effetcs. The results remain the same (not shown). 
 
Appendix C: Econometric Comments 
In the paper I use the ordered probit model for my analysis. Analysts are issuing their 
recommendations on a scale of 1 to 5. As the differences between these categories, for example 2 = 
buy to 3 = hold, differs between brokers, I have to treat these answers as numbers on an ordinal 
scale. Thus my choice of the ordered probit model as the econometric model. An ordered probit 
regression is equivalent to running J-1 (with J the number of possible outcomes on an ordinal scale) 
binary regressions with constant slope coefficients for each regression. This results in the parallel 
regression assumption (Long and Freese (2006) p.197) on which the ordered probit model is based. 
However, the log-likelihood ratio test refutes this assumption for several variables of the data. 
Additionally, a Wald test as proposed by Brant (1990) examining the parallel regression assumption 
on each variable, shows that some variables violate the parallel regression assumption.  
To address this issue, I rerun my regressions using a different methodology. The generalized 
ordered logit model avoids the parallel regression assumption (Greene (2003)). Instead of assuming 
identical regression coefficients for all J-1 regressions as the ordered probit or ordered logit model, 
the generalized ordered logit model10 allows the coefficients to vary for each single regression. 
                                                 
10 I employ the gologit2 command by Williams (2005) 
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However, in contrast to a multinomial logit model, it is possible to relax only those 
coefficients from the parallel regression assumption which violate it. The other coefficients are held 
constant.  In addition,  Peterson (2008) investigates the accuracy of standard errors in panel data 
sets for widely used econometrical approaches popular in the finance literature. He demonstrates 
significant biases for several methodologies and strongly urges to account for a possible 
dependency in residuals. Otherwise, he warns, standard models are having a tendency to 
overestimate the significance of the regression coefficients. Taking up his suggestions, I allow for a 
correlation of analyst coverage and recommendations for a given firm by clustering the error terms 
on the firm level. As robustness check, I additional cluster, as a second level, the error term of the 
recommendations by the same analyst for a given firm. Rerunning my regressions using this 
technique shows results very similar to those calculated by the ordered probit model. 
Adding fixed effects to an ordered probit model in a panel data setting raises serious 
econometric issues, which have not yet been solved by the profession. Trying to obtain fixed effects 
by inserting dummy variables when using probit models will trigger the incidental parameter 
problem. In a first attempt to avoid these problems and to investigate the impact of fixed effects on 
my data, I rerun my regressions with panel data conditional logit regression model using fixed 
effects. This type of model has been developed by Andersen (1970) and Chamberlain (1980) to 
circumvent the incidental parameter problem. However, to be able to apply this model, I have to 
reduce the analyst’ recommendation from a five point scale ranging from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (strong 
sell) to a binary recommendation scale consisting of good recommendations (which include 
recommendation 1 and 2) and hold/sell recommendations (including recommendation 3, 4 and 5). 
Having in such a way created a binary outcome of the analyst recommendation, I am now able to 
employ a panel data fixed effect conditional logit regression. Rerunning all regressions with this 
technique yields very similar results, which emphasizes the robustness of my earlier presented 
results and conclusions. 
  
- 43 - 
 
Figure 1: Selling pressure after the end of the lockup period, three years after the IPO and in the average firm 
This table compares the sell-to-buy ratio of insider after the end of the lockup period, three years after the IPO 
as well as for U.S. companies in general. The sell-to-buy is calculated by the number of insider sells divided by 
insiders buys from the end of the lockup period up to 50 days thereafter. I include IPOs which went public from 
1995 - 2006 and were subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as reported by the SDC 
database. I exclude REITS, utilities and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price 
below $5. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database. 
Insider trading is obtained from Thompson Financial. Insider trading three years after the IPO consists of 
insiders of my sample firms trading three years after the IPO. The insider trading in general sell to buy ratio is 
taken from Seyhun (1998) and describes the average insider trading ratio for U.S. firms. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of analyst recommendation during and after the lockup period 
This histogram shows the frequency of analyst recommendations (on a 1 (=Strong Buy) to 5 (=Strong Sell) scale). 
Each bar denotes the percentage points the respective recommendation has been issued in comparison to all 
recommendations issued during this time period. The recommendations are divided into two time periods: 
recommendations issued after the quiet period until the end of the lockup period and recommendations issued 
from the day of the end of the lockup period up until 50 days later. The sample consists of IPOs which went 
public from 1995 - 2006 and were subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. I exclude 
REITS, utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price below $5. 
Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well as 
lockup period information on SDC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
during lockup period after end of lockup period
P
er
ce
nt
Analyst recommendation
 
- 45 - 
 
0
50
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
during lockup period after end of lockup period
P
er
ce
nt
Non-affiliated analyst recommendation
 
Figure 3c
Figures 3a, b, c: Distribution of analyst recommendation during and after the lockup period per type of 
affiliation 
Histograms of the analyst recommendations (on a 1 (=Strong Buy) to 5 (=Strong Sell) scale) with each bar 
denoting the frequency in percent this recommendation has been issued in comparison to all recommendations 
issued in this time period. Figure 3a shows the recommendations by Lead Manager affiliated analysts, Figure 3b 
the recommendations by Co-Manager affiliated analysts and Figure 3c the recommendations by non-affiliated 
analysts. The recommendations are divided into two time periods: recommendations issued after the quiet 
period until the end of the lockup period and recommendations issued from the day of the end of the lockup 
period up until 50 days later. The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1995 - 2006 and were 
subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. I exclude REITS, utilities, ADRs and financial 
institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price below $5. Companies have to have information 
on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well as lockup period information on SDC. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of the last analyst recommendation before the lockup period compared to the first 
recommendation after the end of the lockup period 
Figure 4a shows the distribution of the last recommendation issued before the end of the lockup period and 
Figure 4b the distribution of the first recommendation issued after the end of the lockup period. 
Recommendations are issued on a 1 (=Strong Buy) to 5 (=Strong Sell) scale. The sample consists of IPOs which 
went public from 1995 - 2006 and were subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. I 
exclude REITS, utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price 
below $5. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as 
well as lockup period information on SDC. 
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Figure 5: Prediction II and Prediction III of the Prop Up During Lockups hypothesis in relation to firm performance and analyst recommendations 
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Figure 6: Timing of the start of coverage by analysts in respect to the end of the quiet period  
The start of broker coverage is defined as the first recommendation of a broker for a given company. Data on 
analyst recommendation is obtained from FirstCall. Distance in days from the end of the quiet period is the 
difference in days of the date of analyst recommendation minus the date of the end of the quiet date as reported 
by SDC. The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1995 - 2006 and were subsequently registered 
either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. I exclude REITS, utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I 
furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price below $5. Companies have to have information on shares 
outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well as lockup period information on SDC. 
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Figure 7:  Analyst stopping coverage around the end of the lockup period 
The end of broker coverage is defined if a broker did not issue a new recommendation for at least one year for a 
given company. Data on analyst coverage is obtained from FirstCall. Distance in days from the end of the lockup 
period is the difference in days of the date of analyst recommendation minus the date of the end of the lockup 
date as reported by SDC. I focus on the end of broker coverage events in the +/- 150 period around the end of the 
lockup period. The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1995 - 2006 and were subsequently 
registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. I exclude REITS, utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I 
furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price below $5. Companies have to have information on shares 
outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well as lockup period information on SDC. A Kruskal-
Wallis test reveals that the difference in number of analysts stopping coverage around the end of the lockup test 
is highly significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
Obs Mean Median Minimum Maximum Interquartile Range
Panel A Proceeds 1'232 82 m$ 45 m$ 4 m$ 4'600 m$ 48 m$
Firm size 1'017 340 m$ 180 m$ 13 m$ 10'000 m$ 260 m$
Length of lockup 
period 1'232 185 180 90 730 0
VC backing 542
% of insider 
ownership 1'082 45% 46% 0% 100% 32%
Panel B
Shares offered in IPO 
as % of total shares 
outstanding after IPO
1'150 32% 26% 0% 501% 16%
Primary shares 
offered 1'206 4'494'845 3'350'000 400'000 46'000'000 2'610'000
Primary shares as % 
shares offered 1'206 92% 100% 8% 100% 11%
Secondary shares 
offered 423 3'402'234 0 12'000 200'000'000 1'369'310
The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1996 - 2006 and subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or
AMEX as reported by the SDC database. I exclude REITS, ADRs and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an
offer price below 5 $. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well
as lockup period information on SDC. 
Panel A reports the firm characteristics of the offering companies. Proceeds are shown in million $. Firm size is calculated with the
Compustat variables "Shares outstanding" * "Share Price" as reported on the day of the offering by CRSP and shown in million $.
Length of lockup period is measured in days. % of insider ownership represents the percentage of the company owned by
managers (as reported by SDC) before the IPO. 
Panel B shows the amount and type of shares offered during the IPO. Shares offered in IPO as % of total shares outstanding after
IPO measures the relation of shares offered during the IPO to the total amount of shares outstanding after the offering. Primary 
shares as % shares offered measures the ratio of primary shares offered in the IPO to the total amount of shares offered (primary
plus secondary shares) in the IPO. Data is obtained from SDC
Shares outstanding 
after the offering 1'154 23'000'000 15'000'000 648'848 490'000'000 17'000'000
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Table 2: Insider trading after the IPO  
 
Total
Obs Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Interquartile 
Range Obs Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Interquartile 
Range Mean
Value of total shares 
traded by insiders 
after lockup period
809 -$3'348'249 $0 -$730'000'000 $8'283'228 $0 423 -$1'975'502 $0 -$150'000'000 $45'000'000 $154'535 -$2'876'924
Value of shares sold 
by insiders  after 
lockup period
809 $3'418'803 $0 $0 $8'283'228 $0 423 $2'091'080 $0 $0 $150'000'000 $156'450 $2'962'937
Value of shares 
bought by insiders 
after lockup period
809 $66'459 $0 $0 $730'000'000 $0 423 $115'578 $0 $0 $45'000'000 $0 $83'324
Value of all  shares 
traded after lockup 
period
809 -$7'403'011 $0 -$2'500'000'000 $50'000'000 $0 423 -$7'352'248 $0 -$1'000'000'000 $45'000'000 $198'000 -$7'385'582
Value of all  shares 
sold after lockup 
period
809 $7'641'631 $0 $0 $2'500'000'000 $11'750 423 $7'494'194 $0 $0 $1'000'000'000 $209'904 $7'591'009
Value of all  shares 
bought after lockup 
period
809 $234'526 $0 $0 $50'000'000 $0 423 $141'946 $0 $0 $45'000'000 $0 $202'739
No Secondary Shares Sold in IPO  Secondary Shares Sold in IPO
The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1996 - 2005 and subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as reported by the SDC database. I exclude REITS, utilities, reverse LBOs, spinoffs, ADRs
and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price below 5 $. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well as lockup period information on
SDC. 
This table reports the dollar value of ihe shares traded by insiders beginning with the lockup period for 50 days, depending on whether secondary shares were issued during the IPO. Insiders are defined as CEO, COO, CFO, CIO,
CTO, Executive-Vice President, plus officers and directors. All traded shares, all shares sold and all shares bought incorporate every trade recorded in the Thompson Insider Trading database. 
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Table 3: Analyst recommendations during and after the lockup period
 
  
Analyst affiliation
during lockup 
period 
after lockup 
period
Difference after - 
before
Lead manager # 342 167
mean 1.85 2.23 0.38 ***
1.81 0.36 ***
2.17
Co-manager # 670 350
mean 1.85 2.09 0.24 ***
1.81 0.20 **
2.01
Non-affiliated # 1,348 1,193
mean 1.86 2.04 0.18 ***
1.75 0.24 ***
1.99
All analysts # 2,360 1,710
mean 1.86 2.06 0.20 ***
1.78 0.24 ***
2.02
last recommendation before lockup
first recommendation after lockup
first recommendation after lockup
last recommendation before lockup
Recommendations issued
Analyst recommendation (on a 1 (=Strong Buy) to 5 (=Strong Sell) scale) by analyst
affiliation (Lead manager – Co-manager – Non-affiliated - All Analysts) to the
investment bank organizing the IPO. We show the mean of the recommendations
issued during the lockup period (after the quiet period until the end of the lockup period)
and after the lockup period ended (recommendations issued from the day of the end of
the lockup period and 50 days following) with # describing the number of
recommendations issued. The last recommendation before lockup lists the last
recommendation by an analyst before the end of the lockup period. First 
recommendation after lockup shows the first recommendation issued by an analyst
after the lockup period has expired. The sample consists of IPOs which went public
from 1995 - 2006 and were subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or
AMEX. I exclude REITS, utilities, reverse LBOs, spinoffs, ADRs and financial
institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price below 5 $. 
last recommendation before lockup
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows signif icant differences between the groups at the *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%) 
confidence level.
last recommendation before lockup
first recommendation after lockup
first recommendation after lockup
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Table 4: Ordered probit regression highlighting the change in analyst' recommendations around the end of the 
lockup period 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
                
Lockup ended            0.369***         0.369***         0.373***          0.260***
(10.41) (10.31) (10.43) (6.24)
Lockup ended x lead manager            0.225**         0.225**         0.232** 0.168
(2.34) (2.4) (2.37) (1.45)
Underwriter rank          0.027**          0.027**          0.020*           0.065***
(2.28) 2.32 (1.68) (4.6)
Lead manager         -0.093**         -0.093**         -0.103**         -0.127** 
-(2.04) -1.98 -(2.26) -(2.27)
Co-manager 0.049 0.049 0.042 -0.036
                (1.52) 1.45 (1.27) -(0.91)
log_size                 0.121***          0.121***          0.145*** 0.022
                (6.85) 7.13 (7.06) (1.02)
NASDAQ          0.08 0.08 0.034 0.133
                (0.56) 0.56 (0.23) (0.76)
NYSE            0.196 0.196 0.169 0.263
                (1.33) 1.35 (1.11) (1.46)
Primary shares in % of shares offered 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
                (0.76) 0.75 (1.37) (1.54)
Proceeds          0.001***          0.001***          0.000**          0.001***
                (4.11) 4.12 (2.27) (3.96)
# Lead managers          0.225***          0.225***          0.211***          0.202***
                (6.25) 6.19 (5.38) (5.37)
Bubble          -0.154***
-(4.27)
SIC 2 Digit dummy No No Yes No
R-squared       0.044 0,044 0.055 0.034
N               6596 6596 6593 4215
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Ordered probit model regression with analyst recommendations as the dependent variable. Model 1 uses standard firm control
variables. Model 2 uses the bootstrap methodology to calculate the standard errors of the coefficients. Model 3 additionally controls for
the bubble period during 1999 and 2000 as well as for the industry in terms of the 2 digit SIC codes. Model 4 omits firms with less than
5 analyst recommendations.
Lockup ended is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the recommendation was issued after the end of the lockup period. Underwriter rank
is the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriting reputation rank as updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). Lead manager equals 1 if
the recommendation has been issued by a lead-underwriter. Lockup ended x lead manager is a dummy variably equaling 1 if the
analyst affiliated with the lead manager and the recommendation has been issued after the end of the lockup period. Co-manager 
equals 1 if the recommendation has been issued by a analyst affiliated with a co-managing bank in the IPO process. Log_size 
represents the log of the market capitalization as calculated by the shares outstanding after the offering (obtained from CRSP)
multiplied with the share price at the end of the offering day (obtained from SDC). Primary shares in % of shares offered is the ratio of
primary shares offered divided by the total amount of shares (=primary plus secondary) offered during the IPO. Proceeds is the
amount in dollars of the total shares offered during the offering (SDC). VC is a dummy variable if the offering was backed by a venture
capitalist (SDC). # Lead managers (# Co-managers ) represents the number of lead manager (co-managers) during the IPO process.
Bubble is a dummy variables equaling 1 during the years 1999 and 2000. We include recommendations by analysts in the time period
starting from the date of the offering up to 50 days after the lockup period has ended.  
The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1996 - 2006 and subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX
as reported by the SDC database. I exclude REITS, utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an
offer price below $5. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well as
lockup period information on SDC. The number of lead managers and co-managers are taken from the SDC database. Analyst
recommendations are taken from FirstCall, insider trading from Thompson Financial. The t-values are shown in brackets below the
coefficients.
dependent variable: analyst recommendation
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Table 5: Impact of underperforming companies and the end of the lockup period on analyst recommendation 
 
  
Under- 
performance
Over- 
performance Total
Difference Under - 
Overperformance
Panel A N 1'709 1'696 5'159
mean 1.77 1.78 1.76 -0.01
N 321 333 930
mean 2.13 2.02 2.04 0.11**
Panel B N 685 771 674
mean 1.69 1.65 1.73 0.04
N 213 183 203
mean 2.15 2.01 1.91 0.14***
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
last recommendation 
before end of lockup
first recommendation 
after end of lockup
Difference before - 
after lockup
Average recommendation (on a 1 (=Strong Buy) to 5 (=Strong Sell) scale) by analyst affiliation (Lead manager – Co-
manager – Non-affiliated) to the investment bank organizing the IPO. Panel A shows the average recommendation
from the IPO up to the end of the lockup period as well as from the end of the lockup period for 50 days. In Panel B I
show the last recommendation before the end of the lockup period and the first recommendation after the lockup period
expired. The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1995 - 2006 and were subsequently registered either at
the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. I split the sample into terciles according to their stock buy-and-hold return from time of
the day after the offering up to one day before each recommendation (benchmarked against the equally weighted
market portfolio). The significance of the differences between the groups is calculated using a Kruskal-Wallis equality-
of-populations rank test.
mean recommendation 
before end of lockup
mean recommendation 
after end of lockup
0.24***0.36***
Difference before - 
after lockup 0.46*** 0.36**
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        Table 6: Average recommendation around the lockup period by past firm performance   
   
Model 1 Model 2
         0.169**                  
(2.26)                  
        -0.154**                  
-(2.07)                  
-0.019                  
-(0.97)                  
         0.284***
(3.89)
-0.09
-(1.27)
-0.013
-(0.79)
Lockup ended          0.387***          0.338***
(6.91) (6.39)
Underwriter rank          0.022*           0.022*  
(1.95) (1.94)
Underpricing         -0.058*  -0.019
                -(1.73) -(0.5)
Lead-manager -0.059 -0.059
                -(1.43) -(1.42)
Co-manager 0.049 0.043
                (1.51) (1.31)
log_size                 0.129***          0.133***
                (6.08) (6.27)
NASDAQ          0.08 0.076
                (0.57) (0.53)
NYSE            0.224 0.218
                (1.53) (1.47)
Primary shares in % of shares offered 0 0
                (0.3) (0.48)
Proceeds             0.001***          0.001***
                (3.73) (3.57)
VC                       0.078**          0.078** 
                (2.56) (2.55)
# Lead managers          0.233***          0.237***
                (6.4) (6.53)
# Co-managers         -0.010***         -0.010***
                -6.2 -6.22
R-squared       0.0465 0.0431
N               6590 6596
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
underperformance up to mid of lockup period x 
lockup_ended
overperformance up to mid of lockup period x 
lockup_ended
overperformance up to mid of lockup period
dependent variable:                     
Dependent variable is the current analyst recommendation, issued on a 1 (=Strong Buy) to 5 (=Strong
Sell) scale and obtained from the FirstCall database. I add the crossproduct lockup_ended (=1 if
lockup period has ended, 0 otherwise) x underperforming tercile, the crossproduct lockup_ended x
overperforming tercile as well as the performance variable itself. In Model 1 I measure the
performance as the buy-and-hold return from the end of the offer day up to the midpoint of the lockup
period, benchmarked against the equally weighted CRSP market return. In Model 2 I calculate the buy-
and-hold return from the offer day up to one day prior to the recommendation date.
Additional control variables are: Underwriter rank is the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriting
reputation rank as updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). Underpricing , measured as the difference
between the closing price of the first trading day minus the offer price. Lead manager equals 1 if the
recommendation has been issued by a lead-underwriter, Co-manager equals 1 if the recommendation
has been issued by an analyst affiliated with a co-managing bank in the IPO process. Log_size 
represents the log of the market capitalization as calculated by the shares outstanding after the
offering (obtained from CRSP) multiplied with the share price at the end of the offering day (obtained
from CRSP). Primary shares in % of shares offered is the ratio of primary shares offered divided by
the total amount of shares (=primary plus secondary) offered during the IPO. Proceeds is the amount
in dollars of the total shares offered during the offering (SDC). VC is a dummy variable if the offering
was backed by a venture capitalist (obtained from SDC). We include recommendations by analysts in
the time period starting from the date of the offering up to 50 days after the end of the lockup period.
The t-values are shown in brackets below the coefficients.
underperformance up to recommendation x 
lockup_ended
overperformance up to recommendation x 
lockup_ended
overperformance up to recommendation 
analyst recommendation
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Table 7: Ordered probit regression of past firm performance on analysts’ recommendations 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent variable
                                                                    
0          0.396*** 0.014         0.430***          0.356***
(0.01) (5.73) (0.23) (4.95) (3.05)
0.023 0.067 0.052 0.056 0.1
(0.61) (1.) (0.89) (0.63) (0.79)
Underpricing          0.038*** -0.01          0.036*  -0.031         -0.103** 
                (2.93) -(0.41) (1.74) -(0.94) -(2.19)
Lead manager         -0.100** 0.09 -0.007 0.107 0.236
                -(2.11) (1.05) -(0.12) (1.06) (1.62)
Co-manager 0.037 0.058          0.153*** -0.002 0.059
                (1.01) (0.82) (2.68) -(0.02) (0.49)
log_size                 0.161*** -0.021          0.119*** 0.007         -0.207***
                (7.53) -(0.61) (3.59) (0.15) -(3.47)
NASDAQ          0.104 -0.075 -0.14 0.032 -0.335
                (0.63) -(0.25) -(0.7) (0.1) -(0.78)
NYSE            0.225 0.193 -0.025 0.218 -0.383
                (1.31) (0.63) -(0.12) (0.62) -(0.86)
0          0.003*  -0.002 0.001 0.003
-(0.42) (1.65) -(1.36) (0.35) (0.87)
Proceeds             0.001***          0.001***          0.001*           0.001*** 0
                (3.14) (3.14) (1.85) (2.92) (0.51)
VC                       0.100*** 0.002          0.158*** 0.048 0.02
                (2.82) (0.03) (2.94) (0.61) (0.19)
# Lead managers          0.246***          0.204***          0.263***          0.198*  0.051
                (5.83) (2.87) (3.56) (1.95) (0.39)
# Co-managers         -0.011***         -0.008**         -0.015***         -0.007*           0.012** 
                                                                                    -1.55
R-squared       0.044 0.046 0.023 0.024 0.048
N               5000 1596 2203 951 507
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Primary shares in % of 
shares offered
Ordered probit model regression with 5 different dependent variables: Model 1 uses recommendations by analysts issued in the second half
of the lockup period, model 2 the analysts’ recommendations issued after the end of the lockup period. Model 3 uses the last
recommendation issued by analysts before and model 4 the first recommendations after the end of the lockup period as the left hand side
variable. Model 5 uses the difference between the first recommendation minus the last recommendation before the end of the lockup period
of a given analyst for a given firm as the dependent variable. 
Recommendations 
issued during lockup  
Recommendations 
issued after end of 
lockup   
Last 
recommendation 
issued before end 
of lockup   
First 
recommendation 
issued after end 
of lockup   
Difference of first 
recommendation after 
lockup and last 
recommendation. before 
end of lockup
Analyst recommendations are on a 1 (=Strong Buy) to 5 (=Strong Sell) scale and obtained from the FirstCall database. Lockup ended is a
dummy variable equaling 1 if the recommendation was issued after the end of the lockup period. The indicator variable Underperformer 
(Average performer ) equals 1 if the company belongs to the lower tercile (middle tercile) of our sample in terms of the performance starting
from the end of the offering day up to the midpoint of the lockup period, benchmarked against the equal weighted market portfolio return.
Underpricing  denotes the ratio of closing price minus offer price divided by offer price. 
The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1996 - 2006 and subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as
reported by the SDC database. I exclude REITS, utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price
below 5 $. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well as lockup period
information on SDC. The number of lead managers and co-managers are taken from the SDC database. Analyst recommendations are
taken from FirstCall, insider trading from Thompson Financial. The t-values are shown in brackets below the coefficients.
Lead manager equals 1 if the recommendation has been issued by a lead-manager, co-manager equals 1 if the recommendation has been
issued by an analyst affiliated with a co-managing bank in the IPO process. Log_size represents the log of the market capitalization as
calculated by the shares outstanding after the offering (obtained from CRSP) multiplied with the share price at the end of the offering day
(obtained from CRSP). Primary shares in % of shares offered is the ratio of primary shares offered divided by the total amount of shares
(=primary plus secondary) offered during the IPO. Proceeds is the amount in dollars of the total shares offered during the offering (SDC).
VC is a dummy variable if the offering was backed by a venture capitalist (SDC). # Lead managers (# Co-managers) represents the
number of lead manager (co-managers) during the IPO process. I include recommendations by analysts in the time period starting from the
date of the offering / end of the quiet period up to 50 days after the lockup period has ended.  
Underperformer 
Average performer 
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Table 8: Influence of different shareholders on analyst recommendation   
 
                dependent variable
analyst recommendation
                 
VC x lead-manager x lockup         0.672***
(2.93)
High insider ownership  x lead-manager x lockup         0.322** 
(2.01)
VC x co-manager x lockup 0.023
(0.11)
High insider ownership  x co-manager x lockup -0.009
-(0.07)
VC x lockup -0.119
                -(1.54)
High insider ownership x lockup 0.01
(0.12)
VC                       0.068*  
                (1.86)
Insider Ownership before IPO         -0.002***
                -(3.47)
Lockup ended         0.407***
(7.3)
Underwriter rank 0.008
(0.62)
Lead-manager -0.069
                -(1.45)
Co-manager 0.04
                (1.05)
log_size                 0.142***
                (7.11)
R-squared       0.48
N               5624
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is the current analyst recommendation, issued on a 1 (=Strong Buy) to 5 (=Strong
Sell) scale and obtained from the FC database. Lockup ended is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the
recommendation was issued after the end of the lockup period. VC x lockup is a dummy variable
equaling one if the company is VC backed and the lockup period is over. VC x lead(co)-manager-lockup
is a dummy variable if an analyst affiliated with the lead(co)-manager issued the recommendation, the
lockup period has ended and the company is backed by VCs. High Insider Ownership x lockup is a
dummy variable equaling 1 if the company belongs to the highest quartile in terms of ownership by
management before the IPO and the lockup period is over. High Insider Ownership measures the
ownership of managers before the IPO in percent (obtained from SDC). High Insider Ownership x lockup
is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the company belongs to the highest quartile in terms of the degree of
insider ownership before the IPO. High insider ownership x lead(co)-manager x lockup equals one if an
analyst affiliated with the lead(co)-manager issued the recommendation, the lockup period has ended and
the company belongs to the highest quartile in terms of the degree of insider ownership before the IPO.
Lead manager equals 1 if the recommendation has been issued by a lead-underwriter, Co-manager 
equals one if the recommendation has been issued by a analyst affiliated with a co-managing bank in the
IPO process. Log_size represents the log of the market capitalization as calculated by the shares
outstanding after the offering (obtained from CRSP) multiplied with the share price at the end of the
offering day (obtained from SDC). Primary shares in % of shares offered is the ratio of primary shares
offered divided by the total amount of shares (=primary plus secondary) offered during the IPO. Proceeds 
is the amount in dollars of the total shares offered during the offering (SDC). VC is a dummy variable if
the offering was backed by a venture capitalist (SDC). We include recommendations by analysts in the
time period starting from the date of the offering / end of the quiet period up to 50 days after the lockup
period has ended. The t-values are shown in brackets below the coefficients.
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Table 9:  The impact of new regulation on the downward revision of analysts after the lockup period  
 
dependent variable:               
analyst recommendation
                
Regulation         0.762***
(17.12)
Regulation x lockup ended         -0.140**  
-(1.94)
Lockup ended            0.411***
                (10.33)
Underwriter rank 0.012
(1.01)
Lead manager         -0.120***
                -(2.88)
Co-manager -0.029
                -(0.86)
log_size                 0.108***
                (5.55)
NASDAQ          -0.031
                -(0.21)
NYSE            0.059
                (0.38)
Primary shares in % of shares offered          0.002** 
                (2.19)
Proceeds 0
                (0.7)
                
SIC 2 Digit dummy yes
R-squared       0.0767
N               6593
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Ordered probit model regression with analyst recommendations as the dependent variable.
Regulation is a dummy variable equaling 1 if recommendations were issued after more
restrictive regulation (NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, the Global Settlement) of analyst and
company disclosure has been in enacted. Regulation x lockup ended is the interaction term
equaling 1 if the lockup period has ended and the new regulation has been passed. Lockup 
ended is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the recommendation was issued after the end of the
lockup period. Underwriter rank  is the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriting reputation rank 
as updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). Lead manager equals 1 if the recommendation has
been issued by a lead-underwriter, Co-manager equals 1 if the recommendation has been
issued by a analyst affiliated with a co-managing bank in the IPO process. Log_size 
represents the log of the market capitalization as calculated by the shares outstanding after the
offering (obtained from CRSP) multiplied with the share price at the end of the offering day
(obtained from SDC). Primary shares in % of shares offered is the ratio of primary shares
offered divided by the total amount of shares (=primary plus secondary) offered during the IPO.
Proceeds is the amount in dollars of the total shares offered during the offering (SDC). VC is a
dummy variable if the offering was backed by a venture capitalist (SDC). # Lead managers (# 
Co-managers ) represents the number of lead manager (co-managers) during the IPO
process. Bubble is a dummy variables equaling 1 during the years 1999 and 2000. We include
recommendations by analysts in the time period starting from the date of the offering up to 50
days after the lockup period has ended.  
The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1996 - 2006 and subsequently registered
either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as reported by the SDC database. I exclude REITS,
utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price
below 5 $. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the
CRSP database as well as lockup period information on SDC. The number of lead managers
and co-managers are taken from the SDC database. Analyst recommendations are taken from
FirstCall, insider trading from Thompson Financial. The t-values are shown in brackets below
the coefficients.
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Table 10: Test if analyst learning explains downward revision at the end of the lockup period 
  
Recommendation number         0.033***
                (8.93)
Lockup ended         0.178***
                (4.38)
Underwriter rank 0.014
(1.15)
Lead-manager         -0.077*  
                -(1.75)
Co-manager 0.037
                (1.06)
log_size                 0.091***
                (4.63)
NASDAQ          -0.02
                -(0.13)
NYSE            0.078
                (0.48)
Primary shares in % of shares offe 0.001
                (0.95)
Proceeds             0.001***
                (3.31)
VC              0.032
                (0.98)
# Lead managers          0.169***
                (4.36)
# Co-managers         -0.010***
                -(5.71)
R-squared       0.048
N               5792
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
analyst recommendation
dependent variable: 
Ordered probit model regression with analyst recommendations as the dependent
variable. Recommendation number counts the recommendations issued since the
IPO in ascending order. Lockup ended is a dummy variable equaling one if the
recommendation was issued after the end of the lockup period. Underwriter rank is
the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriting reputation rank as updated by Loughran
and Ritter (2004). Lead manager equals one if the recommendation has been issued
by a lead-underwriter, Co-manager equals one if the recommendation has been
issued by a analyst affiliated with a co-managing bank in the IPO process. Log_size 
represents the log of the market capitalization as calculated by the shares outstanding
after the offering (obtained from CRSP) multiplied with the share price at the end of
the offering day (obtained from SDC). 
Primary shares in % of shares offered is the ratio of primary shares offered divided by
the total amount of shares (=primary plus secondary) offered during the IPO.
Proceeds is the amount in dollars of the total shares offered during the offering
(SDC). # Lead managers (# Co-managers ) represents the number of lead managers
(co-managers) during the IPO process. Bubble is a dummy variables equaling one
during the years 1999 and 2000. We include recommendations by analysts in the time
period starting from the date of the offering up to 50 days after the lockup period has
ended.  
The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1996 - 2006 and subsequently
registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as reported by the SDC database. I
exclude REITS, utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude
offerings with an offer price below 5 $. Companies have to have information on
shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database as well as lockup period
information on SDC. The number of lead managers and co-managers are taken from
the SDC database. Analyst recommendations are taken from FirstCall, insider trading
from Thompson Financial.. The t-values are shown in brackets below the coefficients.
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Table 11: Earnings per share development around the end of the lockup period of newly issued companies 
 
 
Quarter prior to 
lockup expiration
Earnings per 
share (diluted, 
winsorized)
Difference Eps to 
Eps of prior quarter 
(winsorized)
mean -3 -0.38 0.00
median -0.02 0.00
mean -2 -0.20 0.07
median 0.03 0.01
mean -1 -0.03 0.18
median 0.05 0.02
mean 1 -0.01 0.03
median 0.06 0.01
mean 2 -0.02 -0.02
median 0.07 0.00
mean 3 -0.01 0.00
median 0.06 0.00
Quarterly earnings per share data is taken from Compustat. Quarter
prior to lockup is the distance in terms of earnings announcements to
the lockup period. I winsorize the earnings per share at the 5 percent
level. Difference Eps to Eps of prior quarter is the difference between
the current Eps and the Eps of the prior quarter (both winsorized). The
sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1995 - 2006 and were
subsequently registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as
obtained from the SDC database. I exclude REITS, utilities and
financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price
below 5 $. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding
and stock returns in the CRSP database.
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows no significant differences between the three groups at the 
15% confidence level.
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Table 12: Earnings per share development around the end of the lockup period of newly issued companies with 
earnings announcement 30 days around the expiration of the lockup period 
 
 
  
Quarter prior to 
lockup expiration
Earnings per share 
(diluted, winsorized)
Difference Eps to Eps of 
prior quarter 
(winsorized)
mean -1 -0.13 0.19
median 0.03 0.02
mean 0 -0.01 0.11
median 0.05 0.03
mean 1 -0.02 -0.01
median 0.04 0.00
Quarterly earnings per share data is taken from Compustat. Quarter prior to
lockup is the distance in terms of earnings announcements to the lockup
period, with 0 being the earnings announcement at the end of the lockup
period. I show Eps as well as at the 5 percent level winsorized EPS.
Difference Eps to Eps of prior quarter is the difference between the current
Eps and the Eps of the prior quarter (both winsorized). The sample consists
of IPOs with earnings announcements in the 30 days around the lockup
period. The IPOs went public from 1995 - 2006 and were subsequently
registered either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as obtained from the SDC
database. I exclude REITS, utilities and financial institutions. I furthermore
exclude offerings with an offer price below 5 $. Companies have to have
information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP database.
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows no significant differences between the three groups at the 15% 
confidence level.
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Table 13: Impact of the end of the lockup period versus 180 days after IPO 
 
 
dependent variable: 
analyst recommendation
Lockup ended            0.417***
                (2.71)
180 days dummy 0.214
                (1.33)
Underwriter rank -0.003
-(0.05)
Lead manager         -0.526** 
                -(2.27)
Co-manager 0.083
                (0.47)
log_size        0.073
                (0.69)
NASDAQ          0.058
                (0.13)
NYSE            0.437
                (0.91)
Primary shares in % of shares offered 0.004
                (0.84)
Proceeds -0.001
                -(0.31)
# Lead managers 0.205
                (1.01)
# Co-managers         -0.021** 
                -(2.53)
R-squared       6.06
N               253
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Ordered probit model regression with analyst recommendations as the dependent
variable. Lockup ended is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the recommendation was
issued after the end of the lockup period. 180 days dummy is a dummy variable
equaling 1 if 180 days after the IPO have passed, 0 else. Underwriter rank is the
Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriting reputation rank as updated by Loughran
and Ritter (2004). Lead manager equals 1 if the recommendation has been issued
by a lead-underwriter, Co-manager equals 1 if the recommendation has been
issued by a analyst affiliated with a co-managing bank in the IPO process. Log_size 
represents the log of the market capitalization as calculated by the shares
outstanding after the offering (obtained from CRSP) multiplied with the share price at
the end of the offering day (obtained from SDC). Primary shares in % of shares
offered is the ratio of primary shares offered divided by the total amount of shares
(=primary plus secondary) offered during the IPO. Proceeds is the amount in dollars
of the total shares offered during the offering (SDC). VC is a dummy variable if the
offering was backed by a venture capitalist (SDC). # Lead managers (# Co-
managers ) represents the number of lead manager (co-managers) during the IPO
process. I include recommendations by analysts in the time period starting from the
date of the offering up to 50 days after the lockup period has ended. 
The sample consists of IPOs with a lockup period different from 180 days. The
companies went public from 1996 - 2006 and subsequently registered either at the
NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as reported by the SDC database. I exclude REITS,
utilities, ADRs and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer
price below 5 $. Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and
stock returns in the CRSP database as well as lockup period information on SDC.
The number of lead managers and co-managers are taken from the SDC database.
Analyst recommendations are taken from FirstCall. The t-values are shown in
brackets below the coefficients.
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Table 14: Market reaction to analyst recommendations before and after the offering 
 
Underperformer
Average 
Performer Overperformer Total
Panel A: Market reaction following a downgrading by an analyst
Timing of revision
# of recs. 157 101 100 358
Mean -18.50% -6.90% -9.20% -12.60%
Median -14.90% -4.50% -4.40% -6.50%
 
# of recs. 72 52 52 176
Mean -12.60% -11.50% -11.40% -11.90%
Median -6.60% -4.00% -6.00% -5.80%
-5.90% 4.60% 2.20% -0.70%
-8.30% -0.50% 1.60% -0.70%
Panel B: Market reaction following an upgrading by an analyst
Timing of revision
# of recs. 103 80 97 280
Mean 3.90% 1.80% -1.20% 1.50%
Median 2.00% 1.70% -2.60% 0.60%
 
# of recs. 33 36 53 122
Mean 5.10% 4.30% 4.60% 4.70%
Median 3.00% 1.50% 2.50% 2.40%
-1.20% -2.50% -5.8%*** -3.20%
1.00% -0.20% 5.10% 1.80%
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Difference before - 
after lockup
Downgrading issued 
before end of lockup
Downgrading issued 
after end of lockup
Upgrading issued 
before end of lockup
Upgrading issued 
after end of lockup
Difference before - 
after lockup
Panel A presents the number of downgrades, the mean and the median market reaction following a
negative change in recommendation by an analyst compared to his earlier recommendation. Panel
B presents the number of upgrades, the mean and the median market reaction following a positive
change in recommendation by an analyst compared to his earlier recommendation, The market
reaction is calculated using the buy and hold return of the share one day prior to the
recommendation up to one day after the recommendation and is benchmarked against the equally
weighted market return in the same period. The share price performance is calculated as the buy
and hold return from the end of the first offer day up to the midpoint of the lockup period and is
benchmarked against the equal weighted market return. The sample is split into three terciles of
overperformer, average performer and underperformer according to their buy and hold return.
Revisions issued before the end of lockup include all changes in recommendations issued by a
given analysts from the offering day up to the day prior to the end of the lockup period. Revisions
after the end of the lockup period include all changes in recommendations from the day of the end
of the lockup period up to 50 days thereafter.
The sample consists of IPOs which went public from 1995 - 2006 and were subsequently registered
either at the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX as obtained from the SDC database. I exclude REITS,
utilities and financial institutions. I furthermore exclude offerings with an offer price below 5 $.
Companies have to have information on shares outstanding and stock returns in the CRSP
database. The number of lead managers and co-managers are taken from the SDC database.
Analyst recommendations are taken from FirstCall, insider trading from Thompson Financial. The
significance of the differences between the groups is calculated using a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-
populations rank test.
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The Impact of Optimistic and Privately 
Informed Managers on Firm Performance and 
Corporate Decisions1 
 
Jens Martin2 
 
 
This paper investigates if and to which extent managerial behavior, its private information and 
potential behavioral biases of managers can explain the underperformance of IPOs and SEOs. I test 
a behavioral explanation, the optimistic manager hypothesis, as well as rational theories, the 
window of opportunity hypothesis and empire building. Using data on U.S. IPOs and SEOs going 
public from 1990 through 2003, I find evidence that optimistic managers as well as privately 
informed managers seem to drive the long run underperformance of equity offerings. I furthermore 
investigate the investment decisions taken by each type of manager after the share issuance. I see a 
distinct different behavior by each type of manager in terms of capital expenditures, debt 
rebalancing and cash holdings. 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper, I aim to shed light on if and to which extent managerial behavior, its private 
information and potential behavioral biases of managers’ help to explain the underperformance of 
companies. I derive the theoretical predictions for the behavior of the managers both from the 
behavioral literature as well as from the rational expectations literature. Indeed, several models of 
these two schools of thought can be found to offer very similar predictions, which seem plausible 
examined on their own. However, I find these rivaling models standing in stark contrast in their 
reasoning to each other, while trying to explain the same economic context.  
An equity issuance constitutes a special event in the lifecycle of a company. During an IPO 
or SEO a company receives a large influx of money in a short time period. Thus the way and extent 
to which these proceeds will be invested will impact significantly the future course and performance 
of the company. Such a setting allows me to relate observe how managerial behavior as well as the 
managerial private information impacts on firm performance. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature on several dimensions. First, I give 
for the first time empirical evidence of the impact of optimistic managers on underperformance of 
IPOs respectively SEOs. Second, I show that the amount of free cash that both privately informed 
managers as well as optimistic managers are able to invest helps to explain the underperformance 
phenomenon of equity issuances. Third, I investigate the development of firm variables such as debt 
level, cash holding and capital expenditure around the offering, and if this change is consistent with 
the predicted behavior for each type of manager.  
Recent literature, for example Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2004), investigate whether 
managers conducting SEOs take advantage of temporary “windows of opportunity”. The manager is 
hereby trying to time the market and to take advantage of his private information. The manager 
believes that the market overvalues the company. The company will revert from its inflated share 
price to its true value on the long run, resulting in a long term underperformance of the stock price. 
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Thus, the offering in itself constitutes a positive net present value project which should motivate the 
manager to maximize the amount of proceeds raised. Lee (1997) is looking to determine whether 
insiders of SEOs can time the market. Both papers focus solely on insider selling and if this insider 
selling has predictive power on long term performance. However, insiders trade and in particular 
sell shares for a variety of reasons, for example diversification, personal liquidity needs etc. Only if 
their reason for trading company shares is to take advantage of their inside information to time the 
market, they are correctly identified as behaving according to the window of opportunity 
hypothesis. In contrast to earlier research, I aim to use a more refined proxy. I use as a proxy the 
amount of free cash generated in the offering, conditional on insider trading. The higher the 
perceived undervaluation by the manager, the higher the proceeds he is trying to raise. Even at 
increasing marginal costs as the market has to absorb a larger number of offered shares. 
A different cause for the underperformance arises from the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders. Managers may, according to Jensen (1986), rationally maximize their 
private benefits at the expense of their shareholders.  This implies that the more free cash the 
manager is able to raise during the offering, the more he can channel away to invest in pet projects 
and perquisites. This will lead to a worse performance of the firm on the long run. I aggregate these 
two hypotheses and label managers exhibiting behavior consistent with either hypothesis as 
privately informed. Managers according to both the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis as well as to the 
Window of Opportunity Hypothesis know, albeit for different reasons, that the future share price 
will decrease. Thus informed managers will sell shares.  
The behavioral finance literature underscores the impact of optimistic managers. Roll (1986) 
called it the “managerial hubris” and  Heaton (2002) investigates theoretically the impact of 
optimistic managers on corporate decisions. An optimistic manager is defined as a manager who 
systematically overestimates good firm behavior and underestimates bad firm behavior. Thus, while 
believing to act in the best interest of shareholders and the firm, the manager will invest the 
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proceeds of the offering into suboptimal projects. However, the manager will believe in the 
profitability of the investments by the company. 
Even though the concept of overconfident / optimistic managers has been picked up in other 
strands of the literature several years ago, only recently I see a growing number of empirical studies 
in corporate finance. Examples are Malmendier and Tate (2005), Brown and Sarma (2007) or Puri 
and Robinson (2007). To my best knowledge, no empirical study exists which investigates the 
impact of overconfident managers on long time performance of SEOs and IPOs. The aim of this 
study is to fill this gap. One has to note, however, that privately informed and optimistic managers, 
while being mutually exclusive on the firm level, may both help to explain part of the 
underperformance puzzle. 
Using US data of companies undertaking either an IPO or a SEO from 1990 through 2003, I 
find that insiders trade according to their private information after the lockup period has ended. I 
predict and find that additional “free cash” will aggravate long term performance for companies 
being led by privately informed managers. I here for regress the three year abnormal buy-and-hold 
return (calculated either as a matched firm approach or in comparison to market-to-book portfolios) 
on proceeds from primary shares conditional on insider selling.  
To test the Optimistic Manager Hypothesis on my data, I measure the impact of the amount 
of new cash raised from primary shares on firm performance, conditional on insider buying. My 
regressions show that optimistic managers have a negative impact on firm performance.  
Following, I investigate the differences in corporate investment decisions by these types of 
managers. I analyze the debt level, cash holdings as well as capital expenditures from the year prior 
to the year after the offering. I find that optimistic managers show a much higher propensity to 
increase debt than both the control group of non-trading managers as well as the privately informed 
managers, both in the IPO and SEO sample. Privately informed managers decrease debt, which 
supports the Window of Opportunity Hypothesis and contradicts the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis. I 
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find no significant different behavior for optimistic, privately informed as well as non-trading 
managers in their capital expenditures. However, I detect a decrease in cash levels of optimistic 
managers after IPOs and SEOs, supporting the Optimistic Manager Hypothesis. In addition, I find 
that privately informed managers tend to increase their cash holdings, supporting once more the 
Window of Opportunity Hypothesis. 
The paper is organized in the following structure: in Section II, I describe the data and give 
the sample description. In Section III I illustrate the announcement day effect and the insider trading 
data. In Section IV I explain the methodology and the results of the long term performance study. 
Section V discusses the theoretical implications for debt, cash and capital expenditures development 
and Section VI shows the empirical findings. Section VII concludes.  
II. Sample   
A. Equity Offering Data 
My sample consists of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) 
recorded by the Security Data Company (SDC) during the years 1990 to 2001. All firms have to 
have monthly returns listed at the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and on 
Compustat. I consider firms issuing common class A shares up to 2001 in order to execute a three 
year performance study. Firms included in my sample have to be traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or NASDAQ. I exclude unit offers as well 
as real estate investment trusts (REITS), American depository receipts (ADRs) and closed end 
mutual funds. In addition, I exclude offerings of financial institutions as well as of utility companies 
(SIC codes 4910-4949). Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the 
SDC database have been excluded. I screen the data for possible errors and use third party sources, 
for example as provided by JayRitter (2006), to correct my sample.  
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B. Data on Insider Trading 
For each of my sample firms I collect the insider trading data from Thomson Financial. I 
examine all open market transactions.  To check for the robustness of my data, I use four different 
definitions of insiders according to their position in the company hierarchy: 
CEO: CEO   
Directors: Directors  
Managers: CEO, COO, CFO, CIO, CTO and (Executive-)Vice President 
Insiders: Definition as in Managers plus officers and directors 
 
Throughout the paper, I consider two distinct time periods in which I analyze the trading by 
insiders: 
Trading Before: six months before the equity issuance up to one day before the issuance 
Trading After: Beginning from the end of the lockup period for three months. In case I lack the 
exact duration of the lockup period, I assume a six month lockup period. 
 
I add the second time period Trading After as insiders might refrain from trading before the 
offering for fear of sending a bad signal resulting in a negative market reaction. Brau and Fawcett 
(2006) show that insiders are well aware of this possibility. Consequently insiders, instead of 
revealing their true beliefs about the future of the company and selling before the offering, might 
time their selling until after the offering has taken place.  
I aggregate the number of shares traded by insiders during each period. A positive Buy (Sell) 
dummy variable for a specific firm signifies that the sum of all shares bought minus shares sold by 
- 73 - 
 
insiders in the respective time period is positive (negative). Pure Buys (Pure Sells) is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if at least one insider buys (sells) and no insider sells (buys) in the 
respective time period for the firm event. I run all tests and regressions by summarizing the number 
of trades committed. Using the number of shares traded instead of the number of trades undertaken 
yields similar results. 
C. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the basic sample description of the full sample as well as the sample 
description divided into the type of insider trading. The vast majority of shares issued, both for 
SEOs (85%) and IPOs (91%), are primary shares. Primary shares are new shares and proceeds flow 
to the firm. The median for new shares issued, both for SEOs and IPOs, is with 100%. This 
indicates that either the company uses these offerings mainly to raise money for future projects or 
those insiders are well aware of the possible negative signal of cashing out.   
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
I find that insiders sell more shares than they buy. Over my sample period from 1990 up to 
2001, I see a steady increasing amount of insider trading. These observations are consistent with the 
literature on insider trading (Seyhun (1998)). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Trading patterns across all four groups of insiders are remarkably similar. As the sample size 
of the trading by CEOs is small, I use for the later statistical analysis the trading behavior of the 
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broader insider definitions of Manager and Insider. To see trading activities by managers before an 
IPO might strike the reader as curious. However, this has two possible reasons:  
All public firms registered at the SEC have to report under Section 16a/2a tradings by 
insiders and owners with a stake of 10% or more in the company. This rule applies from the first 
registration of the shares with the SEC (Forms 3, 4 and 5) as stated in the Securities Act of 1933. 
However, such an insider has to declare even a trade before the registration of the company, if this 
insider traded again in a 6 month period while the company is registered.  
Example: A company registers on January 1st. An insider trades in November, thus two 
months before registration. If he doesn’t trade until May, he does not have to publish his November 
trade. But if he would trade again in February, he would have to declare the February trading as 
well as the November trading. In this case I would observe a pre-IPO insider trading in November, 
two month before the offering took place. 
Furthermore, it is possible that a company is public and listed on another exchange with the 
SEC, for example at Over the Counter Bulleting Board (OTCBB), and then decides to list at NYSE. 
In this case, I have the history of insider trading dating back to the point in time when the company 
registered with the SEC for the first time, which would be the registration with the OTCBB.  
 
III. Optimistic and privately informed managers and the 
announcement day reaction 
If privately informed and optimistic managers underperform the market on the long run and 
the two types of managers can be identified on the basis of their personal trading, the market could 
react accordingly and exhibit a negative announcement reaction. Additionally, the insiders 
themselves should be aware of the signal they are sending to the market by trading shares of their 
own company beforehand. CFOs interviewed by Brau and Fawcett (2006) believe that selling 
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insider shares before and / or during the IPO sends a bad signal to the market. Does the market react 
accordingly? To answer this question, I conduct a short term event study. I split my sample into 
three portfolios depending on the type of trading before the offering (sells / no trades / buys). I 
measure the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) with respect to the market portfolio two 
days prior through two days after the announcement date of the offering.   
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
I limit this investigation to SEOs, because stock prices prior to the offering of IPOs are not 
available. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The market does not react significantly different to SEO announcements whether insiders 
sell or buy beforehand as shown in Table 3. Confining my sample to managers or CEOs, the market 
reacts to offering announcements 50 basis points more negative if insiders buy in contrast to when 
they sell. However, a t-test of comparison of the means yields no statistical significance between 
these announcement effects. 
Instead of considering trades before the offering, I now turn towards the market reaction of 
the SEO announcement if insiders change their ownership share during the equity offering. Because 
the change in ownership during the equity offering is already published in the prospectus at the time 
of the filing with the SEC, the market should take this information into consideration and react 
according to this information. I use two different methodologies to define a sell during the offering. 
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The first approach calculates the raw difference in ownership and the second approach accounting 
for the dilution during the SEO: 
Change in Ownership (without dilution) = % of insider shares after offering - % of insider shares 
before offering 
Change in Ownership (with dilution) = Number of shares owned by insiders before the offering – 
number of shares owned by insiders after the offering3  
Thus, the variable Change in Ownership (without dilution) indicates whether the total 
percentage of insider ownership decreases during the offering, regardless of the dilution due to 
primary shares issued. Change in Ownership (with dilution) takes the dilution due to new shares 
issued into account by focusing on the shares held by insiders before and after the offering.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
I create five portfolios according to the amount of change in insider ownership. Similar to 
the announcement day reaction whether (Table 3), I see in Table 4 a remarkably constant negative 
announcement abnormal return of -2% across all five portfolios along the degree in change of 
ownership. The market reacts even more negative if insiders sell a low percentage of shares during 
the offering. The difference between the two extreme portfolios is 5 basis points and not significant. 
Thus, the market views a SEO on average as negative news. The value of the company drops by 
approximately 2% on the four days around the announcement date which is consistent with earlier 
studies. The lack of a significant difference of the market reaction could be due to different reasons:  
                                                 
3 Alternative formula: % Of Insider Shares After Offering – (% Of Insider Shares Before Offering / (1 + Primary Shares 
as Percentage of Shares out Before Offering)) 
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a) The sells of the insiders which I observe have a true, or at least believable, story such as 
diversification, liquidity needs, etc. Thus, the market does not believe the trades incorporate 
inside information concerning the future performance of the company. Consequently, the 
market does not judge the insider trades as a bad signal and reacts indifferently.  
b) The insiders who suspect their trades to cause a negative impact on the market refrain from 
selling (at least from selling publicly before the offering, hence before or during the 
offering). 
c) The market believes that insiders fear juridical consequences from trading on inside 
information and thus expects that insiders refrain from trading on their inside information. 
d) I can measure only legal insider trading which has been reported to the SEC. Insiders might 
trade on their most valuable inside information on different channels.  
IV. Long term performance 
A. Methodology 
I calculate the three year abnormal buy and hold returns (BHRs) based on monthly returns as 
reported by the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). For the long term performance 
calculation I use BHRs instead of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) as Barber and 
Lyon (1997) show that CAARs suffer from a systematic bias. BHR returns are calculated in respect 
to two different reference returns: size and book-to-market matched firms as well as size and book-
to-market matched portfolios 
Portfolio construction: 
My sample firms are matched to 14 size and five book-to-market portfolios as described in 
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2004). The portfolios are created once 
every year in June. First, I calculate the firm size (shares outstanding * share price in CRSP) in June 
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of each year. Following, all NYSE stocks are ranked each year in 10 portfolios according to their 
firm size. Afterwards, the NASDAQ and AMEX stocks are sorted into these 10 portfolios according 
to their size. As companies listed at the NASDAQ or AMEX tend to be smaller than the average 
company listed on the NYSE, the smallest size portfolio becomes disproportionately large. Hence I 
split this portfolio furthermore into 5 size portfolios without respect on which exchange the 
companies are listed.  
To create the market-to-book portfolios, I use the book value of common equity 
(COMPUSTAT item 60) as reported in the balance sheet of the company in December in t - 1, 
divided by the market value of its common equity (see above) in December in t - 1. I subsequently 
create five market-to-book quintiles 
In case the issuing firm is delisted before the end of the three year period I calculate the 
BHR until the delisting date. 
Reference firms: 
To check for the sensitivity and robustness of my data, I use as a second benchmark the long 
term performance of a size and market-to-book matched reference firm. For each company from my 
sample, I select the matching firm from the pool of firms listed on CRSP and which have not issued 
equity in the prior three year period. In a second step I create a pool of firms which have a size +/- 
30% of the firm size of the sample firm in its issuing month. Out of this subsample, I choose the 
company which has the closest market-to-book value, in absolute terms, in respect to the market-to-
book value of the issuing firm. If the matched firm, but not the issuer itself, is delisted during the 
three year period, I replace it with the next best fitting firm at the delisting time (chosen in the same 
procedure described above). Should the issuing firm be delisted before the end of the three year 
period, I calculate the BHR up to that point in time. 
Fama-French three factor model: 
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As a third benchmark I calculate abnormal return as proposed by Fama and French (1993).     
Fama (1998) strongly advocates the use calendar time portfolios to measure long term performance 
as this methodology is more robust as other asset pricing models. In addition, the distribution of 
calendar time portfolios is better suited for traditional statistical calculation as it resembles better 
the normal distribution. Additionally, this methodology accounts for the cross-correlation of firm 
returns, which otherwise creates a potential bias in the statistical interferences. I calculate the 
abnormal long term results using the following model: 
εβα +++−+=− ttftmtftt hHMLsSMBRRRR )(  
with Rt  the calendar time sample return in month t, Rft the risk free rate in month t and the three 
monthly Fama-French factors: excess market return (Rmt-Rft), size factor (small minus large firms = 
SMBt) and book to market factor (high BM firms minus low book to market firms = HMLt) 
B. Long term performance results 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
As illustrated in Table 5, IPOs as well as SEOs underperform their respective benchmark in 
the three year period following the offering. This finding is robust independent of the methodology 
employed or the reference measure chosen. I find a more pronounced underperformance of SEOs, 
which trail their benchmarks by 15% in a three year period. The IPOs underperform in a three year 
period by a lesser amount. They underperform 3% in case of the BHR portfolio firm approach as 
well as the Fama-French methodology, respective 9% with the matched firm approach. 
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V. Insider Trading and Underperformance 
For my empirical tests I combine the long run performance of IPOs and SEOs with the 
insider trading behavior. In particular, I want to test three hypotheses possibly causing 
underperformance of IPOs and SEOs: 
 
Optimistic Managers Hypothesis: 
The optimistic manager hypothesis was first developed by Roll (1986), who called it the 
hubris hypothesis. In his paper, Roll looks into corporate takeovers and argues that bidders will pay 
more than the actual stock price for a company, even if no synergies arise in the merger. This 
behavior is caused by the hubris of the managers. According to Roll, this behavioral bias explains 
the negative stock reaction of bidders at the announcement of a merger. Heaton (2002) advances 
this idea. His theory is based on the assumption that managers are optimistic. The markets are in 
contrast rational (or at least less biased than the managers). The optimistic manager is defined as a 
manager who systematically overestimates good firm performance and systematically 
underestimates bad firm performance. This theory derives from well established evidence in 
psychological research as shown foe example by Weinstein (1980). His experiments demonstrated 
that people have a tendency to be more optimistic about processes which they believe they can 
control. Additionally, people tend to be more optimistic about projects they are highly committed 
to. Both specifications are typical for the job as a manager. 
Proposition I: 
The Optimistic Manager Hypothesis predicts that companies with overconfident managers 
will underperform on the long run. This implies that the more proceeds from primary shares are 
raised in the offering, conditional on insider buying, the worse the future performance will be.  
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This prediction is an extension to the existing literature on underperformance of equity 
offerings. Earlier papers focused solely on the predictive power of insider trading per se and were 
not able to detect a significant effect. As insiders might trade for very different reasons, linking 
insider trading to the amount of free cash raised identifies optimistic managers at a reduced level of 
noise.  
Finding a proxy for optimistic managers is challenging. Malmendier and Tate (2003) use the 
trading pattern and the timing by CEOs of their stock option. However, this data is not available for 
my sample. Instead, I identify optimistic managers by means of their share trading. An optimistic 
manager believes in the good performance of the company he is leading. He consequently assesses 
it as a good investment for his private funds as well and will buy shares.  
 
My proposition 1 translates into the following regression: 
Long term performance = α + β (Proceeds from primary shares x Dummy Insider Buy) + ε 
with β negative and significant 
 
In terms of corporate decision-making, optimistic managers will believe to have more 
positive NPV projects and as they rationally would. Thus, he is more likely to invest the proceeds in 
projects resulting in an increase in Capital Expenditures and decrease in cash and cash equivalents. 
   
Window of Opportunity Hypothesis ( Privately informed managers  ) 
In case the market is too optimistic about the future prospects of a company and thus values 
the stock of a company higher than its true value, the managers will be tempted to take advantage of 
this “window of opportunity”. One possibility to profit in such a situation would be to sell 
overvalued shares, either in form of an SEO or IPO. The managers assume that, in the long run, the 
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share price will revert back to its true value and consequently fall. Thus issuing overvalued shares 
will be in itself a positive NPV project, which the manager will try to optimize by maximizing the 
proceeds.  
In this scenario managers are raising money because raising funds is in itself the objective 
and not because they have a certain set future projects they need the funds for. Hence I expect 
managers to use the proceeds mainly to reduce debt or to keep a high amount of cash to fund 
possible future projects. Managers believing in the current overvaluation sell part of their shares of 
the company to avoid its expected decrease in value.  
However, managers may sell due to a wide variety of reasons. Besides selling because of 
inside information, managers might sell part of their shares for liquidity reasons or risk 
diversification. Those reasons might have different impact on long term performance. Thus to 
isolate how the window of opportunity effects long term performance, I am focusing on the cross-
product of proceeds from primary shares conditional on insider selling.  
 
 
 
Proposition 2:  
The window of opportunity hypothesis predicts that managers of overvalued companies will 
take advantage of this miss-pricing by selling new shares. Thus, the higher the proceeds raised, 
conditional on insiders selling, the worse the long run underperformance of the company. Debt 
levels will decrease and cash levels will stay high. 
 
Free Cash Flow / Empire Building Hypothesis ( Privately Informed Managers ): 
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The Free Cash Flow theory has been first developed by Jensen (1986). He claims that a 
reduction of the free cash flow subjects the managers increasingly to the monitoring of the stock 
market. Jensen assumes managers act in their self-interest and will thus grow the company beyond 
its optimal size, the so-called empire-building, in order to gain more power, prestige and to increase 
their salary. In such a setting, the manager will consciously act in his own interest and at the 
expense of his shareholders.  
Free cash flow is defined by Jensen as “cash flow in excess of that required to fund all 
projects that have a positive net present value when discounted at the relevant cost of capital” 
(p.323). However, I argue that at least part of the money raised in an equity offering causes similar 
agency conflicts. The use of proceeds described in the prospectus of the equity offering describes 
only very vaguely at best the intended investments by the managers. This gives the manager leeway 
on how to invest the generated funds and renders at least part of the proceeds “free cash” after the 
offering.  
Proposition 3 
The Free Cash hypothesis predicts that managers will knowingly invest into non value-
maximizing projects in order to maximize their own benefits on the expense of their shareholders.  
Consequently, the more proceeds from primary shares are raised in an offering, conditional on 
insiders selling, the worse the company will perform on the long term. Capital Expenditure will 
increase and cash holdings will be low or decreasing. 
 
In my statistical analysis, I aggregate the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis and the Windows of 
Opportunity Hypothesis as they both predict a long term underperformance after the offering, which 
the manager expects. I label managers of these two groups privately informed managers and test it 
on my data as follows: 
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Long term performance = α + β (Proceeds from primary shares x Dummy Insider Sell) + ε 
with β negative and significant 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
VI. Empirical Results  
A. Long term performance by optimistic and privately informed 
managers  
In a first effort to screen my data and see the effects of insider trading, I create a two-by-two 
table to detect any striking difference in performance whether and how insider trade before or after 
the offering. I find no significant differences in the long-term performance of a company whether 
insiders sell or buy.  The company underperforms on average in both cases in the three year period 
following its equity offering as highlighted in Figure 7. I even see that managers who buy shares 
underperform selling managers on average. Companies, in which no insiders trade, perform better 
than companies in which insider do trade, but still underperform their reference group of non-
issuing companies. However, the difference between the three insider trading portfolios is not 
statistically significant. 
 INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
To get a more detailed picture I now use a robust ordinarily least square (OLS) analysis to 
shed light on the influence of privately informed and optimistic managers on firm performance. To 
correct for potential heteroskedacity, I employ the White (1980) methodology when estimating my 
standard errors. Eliminating outliers and taking the three year-matched-firm BHR as a left hand 
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variable, I focus on the variables of insider trading, the proceeds from primary shares and the cross 
product of both. Insider trading variables are created for each distinct time period (before the 
offering, during, after the lock up period ended) and are split up into sells and buys. I include 
furthermore control variables such as the log of firm size, log of the market-to-book-value and the 
exchange where the shares will be listed. Including year fixed effects do not change the results. To 
take into account the proportion of new cash to the size of the firm, I created the variable Primary to 
shares out. This measure calculates the ratio of primary shares (=new shares) offered to all shares 
outstanding after the offering. Insiders in this regression are defined as managers4.  
The degree of insider ownership may give an indication what type of manager is heading the 
company. The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis is assuming a conflict of interest between the owner of 
the company and the management. The manager is subsequently not maximizing the value of the 
company. Consequently, I assume this type of manager to have a minor ownership stake in the 
company. Thus, I create quintiles based on the managerial ownership of the company and inter-act 
these quintiles with the primary shares to shares outstanding. I find a negative coefficient (at the 
10% percent level significant) for the latter cross product, supporting the above reasoning. 
Consistent with previous studies, I find a positive coefficient for the log MB variable and a negative 
coefficient for the log of the firm size, both significant at the 1 percent level. 
In Table 7 (see Annex B for a complete overview of the regression) I observe a (at the 5% 
level significant) negative coefficient of the cross-product “insider pure buy after lockup * Primary 
to shares out”, as predicted by my Proposition 1. The more proceeds are raised by the company, 
conditional on insiders buying shares in the open market after the offering, the worse the long term 
performance will be. This finding supports the Optimistic Managers Hypothesis for SEOs as 
                                                 
4 Defined as CEO, COO, CFO, CIO, CTO or (Executive-)Vice President 
- 86 - 
 
described earlier. While I observe a negative coefficient for the same variable for IPOs as well, the 
coefficient lacks statistical significance (using robust t-statistics).  
Testing for privately informed managers, I find a negative coefficient (significant at the 5% 
level) “Insider Pure Sell after Lockup x Primary to Shares out” for IPOs. Hence, the higher the 
proceeds in relation to the size of the company (conditional on insider selling), the worse the firm 
performance will be. This finding supports the privately informed manager hypothesis and my 
Propositions II and III, as I argue that the managers have negative expectations of the company and 
consequently raise as much money as possible before the share price falls.   
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Director Share Programs (DSP), known as well as family and friends programs, do not 
distort my identification of optimistic and privately informed managers. These programs became 
increasingly popular during the late 90’s. Employed in only 24.7% of all IPOs in the US in 1996, 
they were used in 92.6% of all IPOs in the US in 2000 (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)). Due to 
these program, managers might participate and thus buy at the offering not because they believe in a 
positive performance of the company (my identification for optimistic managers), but merely 
because they want to profit on the short term from the expected underpricing. In a Director Share 
Program, a manager is allowed to buy a certain number of shares of his company at the offer price. 
Additionally, shares of the DSP are not subject to the lock up agreement (Ray (2006)). Considering 
the average large first day returns of equity offerings, managers participate in such a program for 
the short term profit, not because of their long term beliefs and will sell their shares shortly after the 
IPO. Thus they do not influence my insider trading variables as I neither count these as buys during 
the offering. Nor do they distort my analysis of insider selling after the lock up period, because they 
will already sell shortly after the offering during the lockup period.  
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Furthermore, my identification of optimistic managers as well as privately informed 
managers is not distorted by insiders who flip shares on a short time horizon. Indeed, insiders have 
to adhere by law to a six month waiting period before being allowed to sell shares after they 
executed a buy (and vice versa)). In addition, insiders are not allowed to short sell stocks of their 
own companies, which additionally reduce noise in my insider trading variable. 
  
B. Corporate decisions by optimistic and privately informed 
managers 
After showing the impact of optimistic respectively privately informed managers on long 
term performance, I aim to shed light on how these types of managers differ in terms of the 
corporate decisions they take. In the following analysis I split my sample into three portfolios, 
optimistic managers, neutral managers (who do not trade around the equity offering) as well as 
privately informed managers.  
For these three groups of managers I compare the change of key firm variables in the period 
of one year before the offering to one year following the offering. I examine the development of 
debt levels, capital expenditures and cash holdings. According to my Proposition I – III, I expect a 
different trading pattern by each type of manager. I summarize these differences in Figure 3. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Focusing on corporate decisions, I am now able to clearly distinguish between the Free Cash 
Flow Hypothesis and the Window of Opportunity Hypothesis. While the Window of Opportunity 
Hypothesis predicts a reduction of debt and a stable or insignificant increase in capital expenditures, 
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the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis predicts an increase in capital expenditures and a constant level or 
insignificant reduction in debt.  
Debt level development 
I create two portfolios (increase, decrease) according to the debt development one year after 
the offering compared to the level one year before the offering, normalized by assets in place. I use 
the data item 9 of Compustat to measure the debt level in a given year and normalize this figure by 
the assets in place in the same year (data item 6 in Compustat).  
I compare the frequency with which each type of manger decreases respectively increases 
debt. Interestingly, privately informed managers tend to decrease their debt with a 55% (237 to 153) 
higher likelihood than increase debt in IPOs. In contrast, optimistic managers are 80% more likely 
to increase debt after the IPOs. These findings support Optimistic Managers Hypothesis and the 
Window Of Opportunity Hypothesis and are in contrast to the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, as 
shown in Figure 4. The development of debt in SEOs is more evenly distributed.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Capital Expenditure development 
In a next step I look at the capital expenditure development after the offering. Taking the 
identical methodology as to investigate the debt development, I partition my sample into two 
groups: companies which increase their capital expenditures and those which decrease capital 
expenditures (Data item 128 in the Compustat database) in the year prior to the offering compared 
to one year after the offering, normalized by the assets in place in the respective year (data item 6 in 
Compustat).  
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INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
I see a remarkably similar pattern in capital expenditure by insider trading portfolios. While 
optimistic managers in SEOs overestimate their investment possibilities and increase their 
investments accordingly, two different forces are at play for privately informed managers. While 
managers according to the Windows of Opportunity Hypothesis are inclined to reduce their 
investments, managers according to the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis will increase investments in 
their pet projects. This might explain why I see no significant differences. 
 
Cash development: 
In the same spirit I examine the cash holding development by type of manager. Cash is 
measured by data item 1 in Compustat and normalized each year by the assets in place (data item 
6). Sorting my sample in two portfolios, decreasing and increasing cash holdings, I compare the 
frequency with which each type of manager is represented in each portfolio.  
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
Optimistic managers and privately informed managers appear to have a very different 
propensity towards cash. While companies of privately informed managers increase their cash 
holdings in 69% of all observations, only 50% of optimistic managers increase their cash holdings. 
While Optimistic Managers will reduce their cash holdings to invest into new projects, managers of 
the window of opportunity hypothesis will refrain from doing so. 
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VII. Conclusion 
This paper is contributing to the existing literature in two ways. First, I give empirical 
evidence of the impact of optimistic and privately informed managers on firm performance. In a 
second step I show how the corporate decisions of these types of managers differ.  
For this purpose I formulate three hypotheses predicting the impact of these types of 
managers on the firm performance and test these on the data. I use US data of companies 
undertaking either an IPO or a SEO from 1990 through 2001 which were subsequently listed on 
NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. 
My first hypothesis is the Optimistic Managers Hypothesis.  I define an optimistic manager 
as a manager who systematically overestimates good firm behavior and underestimates bad firm 
behavior. Thus, the Optimistic Manager Hypothesis predicts that the more proceeds are raised, the 
worse the future performance will be. In a new approach to test the impact on the long run 
performance and to enhance the identification of this effect, I focus on the cross product proceeds 
from primary shares conditional on insider selling. Indeed, I find a significant negative effect on the 
long term performance of the firm for SEOs. Still being negative, I lose significance of this 
coefficient for my IPO sample. Furthermore I see that optimistic managers take different corporate 
decisions: they tend to increase debt and reduce their cash holdings. 
As a second possible explanation for the underperformance of the offering firms I 
investigate the impact of the Window of Opportunity Hypothesis. Managers believe in a temporary 
over-valuation of their company by the stock market and try to profit from it by issuing overpriced 
shares. According to the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis managers pursue their own interests on the 
expense of their shareholders. These managers prefer to invest free cash into pet projects to increase 
their perquisites or social status instead of maximizing the return for their shareholders. 
Consequently, the more proceeds from primary shares the manager can raise in the offering, the 
worse will be the performance of the company. I label managers of both hypotheses as privately 
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informed managers. Both predict a negative performance, which the manager foresees. I find 
significant impact on underperformance of privately informed managers for IPOs and loose some 
significance for SEOs.  
Additionally, privately informed managers retain a higher level of cash holdings after the 
offering and have a higher propensity to reduce debt level after the offering compared to their 
optimistic counterparts. I show that both optimistic managers as well as privately informed 
managers help to explain the underperformance puzzle of equity offerings. I observe a distinct 
different behavior in corporate decisions after the offering by each type of manager. 
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IX. Annex 
A. Long Term Performance Calculation 
I calculate the three year abnormal buy and hold returns (BHRs) based on monthly returns as 
reported by the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). The returns are calculated as 
follows:  
r(t) = [(p(t)f(t)+d(t))/p(t')]-1  
For time t (a holding period), let:  
t’ = time of last available price < t  
r(t) = return on purchase at t’, sale at t  
p(t) = last sale price or closing bid/ask average at time t  
d(t) = cash adjustment for t  
f(t) = price adjustment factor for t  
p(t’) = last sale price or closing bid/ask average at time of last available price < t.  
 
For my long term performance calculation I use BHRs instead of cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAARs) as Barber and Lyon (1997) show that CAARs suffer from a systematic bias. 
 
The Abnormal Returns are calculated as follows 
)( τττ iii RERAR −=  
with τiR   = Buy and Hold Return (BHR) of firm i for period τ (one or three years or till 
the company is delisted)  
 )( τiRE  = Expected (=reference) BHR of firm i for period τ (one or three years)  
BHR is hereby defined by the following formula 
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)()(
)(p-(T)p BHR
1
ii∑
= −=
n
i IndexIndex tpTp
t
 
with pi = price of stock i 
        t   = month after Issue 
        T  = end of time period (one / three years) or delisting date of the issuing firm 
 
BHR returns are calculated in respect to two different reference returns: size and book-to-
market matched firms as well as size and book-to-market matched portfolios 
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B. Regression analysis on insider trading 
I use the different right hand side variables depending if I use the whole sample, SEO 
subsample and the IPO subsample. The variable PS, which represents my normalized free cash 
proxy, stands for ratio of primary shares offered to shares outstanding after the offering. 
Whole Sample: 
i
i
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IPO Subsample: 
i
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SEO Subsample: 
PSerInsSellAfterInsSellAftPSrInsBuyAfterInsBuyAfte
PSdilutionwithOfferinNetSelldilutionwithOfferinNetSell
PSdilutionwithOfferinNetBuydilutionwithOfferinNetBuy
PSInsSellBefInsSellBefPSInsBuyBefInsBuyBef
PSHighOwnerHighOwnerPSLowOwnerLowOwnerPS
imarySharesizefirmMBNASDAQNYSEyBHR i
**
*)_(__)_(__
*)_(__)_(__
**
**
Pr_loglog3
21201918
1716
1716
15141312
1110987
654210
αααα
αα
αα
αααα
ααααα
αααααα
++++
++
++
++++
+++++
+++++=
 
- 97 - 
 
 
Independant Variables
                
 Full Sample IPO SEO
0.1369         0.6030*** -0.1281
(0.93) (3.59) (-0.69)
-0.1054         0.2236+         -0.3012*  
(-0.82) (1.51) (-1.85)
0.0526      (dropped)        (dropped)   
(0.84)                                   
        0.2537***         0.2272***         0.2611***
(6.09) (6.12) (4.07)
       -0.1228***        -0.1633***        -0.0934** 
(-4.54) (-6.56) (-2.28)
-0.08 -0.2699         0.2040+  
(-0.60) (-1.07) (1.52)
-0.0728 0.021 -0.1186
(-0.44) (0.49) (-0.21)
                                  0.1621
                                  (1.18)
                                         -1.1536*  
                                  (-1.68)
                                  -0.0682
                                  (-0.56)
                                  0.277
                                  (0.41)
       -0.2796*  -0.1006        -0.7722** 
(-1.71) (-0.62) (-2.35)
0.2295         0.3605+          2.4804*  
(0.79) (1.59) (1.72)
-0.146 -0.1645        -0.2952** 
(-1.37) (-0.70) (-2.18)
-0.3252 0.2355 -0.0099
(-0.76) (0.41) (-0.01)
-0.0131 0.151                  
(-0.13) (1.32)                  
0.1476        -0.2863*                   
(0.64) (-1.83)                  
        0.3432*  0.1555         0.8175***
(1.77) (0.88) (2.73)
       -1.2003** -0.3933        -1.9837** 
(-2.48) (-1.18) (-2.40)
        0.3050*** 0.1035         0.4695***
(3.26) (1.06) (3.15)
       -0.6544***        -0.4055** -1.1306
(-2.78) (-2.42) (-1.35)
                                         -0.2779+  
                                  (-1.48)
                                  0.6211
                                  (1.00)
                                          0.2998** 
                                  (2.32)
                                         -1.5686** 
                                  (-2.04)
Constant                1.1573***         1.4993*** 0.7442
                (3.14) (3.89) (1.38)
R-squared       0.024 0.024 0.046
N               3001 2473 1273
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependant Variable: 3 year BHR 
(matched firm approach)
NetSell in Offering (with dilution) x 
prim shares
NetBuy in Offering (with dilution)
NetBuy in Offering (with dilution) x 
primary shares
Insider ownership highest quintile x 
primary shares to shares out
NetSell in offering (without dilution)
NetSell in offering (without dilution) x 
primary shares
Insider Buy before offering x primary 
shares to shares out
Insider Buy before offering 
Insider Sell before offering 
Insider Sell before offering x primary 
shares to shares out
log MB          
Insider Buy after lockup
Insider Buy after lockup x primary 
shares to shares out
Insider Sell after lockup
Insider Sell after lockup x primary 
shares to shares out
NetSell in Offering (with dilution)
with robust t-stats 
log firm size   
% of primary shares to total shares 
offered 
Primary shares to shares out after 
offering
Insider ownership highest quintile
Insider ownership lowest quintile
Insider ownership lowest quintile x 
primary shares to shares out
NYSE dummy           
NASDAQ dummy
IPO dummy
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C. Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics whole sample 
 
 
SEO's IPO's Total
Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median
N 3412 2895 6307
Number of 
employees 1'912 6'484 898 1'615 1'695 300 3'527 4'291 519
Age 1'530 14 11 1'200 9 6 2'730 12 8
Proceeds 3'412 124 60 2'895 63 36 6'307 96 45
Shares out after 
the offering 3'016 64'000'000 21'000'000 2'823 19'000'000 9'236'694 5'839 42'000'000 14'000'000
Primary Shares 
offered 3'412 2'986'382 2'000'000 2'895 4'170'937 2'800'000 6'307 3'530'109 2'300'000
Primary Shares 
as Shares 
offered (in%)
2'896 85 100 2'868 91 100 5'764 88 100
Secondary 
Shares offered 3'412 1'538'808 0 2'895 407'032 0 6'307 1'019'307 0
Firm Size 3'331 2'574'217 474'598 2'599 536'940 135'349 5'930 1'681'319 263'151
MB 3'391 3.70 3.20 2'855 4.10 3.40 6'246 3.90 3.30
The sample consists of companies issuing equity, either in an IPO or an SEO, starting January 1st, 1990 until
December 31st, 2001 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms trade on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. I excluded unit offers as well as Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies
and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers
with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database are excluded. We winsorize the MB at
the 2.5% level.
Proceeds are shown in million $. Age reports the age of the firm in years when it issues equity. Firm size is calculated
with the Compustat variables "Shares outstanding" * "Share Price" as of July of each respective year (in case of an
IPO or if the data is not available in Compustat, the we calculate firm size with the variables "shares outstanding after
IPO" * "closing price of the  first offer day" as reported by the SDC database.)  
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Table 2: Insider trading before, during and after the offering 
 
Director CEO Manager Insider Director CEO Manager Insider
Ins Pure Buys before obs 113 25 48 99
Ins Pure Sell before obs 802 321 728 1'099
NetBuying in Offering 
(with dilution)
obs - - - 122 - - - 489
NetSelling in Offering 
(with dilution)
obs - - - 670 - - - 628
NetSelling in Offering 
(without dilution)
obs - - - 1'735 - - - 969
Ins Pure Buys after 
lockup
obs 132 39 63 113 138 48 79 144
Ins Pure Sell after 
lockup
obs 731 368 772 1'024 386 216 388 560
# of Shares traded by 
Insiders before
mean -312'608 -20'548 -29'826 -377'975 -4'446 -2'350 -2'881 -12'361
# of Shares traded by 
Insiders after
mean -270'803 -29'152 -38'996 -377'975 -86'933 -17'433 -25'592 -132'395
Type of Offering
SEO IPO
Type of Insider Type of Insider 
Insider trading is obtained from Thompson Financial. For robustness I form four groups of insiders according to their
level in the hierarchy of the company: CEOs, Directors, Managers (CEO, COO, CFO, CIO, CTO and (Executive-)Vice
President) as well as insiders in general (Managers plus officers and directors). 
The dummy variable NetSelling in Offering (without dilution) equals one if the share of insider ownership in percent of
the company (as reported by SDC database) decrease after the offering. This variable does not take the dilution of their
ownership stake due to newly issued primary shares into consideration. The dummy variable NetSelling (Netbuying) in
Offering (with dilution) equals one if the number of shares owned by insiders of the company (as reported by SDC
database) decreases (increases) after the offering. This variable accounts for the decrease in the ownership of insiders
due to newly issued primary shares. # of Trades equals the number of trades undertaken by the insider in the given
time period, # of Shares equals the number of shares traded per firm event in the given time period
I consider two distinct periods during which I analyze the trading by insiders: Trading Before: Six months before the
equity issuance up to one day before the issuance. Trading After: Beginning from the end of the lockup period for three
months. (In case I lack the exact duration of the lockup period, I assume a six month lockup period). Insider Pure Buys
(Sells) equals one for a firm event if I see insiders buying and NO insider selling for a specific company during the time
period.
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Table 3: Announcement effect per type of manager 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Insider Managers CEO
Aggr. Pure Aggr. Pure Aggr. Pure
obs 1223 1064 729 707 317 314
mean -2.90% -2.90% -2.80% -2.90% -3.60% -3.60%
median -2.80% -2.80% -2.70% -2.80% -2.80% -2.80%
obs 1817 1998 2377 2401 2812 2816
mean -3.30% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% -3.10% -3.10%
median -3.20% -3.10% -3.00% -3.00% -2.90% -2.90%
obs 115 93 49 47 26 25
mean -2.50% -2.90% -3.30% -3.60% -4.10% -4.00%
median -1.90% -2.70% -3.30% -3.60% -3.30% -3.30%
mean 0.40% 0.00% -0.50% -0.70% -0.50% -0.40%
median 0.90% 0.10% -0.60% -0.80% -0.50% -0.50%
Difference 
Buy - Sell
Sell
Neutral
Buy
The sample consists of companies issuing equity, either in an IPO or an SEO, starting
January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2001 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC
Platinum). Firms trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. I excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies
and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common
class A shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC
database are excluded. We winsorize the MB at the 2.5% level.Aggregate insider selling
(buying) equals one if the difference of insider sells - buys is positive (negative) for a given
company in the respective time period. Insider Pure Buys (Sells) equals one if we see
insiders buying and NO insider selling of the same company during the time period.
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs), calculated on basis of the market model,
starting 2 days before the announcement day up to 2 days after the announcement day
(=filing date in SDC) for a SEO. The sample is divided into three portfolios: insider selling.
insider buying in a time period 6 months prior up to the SEO offering and no trading. I discern
between three different groups of insiders: CEOs, Managers (CEO, COO, CFO, CIO, CTO
and (Executive-)Vice President), as well as Insiders in general (Managers plus officers and
directors). 
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Table 4: Announcement period (-2d to +2d) abnormal return by type of insider trading DURING the offering  
 
 
obs 224 301
mean -1.60% -2.10%
median -1.20% -1.40%
obs 280 250
mean -2.00% -1.80%
median -2.10% -1.90%
obs 483 360
mean -2.00% -2.10%
median 1.20% -2.00%
obs 219
mean -1.70%
median -1.40%
obs 109 218
mean -2.00% -1.40%
median -1.80% -1.90%
Change in 
Ownership without 
dilution 
The sample consists of companies issuing equity, either in an IPO or an
SEO, starting January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2001 as listed by the
Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms trade on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the
NASDAQ. I excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds,
utility companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we
restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers with no listed or
negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database are excluded.
We winsorize the MB at the 2.5% level.
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) calculated on basis of the
market model, starting 2 days before the announcement day up to 2 days
after the announcement daay (=filing date in SDC) for SEOs. Our sample is
divided into 5 portfolios according to the degree of change of ownership by
insiders DURING the offering (Source: SDC). The degree of change in insider
ownership is calculated in two possible ways: by comparing the percentage of
ownership of insiders in the firm before and after the offering (= Change in
ownership without dilution ) and by comparing the number of shares held
before and after the offering by insiders (= Change in ownership with
dilution ).
highest increase
highest decrease
Degree of change of 
insider ownership 
during SEO
Change in 
Ownership with 
dilution  
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Table 5: Long term performance of equity issuing firms 
BHR versus matched firm is the Buy and Hold return (BHR) compared to a size and book to market matched 
firm. If an offering firm is delisted prior to its 1st respectively 3rd anniversary, the BHR is calculated from the 
issuing date until the delisting date. If the matched firm delists during the one respectively three year period, I 
choose the next best matching firm to the offering firm. Matching firms are chosen from all firms listed on the 
NYSE not having undertaken an IPO or SEO in the prior three year period and if their firm size is +/-30% of the 
issuing firm size. From this group the firm with the closest MB Value is selected. BHR versus matched portfolio 
is the abnormal BHR of the issuing firms in comparison to a rebalanced portfolio of firms with similar size and 
MB values. Each June 70 portfolios (14 size and 5 MB portfolios) are calculated and matched to each issuing 
firm. For robustness checks I calculate the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR)  benchmarked 
against the value-weighted return as well as equally-weighted return of the S&P 500.  Fama-French Abnormal 
Return is the abnormal return of the issuing firm calculated on the basis of the Fama-French three factor model. 
I omitted firms with no or negative Book Value as well as the 5% outliers in MB value 
 
  
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BHR versus matched firm 1y 1629 -0.75% 0.946 -6.860 8.822
BHR versus matched firm 3y 1629 -14.98% 1.703 -18.011 15.543
BHR versus matched portfolio 1y 1744 0.89% 0.701 -1.629 7.355
BHR versus matched portfolio 3y 1744 -15.90% 1.136 -3.153 16.452
CAAR versus market portfolio (equal weighted) 3y 1797 -14.06% 0.883233 -4.18076 4.772244
CAAR versus market portfolio (value weighted) 3y 1797 -5.77% 0.90449 -3.77964 5.281382
BHR Issuer 3y 1744 19.76% 0.171 0.003 18.625
Fama French Abnormal Return 3y 179 -15.30%
BHR versus matched firm 1y 2674 -2.32% 1.152316 -8.58293 10.94406
BHR versus matched firm 3y 2674 -9.04% 2.990897 -40.2378 54.56193
BHR versus matched portfolio 1y 2599 -0.92% 0.860 -2.694 10.307
BHR versus matched portfolio 3y 2599 -2.83% 2.210 -2.712 53.122
CAAR versus market portfolio (equal weighted) 3y 2895 -11.85% 1.202 -4.450 6.521
CAAR versus market portfolio (value weighted) 3y 2895 -8.55% 1.196 -4.161 6.595
BHR Issuer 3y 2599 23.36% 2.272 0.002 55.591
Fama French Abnormal Return 3y 179 -3.80%
SEO
IPO
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Table 6: Predictions of each hypothesis on the effect on long term performance and corporate decision making 
 
Optimistic 
Manager
Free Cash Flow Window of 
Opportunity
Insiders Buy x Primary Shares Offered 
(=Free Cash) −
Insiders Sell x Primary Shares Offered 
(=Free Cash) − −
Insiders Sell
Or
Insiders Sell * Percentage of Secondary 
Shares Offered to Total Shares 
Outstanding
Capital Expenditures + +
Cash Holdings − − −
Debt Level + + −
−
C
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
 
L
e
v
e
l
D
e
p
e
n
d
a
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
 
 
L
o
n
g
-
T
e
r
m
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
Privately Informed 
Manager
- 104 - 
 
Table 7: Robust OLS regression  
Dependent variable is the 3-year BHR calculated versus a size and MB matched firm. Insiders are defined as 
managers and officers in the respective firm. The sample consists of  companies issuing equity, either in an IPO 
or an SEO, starting January 1st, 1990 through December 31st, 2001 as listed by the Security Data Corporation 
(SDC Platinum). Firms trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
and the NASDAQ. I excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American 
Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions. 
Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value 
on either Compustat or the SDC database are excluded. I consider two distinct periods during which I analyze 
the trading by insiders: Trading Before: Six month before the equity issuance up to one day before the issuance. 
Trading After: Beginning from the end of the lockup period for three months. (in case I lack the exact duration 
of the lockup period, I assume a six months lockup period).The dummy variable Pure Sells (Buys) equals one if 
all insiders only sell (buy) in the respective period.  Prim_to_share_out represents the ratio of primary shares 
offered to all shares outstanding.   
 
Independant Variables
                
Full Sample IPO SEO
       -0.2796*  -0.1006        -0.7722** 
(-1.71) (-0.62) (-2.35)
0.2295         0.3605+          2.4804*  
(0.79) (1.59) (1.72)
-0.146 -0.1645        -0.2952** 
(-1.37) (-0.70) (-2.18)
-0.3252 0.2355 -0.0099
(-0.76) (0.41) (-0.01)
-0.0131 0.151                  
(-0.13) (1.32)                  
0.1476        -0.2863*                   
(0.64) (-1.83)                  
        0.3432*  0.1555         0.8175***
(1.77) (0.88) (2.73)
       -1.2003** -0.3933        -1.9837** 
(-2.48) (-1.18) (-2.40)
        0.3050*** 0.1035         0.4695***
(3.26) (1.06) (3.15)
       -0.6544***        -0.4055** -1.1306
(-2.78) (-2.42) (-1.35)
                                         -0.2779+  
                                  (-1.48)
                                  0.6211
                                  (1.00)
                                          0.2998** 
                                  (2.32)
                                         -1.5686** 
                                  (-2.04)
Constant                1.1573***         1.4993*** 0.7442
                (3.14) (3.89) (1.38)
R-squared       0.024 0.024 0.046
N               3001 2473 1273
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependant Variable: 3 year BHR 
(matched firm approach)
NetSell in Offering (with dilution) x 
prim shares
NetBuy in Offering (with dilution)
NetBuy in Offering (with dilution) x 
primary shares
NetSell in offering (without dilution)
NetSell in offering (without dilution) x 
primary shares
Insider Buy before offering x primary 
shares to shares out
Insider Buy before offering 
Insider Sell before offering 
Insider Sell before offering x primary 
shares to shares out
Insider Buy after lockup
Insider Buy after lockup x primary 
shares to shares out
Insider Sell after lockup
Insider Sell after lockup x primary 
shares to shares out
NetSell in Offering (with dilution)
with robust t-stats 
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Figure 1: The predicted announcement day reaction of SEOs according to different hypotheses 
 
 
positiv
negative
positiv
negative
No Insider Trading
Market believes manager to be optimistic und thus to 
underperform
Insider Buy
Hypothesis Predicted Anouncement Reaction by the MarketObserved Insider Trading
Insider Buy                   Market values insider trading as a valuable signal for 
future performance and believes they have private 
(better) information and trades accordingly Insider Sell
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Figure 2: 3-year BHR performance by type of insider trading 
IPO respectively SEO 3-year BHR against a size and MB machted firm. Divided in terciles according to the 
aggregated insider trading. A buy (sell) is selected if the difference shares bought – sold is positive (negative) in 
the time period 6 month before the offering up to 3 month after the lock up period expired. I omit return outliers 
at the 5% level. 
The sample consists of  companies issuing equity, either in an IPO or an SEO, starting January 1st, 1990 through 
December 31st, 2001 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms trade on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. I excluded unit offers as well as 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility 
companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database are excluded. 
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Figure 3: The distinctive corporate decisions per type of manager  
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Figure 4: Debt levels development after the offering debt levels by type of manager 
This figure displays the number of companies which increase respectively decrease their debt normalized by 
assets in place. I compare the debt-level one year before the offering to one year after the offering as listed in 
data item 9 in the Compustat database, normalized by assets in place in the respective year (data item 6). 
Optimistic (privately informed) managers are defined as such if the managers buy (sell), on an aggregate level, in 
the six month period before the offering up to three months after the lockup period has ended. 
The sample consists of  companies issuing equity, either in an IPO or an SEO, starting January 1st, 1990 through 
December 31st, 2001 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms trade on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. I excluded unit offers as well as 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility 
companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database are excluded. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Capital Expenditure development after the offering by type of manager 
This figure displays the number of companies which increase respectively decrease their capital expenditures 
normalized by assets in place. I compare the level in capital expenditures one year before the offering to one year 
after the offering as listed in data item 128 in the Compustat database, normalized by assets in place in the 
respective year (data item 6). Optimistic (privately informed) managers are defined as such if the managers buy 
(sell), on an aggregate level, in the six month period before the offering up to three months after the lockup 
period has ended. 
The sample consists of  companies issuing equity, either in an IPO or an SEO, starting January 1st, 1990 through 
December 31st, 2001 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms trade on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. I excluded unit offers as well as 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility 
companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database are excluded. 
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Figure 6: Cash development after the offering by type of manager.  
This figure displays the number of companies which increase respectively decrease their cash holdings 
normalized by assets in place. I compare the cash level one year before the offering to one year after the offering 
as listed in data item 1 in the Compustat database, normalized by assets in place in the respective year (data item 
6). Optimistic (privately informed) managers are defined as such if the managers buy (sell), on an aggregate 
level, in the six month period before the offering up to three months after the lockup period has ended. 
The sample consists of  companies issuing equity, either in an IPO or an SEO, starting January 1st, 1990 through 
December 31st, 2001 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms trade on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. I excluded unit offers as well as 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility 
companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database are excluded. 
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IPO.  Furthermore, managers are actively managing their cash holdings prior the IPO. They fear the 
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company of its hard assets before going public. 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification Code: G32; G35 
Keywords: Initial Public Offerings, Dividend Payments  
                                                 
1 Swiss Finance Institute, University of Lugano, Via Giuseppe Buffi 13, CH-6904 Lugano, Switzerland. Email: 
Jens.Martin@lu.unisi.ch. Tel: +41 58 666 4494. Fax: +41 58 666 46 47. Presenting Author.   
2 John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Email: 
Richard_Zeckhauser@harvard.edu. Tel: +1 617 495 1174.  
 
 
- 114 - 
 
1. Introduction 
In May 2006, Burger King conducted an Initial Public Offering (IPO). The company sold 
primary shares to raise 400 million USD in new funds. However, before going public, they paid out 
in February 2006 a dividend of 367 million USD to old shareholders. In addition, they paid 33 
million USD to its senior management as compensation payment at the same time. This anecdote 
illustrates the puzzle we investigate here: Why does a company choose to pay dividends only to pay 
fees shortly afterwards to raise monies in an IPO? An extensive literature exists concerning cash 
holdings after IPOs, such as McLean (2008), as well as research on dividend initiations after the 
IPO, such as Lipson, Maquieira and Megginson (1998). Surprisingly, the phenomenon of dividend 
payments prior to an IPO has received little attention. This paper seeks to help to fill this gap. 
First, we develop three different potential explanations as to why a firm contemplating an 
IPO, and its shareholders, would prefer to receive dividends prior to going public. The first two 
involve the avoidance of negative signals. The third is the avoidance of insufficient valuation: cash 
on hand is undervalued in an IPO.  
Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that stock sales by insiders as part of an IPO send a negative 
signal to the market.  Investors are afraid that inside shareholders are trading on private information 
and will potentially avoid the issue. Brau and Fawcett (2006) find that managers are indeed 
concerned about this signal. Thus, managers might try to use dividends as a means to circumvent 
sending this negative signal: either by substituting the dividend payment prior to the IPO for selling 
secondary shares to secure liquidity. Alternatively, a manager might split the amount of liquidity he 
receives into two parts, dividend payments prior to the IPO and secondary shares in the IPO.  
In a second explanation, managers believe their company to be temporarily overvalued. The 
managers want to take the advantage of this window of opportunity to go public. High levels of 
cash provoke the question of potential investors as to why a company needs the new funds of the 
equity issuances. In addition, the manager assumes a long term underperformance due to the 
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overvaluation. Consequently, the manager will reduce the level of cash and strip the company of its 
hard and liquid assets before going public. 
Our third hypothesis argues that the market undervalues excess cash in an IPO. The market 
focuses foremost on the prospects of the firm going public, such as new products, new technology 
and other stories surrounding the offering. In such a scenario, the market neglects the amount of 
liquidity in the company and undervalues it. Consequently it is optimal for managers to reduce the 
undervalued excess cash before the IPO. 
Dividend payments are public information. Thus, our first two hypotheses imply that 
investors do not accurately monitor the company or do not fully understand the motivation behind 
these dividend payments.  
We measure dividend payments in a period up to three years prior to an IPO as well as in the 
year the company goes public. Dividend payments, both three years as well as one year before the 
offering, are large in number and economically significant. This is true both in relation to proceeds 
raised in an IPO as well as in relation to the market value of the company. We find evidence 
supporting our hypothesis that pre-IPO shareholders use dividends as a means to extract value as 
they reduce ownership in the company. Pre-IPO shareholders split the amount they wish to sell and 
avoid, in such a way, the appearance of having lost the confidence in the company. We find that 
pre-IPO dividend payments help to explain the amount of secondary shares sold in the offering. 
Greater dividends imply a larger amount of secondary shares sold. Both of these are consistent with 
our hypothesis.  
We reject the second hypothesis that manager believe their company to be overvalued and 
thus try to strip the company of part of its liquid assets. The differences in the long term 
performance between both groups are not significant or even in favor of dividend-paying 
companies, both in terms of descriptive statistics as well as in the regression findings. 
We find evidence consistent with our overvaluation hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, 
managers will reduce their excess cash holdings until they believe the market values a dollar in cash 
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correctly. Even though companies that pay dividends prior to their IPO are bigger and have positive 
earnings, their cash holdings after dividends are remarkably similar to those of non-dividend paying 
companies in absolute terms, both on average and in the median. However, taking into 
consideration the dividends already paid out, they would exhibit significantly larger cash holdings 
than non-dividend paying companies, supporting our hypothesis. Normalizing cash holdings by 
assets in place yields a similar pattern as described above. In the next step we regress the impact of 
cash before the IPO on the valuation of the IPO at the offer day. We find that the coefficient of pre-
IPO cash holdings on Tobin’s Q at the time of the offering is positive.  However, its square term is 
negative. This supports the hypothesis that value of each additional dollar of cash on the balance 
sheets is positive, whilst its incremental value on the firm valuation is decreasing. Thus, by 
managing their cash and paying out dividends prior to the IPO, companies minimize wealth losses 
due to undervaluation of excess cash. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the literature. Section 3 
illustrates three potential hypotheses explaining this phenomenon and subsequently discusses the 
costs and benefits of paying dividends versus selling secondary shares. In Section 4 we describe the 
data and Section 5 develops testable predictions and take these to the data. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature 
 
Several papers in the literature investigate the value of cash in established companies. 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) look into the value of US companies across different industries. 
They find that on average the marginal market value of a dollar of cash in the balance sheet is one 
dollar. However, they observe a very pronounced cross-sectional variation across industries. 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) undertake a cross-country study. They show that cash 
holdings of companies are valued more highly in countries with good shareholder protection, 
whereas dividend payments are valued more highly in countries with low shareholder protection. 
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Both use a derivation of a Fama and French (1998) model to evaluate cash. Other papers 
investigated the cash holdings after the IPO and its implications, see for example McLean (2008). 
However, none to our knowledge have looked at the amount of cash and dividend payments prior to 
the IPO.  
Faulkender and Wang (2006) investigate the marginal value of cash of publicly listed 
companies. They identify three different regimes that lead to significantly different valuations of the 
marginal dollar. They argue that cash distributing companies, which pay out dividends, will have a 
marginal value of less than one dollar, because of dividend taxes, corporate taxes and individual 
taxes that have to be subtracted. Thus a dollar in the balance sheet may be worth, in their numerical 
example, only 57 cents. Furthermore they argue that highly leveraged companies will have a lower 
marginal value of cash, as the cash will benefit debt holders. In contrast, companies which seek to 
raise cash are expected to have a marginal value of cash of more than one dollar. As they seek to 
raise capital for new projects, they have to pay a transaction costs for each dollar they need.  
Cash raising companies are the focus of our interest. Leaving aside the costs of conducting a 
roadshow, and the increasing costs of raising even more capital, a firm with a 300 million USD IPO 
can expect to pay about 7% on the margin for each extra dollar of cash raised. This explains why 
paying dividends prior to an IPO represents a puzzle. Each dollar paid out gets replaced with a 
dollar that costs the firm at least $1.07. This figure will be even higher when we consider the costs 
incurred due to the underpricing of the offering. 
Companies paying out dividends before a seasoned equity offering are not rare events, as 
has been shown by Deangelo, Deangelo and Stulz (2007). They find that a large number of 
companies conducting a Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO). 41.4% of companies in their sample pay 
dividends in the year prior to the equity offering. They find evidence that companies that conduct a 
SEO issue shares because they face a high probability of future liquidity needs. 
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3. Motivation and costs of paying out dividends prior 
to the IPO versus selling secondary shares in the 
IPO 
In the first part of this section we will discuss the different potential hypotheses explaining 
the managers’ motivation to partly exit via dividends prior to the IPO instead of selling secondary 
shares during the IPO. In the second part we highlight the different costs and tax treatments 
involved.  
Potential motivation to exit via dividends 
We identified three potential motivations of managers to pay out dividends prior to the 
offering. We discuss these three theoretically and will take them to the data in the following section. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) cite several reasons for a company to go public. They argue that 
financial reasons are the primary motivation and non-financial reasons are of only minor 
importance. The two main financial reasons are raising new funds for the company for future 
investments as well as for old shareholders to diversify/exit (Zingales (1995). Additional reasons to 
conduct an IPO include the possibility to raise future funds via SEOs, higher stock liquidity, 
increased visibility by the firm or having a market price on the company to facilitate mergers and 
acquisitions. 
The number of IPOs, as shown by Lowry (2003), varies greatly over time. She shows that 
the number depends on capital demand of businesses as well as investor sentiment, also called the 
“window of opportunity”. Selling in favorable windows enables managers to take advantage of their 
knowledge of a temporary overvaluation of their company by the stock market.   
Being aware of the informational advantage of managers, potential investors try to infer 
from managerial behavior and the balance sheet of the firm the motivation behind the equity 
issuance. By paying dividends/modifying their cash in the balance sheets, managers may try to alter 
or jam that signal. 
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Paying out dividends to avoid selling secondary shares to the market. 
Managers and shareholders have the potential to significantly reduce the equity stake in the 
company during an IPO by issuing a large amount of secondary shares. However, they generally 
refrain from doing so. Managers correctly fear that selling a large number of secondary shares 
during the IPO will send a bad signal to the market as Leland and Pyle (1977) as well as Brau and 
Fawcett (2006) point out. The number and type of shares offered in an IPO are part of the 
registration statement and the prospectus, as required by the Securities Act of 1933 (Ellis, Michaely 
and O'Hara (2000)) and thus known to the public. Managers believe that selling a large number of 
secondary shares will lead to a lower offer price. To try avoid sending this negative signal, 
managers possibly revert to paying out the total or part of the amount by which shareholders wish to 
disinvest in the form of dividends prior to the IPO. During the IPO the company subsequently sells 
primary shares, which do not send a negative signal to the market, and raise in such a way the 
amount prior paid out in form of dividends,  
Window of Opportunity - Stripping a company of its hard assets 
Several papers have found evidence that managers act according to the “Window of 
Opportunity” theory, both for IPOs (Lowry (2003)) as well as for SEOs (Lee (1997), Clarke, 
Dunbar and Kahle (2004)). Managers believe that investor sentiment is sometimes high and thus 
that investors overvalue the company. Thus, the project of going public is in itself a positive net 
present value (NPV) project and managers do not seek the cash raised to be invested into new 
projects. Managers expect, however, that the value of the company will revert towards its true value 
and thus decrease from the offer price and underperform. Investors overvalue future investment 
opportunities and intangible assets, not the cash on the balance sheet. Thus, managers have an 
incentive to try to strip off the company of hard assets, such as cash, before bringing the overvalued 
company public, which consequently underperforms in the long run. In addition, the amount of cash 
held by a specific company prior to going public sends a certain signal to the market. Managers 
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might fear that a very high level in cash holdings provokes the question of potential investors as to 
why a company needs the new funds of the equity issuance. For example, the pecking order theory 
predicts that managers, due to agency costs, would first revert to internal funds, than debt and 
would only raise money at the stock market as the third option (Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
Investors might infer from an IPO where there is cash on hand that managers act on private 
information such as the window of opportunity. In such instances the management will try to reduce 
cash holding to levels of cash holdings of the average (non-dividend paying) IPO or to the average 
industry level in order to avoid this discount. Thus, managers have an additional motivation to 
decrease cash holdings under this hypothesis. 
Undervaluation of cash 
Under this hypothesis the market focuses on certain aspects of the firm going public. For 
example, it concentrates its attention to new technologies, new products or new patents. For 
example, during the internet bubble of the late 90’s the market became very focused on new internet 
and biotech start-ups, which it thought would revolutionize business in the future. Other aspects of 
the company, such as cash, were possibly undervalued. Thus, a dollar of dividends paid out is more 
valuable than the (undervalued) marginal dollar in excess cash in the IPO. Hence, managers will 
reduce the amount of cash until the manager believes the cash in the company to be valued 
correctly.  
Costs involved in paying dividends versus selling secondary shares 
The tax treatment of paying dividends as opposed to selling secondary shares during the 
offering has differed historically. The U.S. tax system can be classified as a “classical tax system” 
(Graham (2003)). In such a system interest, capital gains and dividends are paid upon receipt by the 
individual investors. In the context of this paper, the investor has to pay dividend taxes in case of a 
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cash payout prior to the offering and capital gains tax in case he is selling shares during the IPO. In 
the following we will address first dividend taxation and then capital gains taxation. 
Until 2003, dividends were taxed according to the marginal tax rate of the individual 
recipient, with a maximum of 35 percent. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003 (thereafter “tax act 2003”) provided a significant change of tax levels of dividend, reducing it 
to 15%3 (Chetty and Saez (2005)). The impact of this reduction in dividend taxes has been 
investigated in several studies. Armstrong, Davila and Foster (2006) find a 20% increase in 
dividend enactments. These increases were especially strong for companies with an ownership 
structure that benefited most from this tax reduction. Moreover, companies with a high incentive for 
the manager to adapt to the new tax treatment, thus companies with high share ownership and low 
option holdings by executives, responded especially strongly. 
In this study we focus on pre-IPO shareholders and their exit strategies. On average, these 
individuals, for example founders, business partners as well as managers, own a considerable stake 
of the company which they bring public. Thus, we argue that it is reasonable to assume that these 
investors will belong to a high income group and tax group. In the subsequent investigation we 
assume their dividend tax rate prior the tax act 2003 to be 33 or 35 percent and after the tax act to be 
15 percent. Their capital gains taxes are assumed to be 28 percent up to 1997, 20 up to 2003 and 15 
percent thereafter.  
INSERT Figure 1 HERE 
Figure 1summarizes the tax rate on dividends as well as capital gains for an individual with 
an income of $100,000. In summary we can deduct that, from a tax point of view, exiting via 
dividends is worse for pre-IPO shareholders than exiting via share-sales up until the tax act 2003. 
Between 1990 and 1997, the tax on dividends was 7 percent higher than the capital gains tax. 
                                                 
3 See Appendix for a more detailed discussion on tax rate changes in our sample period 
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Between up until 2003 the difference increased to 15 percent. After 2003 they were taxed equally. 
In addition to the tax rate, the amount to be taxed differs. Investors have to tax the dividends as a 
whole, while they only have to tax the gains when selling during the IPO. From the standpoint of 
the company, paying out dividends or selling secondary shares does not alter its tax liabilities and 
is, hence, indifferent between these two payments to shareholders from a tax point of view. 
We will examine how these different tax gaps affected the use of dividend payout prior to 
the IPO. We include dividend payouts up to three years before the IPO.  
Exit costs  
The point in time when shareholders exit, before or during the IPO, changes the type of 
charges incurred. We focus on companies conducting equity offerings. Hence, we assume that the 
company or other insiders are not able or willing to fully pay out existing shareholders from internal 
sources. The company is forced to refinance itself by raising equity.  
The most relevant cost factors incurred during the IPO are the investment banking fees, 
which are proportional to the total proceeds raised. The gross spread, the sum of the management 
fee, the underwriting fee and the selling concession, refers to the total fees which investment banks 
charge in an IPO. It is clustered at 7% for the most U.S. IPOs as shown by Chen and Ritter (2000).   
The gross spread is calculated as a percentage of total proceeds raised. Consequently, the 
exit costs via secondary shares compared to the costs of exiting via dividends plus primary shares 
are identical. In addition, the underpricing4 of IPO can be viewed as an additional substantial cost5 
in going public. However, this cost is relative to the total proceeds and thus identical for both types 
of shares sold. 
Alternatively pre-IPO shareholders can exit after the IPO, more precisely after the end of the 
lockup period of the IPO. IPOs are in general followed by a lockup period of 180 days. The lockup 
                                                 
4 The difference between the offer price and the share price at the end of the first trading day 
5 Underpricing varies over time with an average of 22% over the past 20 years and a maximum average in 1999 of 71% 
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period is a voluntary agreement between the underwriter and the investment bank in which the pre-
IPO shareholders agree not to sell, short sell or in any other way disinvest from the company. Thus, 
if pre-IPO shareholders do not exit during or before the IPO, the first time they could sell their 
shares is 180 after the offer day, but with lower exiting costs. The costs incurred at this point in time 
results only from the actual selling of the shares. 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our sample consists of companies conducting an IPO and issuing common class A shares 
from the years 1996 until 2006, as recorded in the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. All 
firms included are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) or NASDAQ subsequent to their offering are included in the sample with the following 
exceptions. Consistent with previous research we omit unit offerings, Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end mutual funds, financial companies 
and utilities. Consistent with IPO literature (Ritter and Zhang (2007)), we also drop all offerings 
with an offer price of less than $5. We omit companies with a negative book value. We screen for 
and correct the data on possible errors such as inconsistencies in primary and secondary shares 
offered and the resulting proceeds, the number of shares outstanding, missing or erroneous sales, 
and errors in the high tech firms’ classification. Our final sample consists of 4,228 companies 
From SDC we obtain information on the IPO, the offer price, insider ownership at the time 
of the offering, and primary and secondary shares offered. Stock returns, share volume traded and 
shares outstanding are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Data on dividends, 
cash, assets and other financial variables used in this study are obtained from Compustat. We use 
third-party sources, for example as provided by Jay Ritter (2006), to correct our sample. As 
robustness checks, we cross-check the pre-IPO dividend payments obtained from the databases with 
the information provided in the offering prospectus.   
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Are cash dividend pay-outs economically significant? 
To address the question if dividend payments of companies prior to the IPO are 
economically significant, we investigate both the frequency of cash dividends paid out by issuing 
firms as well as their magnitude. We look at dividends paid out both in the time period starting 
three years and alternatively starting one year before the IPO up until the offering6. We define 
magnitude in this context as the amount of proceeds that had to be raised in the IPO in order to refill 
the cash distributed via dividends beforehand. Hence, we normalize the sum of these cash dividends 
by the proceeds of the primary shares offered during the IP. We focus on proceeds from primary 
shares which benefit the company. Selling shareholders, on the other hand, receive the proceeds 
from secondary shares sold. In a second analysis we relate the dividends paid to the total market 
capitalization of the respective company.  
Are cash dividend payouts before an IPO a rare event? 
We find companies pay out dividends frequently prior to their IPO. We observe a total of 
1,282 IPOs, out of 4,228 IPOs in total, in which companies paid out cash dividends during the three 
years before the IPO. This represents 30% of all IPOs in our dataset. In the year leading up to the  
IPO we observe 1,036 companies paying out dividends, representing 25% of our sample. 
Number of companies paying cash dividends before the IPO 
 
 
                                                 
6 We use the annual Compustat database, because the quarterly Compustat database lists dividends sometimes twice. In 
future work we will reduce the one year window to a three month window prior to the IPO. 
Number of 
companies
% of 
companies
Yes 1'282 30.3%
No 2'943 69.7%
Yes 1'036 24.5%
No 3'192 75.5%
Companies paying cash dividends 
1 year prior the IPO
3 years prior the IPO
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Do companies paying out pre-IPO dividends differ? 
Both types of companies have roughly the same market capitalization. However, dividend 
paying firms are 60% larger in terms of total assets in place. Table 1 illustrates the differences in the 
descriptive statistics between the two types of companies.  
INSERT Table 1 HERE 
Dividend paying companies tend to be older, and larger in terms of both sales and assets in 
place. They are strikingly more profitable, with positive EPS, as opposed to negative EPS for 
companies not paying dividends. The pattern applies both on average and at the median. Paying 
dividends despite negative earnings almost certainly would appear suspicious. Interestingly, we 
observe that both groups exhibit very similar cash amounts in their balance sheet before the IPO and 
after the dividends have been paid out   
In a next step and as a robustness check, we normalize firm variables by assets in place. We 
observe similar trends to Table 1. Dividend-paying companies tend to have larger normalized sales, 
higher long-term debt and higher earnings normalized by assets in place compared to non-dividend 
paying companies, as shown in Table 2. Comparing the normalized cash holdings, we see that 
dividend paying companies have actually less cash holdings than non-dividend paying firms after 
dividends. Non dividend paying companies have a higher market-to-book ratio and lower, indeed 
negative, EPS ratio.  
 INSERT Table 2 HERE  
While Table 1 and Table 2 show the characteristics of companies paying out dividends up to 
three year prior to their IPO, the firm characteristics of companies paying out dividends in the year 
leading up to the IPO are very similar (not shown). 
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Did dividend payout respond to tax changes? 
To see whether the dividend payouts responded to significant tax changes, especially the tax 
act of 2003, we investigate their time path over the past decade. We find them to be closely related 
to the number of total IPOs in our sample, both for companies paying out dividends up to three 
years as well as one year before the IPO ,as can be seen in Figure 2.  
INSERT Figure 2 HERE 
The ratio of cash dividends paying to non-paying firms prior to their IPO varies between 
20% and 60% during the issuing years. As shown in Figure 1, the tax act in 2003 reduced the 
dividend taxes and closed the gap between the capital gains tax and the dividend tax. Both were set 
hence at 15 percent for the upper income brackets. The effect of this regulatory change is visible in 
the data. Beginning in 2002, we observe an increase in the ratio of pre-IPO dividend paying 
companies, topping 70% in 2005. However, the sample size in these years due to the relatively 
small numbers in IPOs is not large. 
INSERT Table 3 HERE  
In the following we seek to answer if the amount of cash paid out is different over time. We 
split our sample into quartiles according to the dividends paid out prior its IPO, normalized by 
either assets in place at the time of the offering or by the proceeds from primary shares. It is hard to 
see a clear pattern.  Interestingly, we detect a much higher payout rate in the last years compared to 
the beginning of the 90s, which indicates the impact of the 2003 tax act. We see a larger number of 
dividend payments and especially a higher amount of the dividends paid out after 2003.  
INSERT Figure 3 HERE  
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Is the size of the cash dividend paid out before the offering significant? 
So far we have shown that the number of firms paying out dividends prior to the IPO is 
consistent over time and significant in terms of IPO volume. Next, we want to see whether these 
money transfers to existing shareholders constitute a significant percentage of the proceeds raised 
during the offering and if these transfers are significant in terms of market valuation of the 
company. 
Figure 4 shows the amount of cash dividends paid out up one year respectively three years 
before the offering, normalized by the amount of proceeds raised from primary shares.  
INSERT Figure 4 HERE 
We find that, on average, dividend paying IPOs use 26% (median 9.1%) of their proceeds 
from primary shares to refinance their dividends paid out in the three years before the offering. 20% 
(median 7.1%) of the proceeds raised has been paid out in the year prior to the offering in form of 
dividends. 120 companies, representing 10% of our sample, use 60% of their proceeds to pay for 
earlier dividends. Out of dividend paying companies, 429 paid out more than 20% of the IPO 
proceeds raised from primary shares. 191 companies redistributed 50% or more to their old 
shareholders before the IPO. The 90th percentile of dividend paying companies paid out 66% or 
more of their IPO proceeds from primary shares in the three years prior to the IPO and 53.3% in the 
year leading up to the IPO. 
The dividends paid are economically significant in terms of market valuation of the dividend 
paying companies as well. Their mean represents 1.6% of the market capitalization for all IPOs and 
6.4% for the subsample of companies paying out dividends 3 years before their IPO (as shown in 
Figure 5). While we observe that a large majority of payouts represents less than 2% (the median 
for dividend paying firms is 1.8%) in terms of market valuation, we observe a substantial number of 
economically large payouts. 
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INSERT Figure 5 HERE 
5. Testing possible hypotheses to explain dividend 
payments prior to an IPO 
In this section, we seek to test empirically the hypotheses laid out in theory earlier in this 
paper. In particular, we seek to test whether managers try to avoid of sending a bad signal of selling 
secondary shares in IPO, if they try to time the market and strip their company of liquid asset or if 
they pay out dividends in reaction to an undervaluation of cash by the market. 
Do managers try to avoid selling secondary shares during an IPO to 
avoid sending a negative signal to the market? 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) show that managers are well aware of the negative signal that 
selling a high amount of shares during the offering sends to the market. CFOs believe that the 
market interprets this signal as a sign that managers are pessimistic about the future performance of 
the firm. Even if this selling may be due to reasons independent of future performance, such as 
diversification or liquidity, the market will fear this trading to be based on the informational 
advantage of the managers. However, managers and their counseling investment bankers might 
believe that not the insider selling itself, but a certain level of insider selling is sending the bad 
signal. Thus they might aim to avoid a certain threshold of secondary shares sold in the IPO, and 
split the envisioned amount existing shareholders seeks to sell during the IPO, into two parts: a cash 
dividend prior to the offering followed by the offering of secondary shares in the IPO.  
We first investigate whether managers see dividends as a substitute of secondary shares or 
as a means to avoid surpassing a certain threshold in secondary shares sold at the IPO. We 
normalize the primary and secondary shares valued at the offer prize by assets in place and compare 
these values if a firm issues a cash dividend prior to its IPO. As shown in Table 4, the value of the 
normalized primary as well as secondary shares is higher for non-dividend paying companies. The 
- 129 - 
 
percentage of primary shares offered as the percentage of all shares offered decreases from 91.6 % 
to 85.6 % for dividend payers. This increase is an indication that dividend payers issue dividends in 
addition to selling secondary shares during the IPO, and not as a substitute. 
INSERT Table 4 HERE 
However, the level of dividend payouts before an offering might distort the above table. We 
thus test if the large number of dividend paying companies is paying out a relative low dividend 
before the IPO tends to be similar to non-dividend payers. Companies paying out a large dividend 
before the IPO possibly exhibit a different pattern. We divide our sample of dividend paying 
companies into quartiles according to the amount of dividends paid, normalized by the proceeds 
raised. Additionally we add, as the fifth and biggest group, the non-dividend paying companies.  
INSERT Table 5 HERE 
The percentage of secondary shares offered increases with the value of dividends paid out 
before the IPO, normalized by assets in place. On the other hand, the normalized market value of 
secondary shares offered remains stable along the low to high dividend payer quartile. Only the 
highest dividend paying quartile exhibits a propensity to issue more secondary shares in terms of 
market value. This might serve as an indicator that companies try to avoid to exceed a certain 
threshold by splitting up the amount they seek to sell. The fact that we see an increase of secondary 
shares paid out leads us to the conclusion that the dividends paid out before an IPO are not a 
substitute for the offering of secondary shares. As a robustness check, we recalculate the table and 
normalize the market value of the primary and secondary shares by the proceeds raised instead of 
the assets in place. Consistent with our earlier findings, we observe that dividend paying companies 
tend to issue more secondary shares. Across the different dividend payout portfolios we see a 
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similar value of secondary shares paid out, confirming the assumption that firms use dividends as a 
compliment and not as a substitute for the issuance of secondary shares. 
Thus managers seem to be willing to sell secondary shares in the IPO, but will try to split the 
amount they want to sell between dividends paid out and secondary shares sold. In such a setting 
the amount of dividends paid out will be a strong predictor of secondary shares sold in an offering, 
but to a lesser extent a predictor of primary shares. We test this hypothesis in a robust OLS 
regression by examining if the number of secondary shares as well as primary shares is determined 
in part by the amount of cash dividends paid out earlier. Table 6 illustrates our findings. 
INSERT Table 6 HERE 
Consistent with our argument, we find that cash dividends paid out in the three years 
preceding the IPO are a strong and highly significant predictor of the number of secondary shares 
offered. These cash dividends have, on the other hand, no predictive power over the number of 
primary shares offered. The dividend payments in the year prior to the IPO have similar, highly 
significant, coefficient (not shown). 
Do managers strip their companies of hard assets? 
Managers conducting an equity offering, because they believe the company to be 
temporarily overvalued, will expect the company to revert to its true value in the long run. The 
market overvalues the companies because it believes the company has better current and future 
investment opportunities than the managers. Thus, managers might be tempted to strip the company 
of its hard and liquid assets, for example by paying cash dividends prior to going public. After its 
IPO, the company will revert toward its true, lower value. In addition, managers fear that having too 
much cash on their balance sheet will worry investors. Potential investors will raise doubts about 
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the true intentions of the IPO if the company has already a high amount of excess cash. To avoid 
sending this signal to investors, managers will reduce the amount of excess cash.  
From the above discussion we are able to derive the following testable conjecture: dividend 
payments prior to the IPO will predict IPO underperformance. We calculate the three year abnormal 
buy and hold returns (BHRs) based on daily returns as reported by the Center for Research on 
Security Prices (CRSP). For our long-term performance calculation we use BHRs as Barber and 
Lyon (1997) suggest. For robustness we calculate Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAARs). BHR returns are calculated by matching the IPO company to its size decile composed of 
companies listed at the NYSE, Amex as well as NASDAQ. Furthermore we use as a return 
benchmark the value weighted as well as equally weighted market portfolio. For further details on 
the calculation please refer to the Appendix.  
Comparing long-term performance between dividend paying companies and non-dividend 
payers, we see that pre-IPO dividend paying companies perform as well as non pre-IPO paying 
dividend companies up to the first year after the offering, as shown in Figure 6. 
INSERT Figure 6 HERE 
However, after three years we find that non-dividend paying companies underperform 
dividend paying companies. This contradicts the notion that managers strip their company of hard 
assets due to an overvaluation of the firm. The difference in performance is significant if 
benchmarked against the value weighted market portfolio. It is statistically significant at 1% level 
using a non-parametrical test such as the Kruskal-Wallis test. However, the difference in 
performance is insignificant when benchmarked against the size matched portfolio. The observable 
pattern of no-underperformance in the first year and subsequent underperformance after three years 
by our IPO sample is consistent with earlier studies on the performance of IPOs, such as Ritter 
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(1991). In a next step we want to test the impact of dividends on long-term performance using a 
robust OLS regress.  
INSERT Table 7 HERE 
As Table 7 shows, the impact of dividend payments on long-term performance is 
insignificant. We include the year fixed effects as well as industry fixed effects to account for 
potential variations on these dimensions. From these results, we can conclude that managers do not 
use pre-IPO dividend payments to strip a company of its hard assets prior to its IPO. As a 
robustness check we calculate the BHR against size and book-to-market matched portfolios which 
yields similar results (not shown). 
Does the market undervalue excess cash? 
If the market overemphasizes its focus on certain aspects of the firm, such as technology, 
future projects, etc., it will put less emphasis on other parts of the company, for example the cash 
levels of a company. Thus, it potentially undervalues excess cash, the level of cash above a certain 
threshold. It is, under this hypothesis, optimal for the manager to reduce the level of cash berfor the 
IPO. If all managers maximize the wealth of their shareholders in such a manner, the level of cash 
in non dividend paying companies gives us an indication on the level of this threshold. 
We reconstruct the cash holdings prior to the IPO as if no dividends would have been paid 
out. Indeed, the data draws a very clear picture and is consistent with the prediction that companies 
actively manage their cash holdings prior to an IPO. Comparing the levels of cash if no dividends 
would have been paid out, as shown in Figure 7, dividend paying companies would have a 74 % 
higher amount of cash, both on average and in the median, than non-dividend paying companies.  
INSERT Figure 7 HERE  
- 133 - 
 
However, after the actual payment of dividends prior to the IPO, both groups of companies 
have very similar cash holdings. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that managers try to 
actively manage their cash holdings prior to an IPO and to reduce those cash to the threshold of 
non-dividend paying companies. This behavior is even more striking as paying out dividends prior 
the IPO is more costly than selling secondary shares in an IPO, as we have seen from the discussion 
on costs and taxes. In a second step in this analysis we want to test whether the coefficient of cash 
prior to the IPO on the valuation of the IPO value (we take the Market-to-Book value as a proxy) is 
linear. If, on the other hand, the market increasingly undervalues the marginal dollar in excess cash, 
the slope of the coefficient of cash on the valuation of the IPO should be concave. We test this 
assumption in a robust OLS regression. We regress the amount of cash prior to the IPO as well as 
its square term on the Market to Book value at the time of the offering.  
INSERT Table 8 HERE 
Table 8 shows that, while cash prior to the IPO has an (insignificant) positive coefficient, the 
square term of the cash variable has a at, the 9% level, negative impact on the Market-to-Book 
value of the company at the time of the offering. This indicates that the positive impact of cash on 
the company is decreasing with the amount of cash in the books of a company prior to its IPO. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that the market puts less value on each marginal dollar in 
excess cash. Managers reacting to this market behavior will seek to reduce their cash holding before 
the IPO accordingly. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate dividend payments of companies prior to their IPO. We find 
these payments to be significant economically across our whole sample period from 1990 through 
2006. These payments are a puzzle, as, especially before the 2003 tax act, dividends were taxed 
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higher than capital gains and thus it was more costly for shareholders to receive dividends than 
selling secondary shares in an IPO.  
We develop and test three hypotheses which could explain this phenomenon. We find 
evidence that pre-IPO shareholders use dividends as a means to exit the company before the IPO 
itself. In such a way they are able to avoid sending a negative signal to the market by selling a large 
amount of secondary shares during the IPO itself. We reject the second hypothesis that managers 
believe their company to be in a window of opportunity and thus temporarily overvalued. After the 
IPO, the company would revert to its true, lower, level. Managers will consequently strip the 
company of its hard assets and reduce the cash levels in a company, in order to avoid suspicion by 
potential investors about the true motivation for the IPO. However, we do not find that pre-IPO 
dividend paying companies underperform non-dividend paying IPOs. However, we fund support for 
our third hypothesis. The market focuses on certain aspects of company going public such as 
products, technology and industry performance and ignores and thus undervalues cash levels. As a 
consequence, managers try to actively manage the cash levels of a company by reducing the excess 
cash to levels of non pre-IPO dividend paying companies. Consistent, we observe that the market 
decreases the value it attributes on an incremental dollar in cash of an IPO.   
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7. Figures 
 
Figure 1: Capital gains and dividend tax rates for an individual with an income of  $100,000 
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Figure 2: Number of companies paying out cash dividends before the IPO in relation to the whole sample per year 
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the 
Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), 
closed end mutual funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a 
company paying a cash dividend one respectively three years prior to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. 
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Figure 3: The number of companies paying out dividends, per quartile and normalized by proceeds raised from primary shares per year 
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the 
Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), 
closed end mutual funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a 
company paying a cash dividend one respectively three years prior to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. Cash dividends are obtained from 
CRSP. We split our sample into quartiles according to the dividend paid out normalized by the value of primary shares offered at the IPO. 
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Figure 4: Cash dividend paid out before IPO normalized by proceeds raised from primary shares 
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 
1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms 
included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and 
offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have 
been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a company paying a cash dividend one respectively three 
years prior to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. Cash dividends are obtained from CRSP and 
normalized by the primary shares offered at the IPO. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of the value of dividend payments prior to the IPO normalized by the market valuation of 
the firm 
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 
1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms 
included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and 
offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have 
been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a company paying a cash dividend one respectively three 
years prior to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. Cash dividends are obtained from CRSP and 
normalized by the market valuation at the offer date of the IPO (shares outstanding after IPO * 
Offer Price). 
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Figure 6: Long-term performance by type of company 
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 
1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms 
included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and 
offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have 
been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a company paying a cash dividend three years prior up to 
the offering date, as reported in CRSP. We calculate the three year abnormal buy and hold returns 
(BHRs) based on daily returns as reported by the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). 
BHR returns are calculated by matching the IPO company to its size decile composed of companies 
listed at the NYSE, Amex as well as NASDAQ. 
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Figure 7: Amount of cash at time of IPO with and without dividends 
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 
1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms 
included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and 
offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A 
shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have 
been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a company paying a cash dividend three years prior up to 
the offering date, as reported in CRSP. Cash and Equivalents are obtained from Compustat, Cash 
and Equivalents before IPO if no dividends would have been paid out are Cash and Equivalents plus 
dividends paid in the three years prior to the IPO 
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8. Tables  
 
Table 1: Sample descriptive 
 
 
  
No Pre-IPO Dividend Payer Pre-IPO Dividend Payer
Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median
Market Capitalization 
(valued at offer price) 2704 598 148 1161 668 185 10.5% 19.6%
Cash and Equivalents 
before IPO 3015 52.79 2.64 1350 53.92 2.81 2.1% 6.1%
Cash and Equivalents 
before IPO if no dividends 
would have been paid out
3015 52.79 2.64 1350 106.92 9.96 50.6% 73.5%
Long Term Debt 3015  0.47 1374 196.08 5.61 #VALUE! 91.6%
R&D 3104 6.26 0.67 1374 6.71 0.00 6.6%
Advertising Expenses 3175 7.51 1.07 364 16.36 2.50 54.1% 57.1%
Non Cash Assets 920 418.12 25.42 1377 1185.64 80.60 64.7% 68.5%
Net Sales 3106 175.96 31.67 1378 551.56 105.54 68.1% 70.0%
Cost of Sales 3097 121.46 17.27 1378 393.60 63.85 69.1% 72.9%
SGA 3095 41.36 16.05 1156 84.92 20.04 51.3% 19.9%
Dilution 2633 0.04 0.00 449 0.06 0.00 42.3%
EPS 1191 -0.50 -0.03 1370 0.48 0.60 203.2% 104.2%
Firm Age 3000 13 7 1313 22 12 43.1% 41.7%
Ratio (Paying - No-
Paying)/No-Paying
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st,
1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms
included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and
offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares.
Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have been
excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a company is paying a cash
dividend three years prior up to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. 
Firm age was obtained from Fay Ritter's website. Other variables are from the merged
Compustat/CRSP database. Proceeds are shown in million $. Market Capitalization ss defined as
shares outstanding after IPO * Offer Price and displayed in million USD. Cash and Equivalents,
Long Term Debt, R&D, Advertising Expenses, Non Cash Assets, Net Sales, Cost of Sales as well as
SGA are expressed in million USD. Cash and Equivalents before IPO if no dividends would have
been paid out are Cash and Equivalents plus dividends paid out prior to the IPO. Non-Cash Assets are
defined as all assets minus cash and equivalents. 
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Table 2: Sample descriptive, normalized 
 
  
No Pre-IPO Dividend Payer Pre-IPO Dividend Payer
Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median
Total Assets 3110 497 61 1378 1263 107 60.7% 42.8%
Market Capitalisation 
normalized by Assets 2631 3.98 2.40 1151 2.41 1.45 -65.2% -65.7%
Cash and Equivalents 
before IPO normalized by 
Assets
2967 0.08 0.04 1341 0.05 0.02 -52.3% -65.8%
Cash and Equivalents 
before IPO if no dividends 
would have been paid out, 
normalized by Assets
2967 0.08 0.04 1341 0.15 0.09 45.5% 54.2%
Long Term Debt normalized 
by Assets 3104 0.10 0.01 1374 0.16 0.06 38.5% 81.4%
R&D normalized by Assets 3090 0.08 0.03 1363 0.02 0.00 -290.7% #DIV/0!
Advertising Expenses 
normalized by Assets 919 0.06 0.02 363 0.06 0.02 4.9% 27.3%
Net Sales normalized by 
Assets 3092 0.78 0.57 1377 1.16 0.96 32.7% 40.8%
Cost of Sales normalized by 
Assets 3092 0.52 0.31 1377 0.79 0.59 33.9% 47.5%
SGA normalized by Assets 2630 0.35 0.28 1155 0.29 0.23 -19.8% -20.4%
Dilution 1191 0.04 0.00 449 0.06 0.00 42.3%
EPS 3090 -0.50 -0.03 1370 0.48 0.60 203.2% 104.2%
Ratio (Paying-Not-
Paying)/Not-Paying
All below variables are from the merged Compustat/CRSP database. Total Asstes are in million
USD. Market Capitalisation as defined as shares outstanding after IPO * Offer Price and then
normalized by Total Assets. Cash and Equivalents, Long Term Debt, R&D, Advertising Expenses,
Non Cash Assets, Net Sales, Cost of Sales as well as SGA are normalized by Total Assets in place.
Cash and Equivalents before IPO if no dividends would have been paid out are Cash and Equivalents
plus dividends in the three years prior to the IPO
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st,
1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms
included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and
offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares.
Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have been
excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a company is paying a cash
dividend three years prior up to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. 
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Table 3: Number of companies paying / non-paying dividends before undertaking an IPO 1990-2006 
 
  
1990 71 18 0.27 26 0.37 97
1991 180 55 0.31 71 0.39 251
1992 234 102 0.45 122 0.52 356
1993 318 126 0.41 155 0.49 473
1994 257 102 0.42 128 0.50 385
1995 276 102 0.36 128 0.46 404
1996 419 132 0.33 176 0.42 595
1997 267 108 0.40 153 0.57 420
1998 190 45 0.23 74 0.39 264
1999 335 53 0.15 76 0.23 411
2000 255 31 0.12 50 0.20 305
2001 52 10 0.19 17 0.33 69
2002 45 16 0.36 26 0.58 71
2003 43 19 0.45 23 0.53 66
2004 116 49 0.42 61 0.53 177
2005 97 52 0.51 68 0.70 165
2006 51 16 0.31 32 0.63 75
Total 3'206 1'036 1'386 4'584
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting
January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation
(SDC Platinum). Firms included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit
offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository
Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and offerings by financial
institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers
with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have
been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a company paying a cash dividend one year
repectively three years prior up to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. 
Total 
IPOS
Issue 
Year
Dividend 
payer in 
the year 
prior IPO
Ratio Dividend 
payer in the 3 
years priors 
IPO / Non-
Payer
No Pre-
IPO 
dividend 
payer
Dividend 
payer in 
the 3 
years 
priors IPO
Ratio Dividend 
payer in the 
year prior IPO/ 
Non-Payer
- 145 - 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of secondary and primary shares offered in an IPO in relation to whether a firm 
pays out cash dividends in the three years prior to its offering 
 
 
 
  
Market Value Primary 
Shares Normalized by 
Assets
Primary Shares as 
Percentage of Shares 
Offered
Market Value Secondary 
Shares Normalized by 
Assets
Secondary Shares as 
Percentage of Shares 
Offered
Ratio Market Value 
Primary Shares / 
Secondary Shares
N 3086 3172 3114 3201
mean 0.61 93 0.58 8
median 0.54 100 0.16 0 3.34
N 1269 1280 1329 1340
mean 0.45 90 0.39 14
median 0.39 100 0.12 0 3.21
N 4355 4452 4443 4541
mean 0.56 92 0.52 10
median 0.49 100 0.15 0 3.33
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the
Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual
funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers with no listed or
negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a company paying a cash dividend in the
three years prior up to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. The ratio measures the difference between dividend paying and not dividend paying firms,
based on dividend paying firms, in percent. Market Value Primary (Secondary) Shares Normalized by Assets is the ratio of number of primary shares
(secondary) shares offered valued at the offer price (both as recorded ba SDC) and divided by the total assets (data item 6 in Compustat).
No Prior Cash 
Dividend
Prior Cash 
Dividend
Total
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Table 5: Primary and secondary shares offered per dividend size portfolio normalized by assets in place 
 
 
  
Market Value Primary 
Shares Normalized by 
Assets
Primary Shares as 
Percentage of Shares 
Offered
Market Value Secondary 
Shares Normalized by 
Assets
Secondary Shares as 
Percentage of Shares 
Offered
Ratio Market Value 
Primary Shares / 
Secondary Shares
N 3086 3086 3114 3115
mean 0.61 92 0.58 8
median 0.54 100 0.16 0 3.34
N 322 322 333 333
mean 0.37 89 0.29 13
median 0.26 100 0.07 0 3.92
N 319 319 332 332
mean 0.44 91 0.40 12
median 0.37 100 0.11 0 3.34
N 322 322 331 331
mean 0.44 91 0.42 11
median 0.38 100 0.12 0 3.19
N 306 306 333 333
mean 0.55 87 0.44 19
median 0.51 100 0.20 0 2.59
N 4355 4355 4443 4444
mean 0.56 92 0.52 10
median 0.49 100 0.15 0 3.33
No Prior Cash 
Dividend
Highest Prior 
Cash Dividend 
Quartile
High Prior 
Cash Dividend 
Quartile
Low Prior Cash 
Dividend 
Quartile
Medium Prior 
Cash Dividend 
Quartile
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the
Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual
funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers with no listed or
negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC database have been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a company paying a cash dividend in the
three years prior up to the offering date, as reported in CRSP. The ratio measures the difference between dividend paying and not dividend paying firms,
based on dividend paying firms, in percent. We divide the amount of cash dividends paid out, normalized by the proceeds raised in the offering, into four
portfolios. Market Value Primary (Secondary) Shares Normalized by Assets is the ratio of number of primary shares (secondary) shares offered valued at
the offer price (both as recorded by SDC) and divided by the total assets (data item 6 in Compustat).
Total
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Table 6: The predictive power of dividend payments prior to the offering on the amount of primary and 
secondary shares offered in an IPO 
 
  
primary shares offered secondary shares offered
‐1620.502      20990.154** 
‐0.25 2.27
    ‐1.10e+04***      6329.009***
‐4.87 3.38
     1935.924***     ‐1283.478***
4.09 ‐3.32
Year Founded            ‐6394.892 ‐63.019
‐1.43 ‐0.02
% of Insider Ownership prior IPO
2592.33      ‐2714.225*  
1.52 ‐1.87
Proceeds of IPO     31824.430***      9793.871***
10.13 3.79
       ‐0.001**                  
‐2.32                 
     2.75e+05**      ‐1.70e+05*  
2.5 ‐1.84
Constant         ‐3.01E+08 ‐5.15E+07
                 ‐0.08 ‐1.59
R‐squared        0.817 0.464
N                2422 2844
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Financial variables are from the merged Compustat/CRSP database. Dividends paid up to 3 years
prior the IPO is the sum of the cash dividends paid by the company in the 3 years prior to going
public. Proceeds are defined as primary and secondary shares offered times the offer price.
Market Capitalization as defined as shares outstanding after IPO * Offer Price. Year founded is
the founding year of the company as reported by Jay Ritter on his webpage. % of Insider
Ownership prior IPO is the percentage of insider ownership as reported by SDC. Venture backed
is a dummy variable equaling one if the company was backed by a venture capitalist, and issue
year the year of the IPO as reported by SDC. We included two digit SIC codes to account for
industry effects as well as offer year dummies to account for year effects.
Robust OLS regression. The sample consists of companies undertaking an Initial Public Offering
(IPO) starting January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data
Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual
funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore we restrict equity
offerings to common class A shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either
Compustat or the SDC database have been excluded. 
yes yes
Market Capitalization 
Venture Backed
Industry Effects
Dividends paid up to 3 years prior 
the IPO
Cash and Short Term Assets 
before IPO
Total Assets    
Issue Year      
dependent variable: 
yes yes
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Table 7: Impact of Pre-IPO dividend paying companies on long-term performance 
 
  
                 6 month BHR 12 month BHR 36 month BHR 6 month BHR 12 month BHR 36 month BHR
0 0 0 0         ‐0.000*           ‐0.000*  
0.18 ‐1.6 ‐1.4 0.26 ‐1.83 ‐1.75
        ‐0.068***         ‐0.114*** 0.035        ‐0.066***         ‐0.109*** 0.049
‐3.6 ‐4.62 0.58 ‐3.47 ‐4.39 0.81
         0.073***          0.142***         0.303***         0.064***          0.129***          0.269***
5.05 8.09 5.99 4.44 7.32 5.3
0.016 0.048 0.061 0.014 0.048 0.059
0.58 1.42 0.75 0.52 1.43 0.73
0 0 0.002 0 0 0.002
‐0.33 0.51 1.39 ‐0.31 0.61 1.42
‐0.077 ‐0.085 ‐0.135 ‐0.059 ‐0.081 ‐0.08
‐1.14 ‐0.7 ‐0.62 ‐0.86 ‐0.67 ‐0.37
R‐squared        0.043 0.048 0.05 0.05 0.036 0.039
N                3567 3568 3571 3567 3568 3571
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Exhange Listed     
Firm Age
Log Firm Size
Benchmark: value weighted market portfolioBenchmark: matched site decile
Industry Effects
Robust OLS regression. The sample consists of companies undertaking an Initial Public Offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 1990 until
December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms included have to trade on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions. Furthermore
we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC
database have been excluded. 
Financial variables are from the merged Compustat/CRSP database. Dividends paid up to 3 years prior the IPO is the sum of the cash
dividends paid by the company prior to going public. The log of the firm size as defined as the log of the shares outstanding after IPO *
Offer Price. Log Market to Book ratio is the log of firm size divided by assets in place. Year founded is the founding year of the company as
reported by Jay Ritter on his webpage. Venture backed is a dummy variable equaling one if the company was backed by a venture capitalist,
and Issue year the year of the IPO as reported by SDC. We included two digit SIC codes to account for industry effects as well as offer year
dummies to account for year effects.
yes
yes
Dividends paid up to 3 
years prior the IPO
Venture Backed
Year Effects      
Log Market to Book Value
yes yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes yes
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Table 8: Impact of Cash before the IPO on the Valuation of the Company 
 
Dependant Variable: Tobins' Q
4.03
0.96
      ‐10.779*  
‐1.71
3.374
1.2
        0.575***
5.35
       20.616***
2.99
        9.287** 
2.11
‐2.53
‐1.07
        2.471*  
1.77
‐1.781
‐1.21
‐0.164
‐1.13
0.044
0.78
Constant         0.98
R‐squared        0.173
N                3937
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
yes
Sales
Cost of Sales 
Earnings per Share
Year Founded           
Robust OLS regression. The sample consists of companies undertaking an Initial Public Offering (IPO) starting
January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum).
Firms included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and
the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository
Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions.
Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers with no listed or negative book
value on either Compustat or the SDC database have been excluded. 
Financial variables are from the merged Compustat/CRSP database and are normalized by assets (data item
6) in place. (Squared) Cash and Short Term Assets before IPO is the (squared) amount of cash and short
term assets before going public. Dividends paid up to 3 years prior the IPO is the sum of the cash dividends
paid by the company in the 3 years prior to going public (data item 127 from Compustat). Market
Capitalization as defined as shares outstanding after IPO * Offer Price. RD is data item 46, Sales data item 12
and Cost of Sales data 41 from Compustat. Year founded is the founding year of the company as reported
by Jay Ritter on his webpage. Venture backed is a dummy variable equaling one if the company was backed
by a venture capitalist, and issue year the year of the IPO as reported by SDC. We included two digit SIC
codes to account for industry effects, dummy variables for the exchange at which the company is listed as
well as offer year dummies to account for year effects.
Year Effects      
Industry Effects
yes
yes
yes
Dividends paid up to 3 years prior the IPO
Cash and Short Term Assets before IPO
Squared Cash and Short Term Assets 
before IPO 
Market Capitalisation
Exhange Listed     
issue Year      
Long Term Debt
RD
Non‐Cash Asset
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10. Appendix 
Tax Rate Changes in the U.S. 
Shareholder capital gains taxes arise through trades on the secondary market, liquidating 
distributions and share repurchases. The amount is calculated by subtracting the value of the sell 
and the investor’s tax base. The Tax Reform Act in 1986 equalized the capital gains tax and 
ordinary tax rates with a maximum rate of 28 percent. In 1997 the U.S. government passed the 
Taxpayer Relief Act which reduced the capital gains tax furthermore to 20 percent (Lang and 
Shackelford (2000). The tax act of 2003 furthermore reduced the capital gains tax. After 2003, the 
maximal capital gains tax equaled the dividend tax at maximal 15 percent.  The Jobs and Growth 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 provided a significant change of tax levels of dividend. After 
the tax act 2003, taxpayers in the bottom two income tax brackets, with a marginal tax rate of 10 or 
15 percent, face a 5 percent dividend tax. Taxpayers with marginal tax rates of 25, 28, 33 or 35 
percent, which thus belong to the upper four tax brackets, face a reduced dividend tax rate of 15 
percent7 (Chetty and Saez (2005)). 
 
Long Term Performance Calculation 
We calculate the three year abnormal buy and hold returns (BHRs) based on monthly returns 
as reported by the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). The returns are calculated as 
follows:  
r(t) = [(p(t)f(t)+d(t))/p(t')]-1  
For time t (a holding period), let:  
t’ = time of last available price < t  
r(t) = return on purchase at t’, sale at t  
                                                 
7 Taxpayers participating in the Alternative Minimum Tax schedule with a 28 percent percent flat rate benefit as well 
from the 15 percent dividend tax. 
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p(t) = last sale price or closing bid/ask average at time t  
d(t) = cash adjustment for t  
f(t) = price adjustment factor for t  
p(t’) = last sale price or closing bid/ask average at time of last available price < t.  
 
For our long term performance calculation we use BHRs instead of cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAARs) as Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest. 
 
The Abnormal Returns are calculated as follows 
)( τττ iii RERAR −=  
with τiR   = Buy and Hold Return (BHR) of firm i for period τ (one or three years or till 
the company is delisted)  
 )( τiRE  = Expected (=reference) BHR of firm i for period τ (one or three years)  
BHR is hereby defined by the following formula 
 
)()(
)(p-(T)p BHR
1
ii∑
= −=
n
i IndexIndex tpTp
t
 
with pi = price of stock i 
        t   = month after Issue 
       T  = end of time period (one / three years) or delisting date of the issuing firm 
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Additional Tables 
Table 9: Distribution of the amount of cash dividends paid out normalized by proceeds raised in the IPO for our 
whole sample 
 
  
Percentile of whole sample
Cash dividends paid out before IPO in 
% of proceeds raised from primary 
shares
1 0.0%
… …
25 0.0%
50 0.0%
75 0.1%
90 20.8%
95 45.2%
99 116.10%
mean 0.78%
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public
offering (IPO) starting January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006
as listed by the Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms
included have to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We
excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed end mutual
funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions.
Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares.
Issuers with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat
or the SDC database have been excluded. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer
is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a company is paying a cash
dividend two years prior up to the offering date, as reported in
CRSP. 
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Table 10: Distribution of amount of cash dividends paid out in relation to proceeds raised (subsample of 
dividend paying companies) 
Percentile of cash dividend paying 
companies
Cash dividends paid out before IPO in 
% of proceeds raised
1 0.0%
5 0.2%
10 0.5%
25 1.9%
50 0.0%
75 29.9%
90 59.9%
95 78.4%
99 117.2%
mean 20.50%
The sample consists of companies undertaking an initial public offering
(IPO) starting January 1st, 1990 until December 31st, 2006 as listed by the
Security Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). Firms included have to trade on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) and the NASDAQ. We excluded unit offers as well as Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITS), American Depository Receipts (ADR), closed
end mutual funds, utility companies and offerings by financial institutions.
Furthermore we restrict equity offerings to common class A shares. Issuers
with no listed or negative book value on either Compustat or the SDC
database have been excluded. The amount of procceds is obtained from
SDC. Pre-IPO Dividend Payer is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a company
is paying a cash dividend two years prior up to the offering date, as reported
in CRSP. 
